updated skills

plugins/document-navigator/docs/api-stack/api/api-audit-stdout/README.md

@@ -76,4 +76,3 @@ queue wait exceeds the bound the record is dropped, the
 `api.audit.dropped_total{sink,reason}` counter increments, and
 (subject to a once-per-`warnThrottleMs` throttle) a single warning is
 logged. Drops are NEVER silent.
-

plugins/document-navigator/docs/api-stack/api/api-audit-stdout/src/hmac/hmac.md

@@ -7,7 +7,7 @@ _(no submodules)_
 ## Purpose
 
 This module produces the HMAC-SHA-256 tag attached to every audit
-line. Signing operates on a *canonical* byte representation of the
+line. Signing operates on a _canonical_ byte representation of the
 record (keys serialised in a fixed order, `cause` omitted when
 absent) so the same logical record always produces the same MAC under
 the same key, regardless of how the source object was constructed.

plugins/document-navigator/docs/api-stack/api/api-audit-stdout/src/schema/schema.md

@@ -11,7 +11,7 @@ writes. The shape is exactly what design doc §12.5 specifies for the
 admin / audit pipeline: `ts`, `type`, `principal`, `tenant`,
 `request_id`, `trace_id`, `subject`, `outcome`, and a conditional
 `cause`. Every write goes through `parseAuditRecord(...)` so a
-malformed record raises `AUDIT_STDOUT.INVALID_RECORD` *before* a line
+malformed record raises `AUDIT_STDOUT.INVALID_RECORD` _before_ a line
 is written — log pipelines downstream never see a half-finished
 record.
 

plugins/document-navigator/docs/api-stack/api/api-audit-stdout/src/sink/sink.md

@@ -32,7 +32,7 @@ rejected synchronously without consuming the slot.
 - Boundary Zod validation — `AUDIT_STDOUT.INVALID_RECORD` on a bad
   record.
 - Bounded queue — `AUDIT_STDOUT.QUEUE_FULL` on timeout, drop counter
-  + throttled warning.
+  - throttled warning.
 - HMAC-SHA-256 over canonical bytes appended as `_hmac` field.
 - `dispose()` drains the in-flight write and rejects subsequent
   writes as `closed` drops.