Move docs/ package mirror into document-navigator plugin

Relocate the ~6k-file docs tree from the repo root into
plugins/document-navigator/docs/ so the plugin is self-contained and
portable. docs/superpowers/ (specs and plans) stays at the repo root.

Moved via cp+rm rather than git mv because directory rename() fails with
EPERM on this WSL /mnt DrvFs mount; git rename-detection pairs the
identical-content files at commit time.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

plugins/document-navigator/docs/api-stack/api/api-sandbox-vm/src/error-codes/error-codes.md

@@ -0,0 +1,92 @@
+# Error codes
+
+<!-- begin:auto-docs -->
+_(no submodules)_
+<!-- end:auto-docs -->
+
+## Purpose
+
+This module owns the stable `SAND_VM.*` error-code registry used by every
+public failure path inside the `@suaveplan/api-sandbox-vm` package. The
+registry is built once via `defineCodes("SAND_VM", […])` so the
+namespace prefix and per-code suffix are co-derived — that guarantee
+lets the host's lifecycle driver, the audit sink, and the conformance
+harness branch on literal code strings without ever decoding free-form
+error messages.
+
+Side-effect-importing this module from `src/index.ts` ensures every
+consumer that imports the package barrel (or any subpath export)
+participates in the same code registration, which is what
+`scripts/conformance.ts` validates.
+
+## Features
+
+- Five stable codes (`EVAL_REJECTED`, `INDIRECT_EVAL_REJECTED`,
+  `MODULE_IMPORT_FORBIDDEN`, `SOURCE_TEXT_MODULE_FAILED`,
+  `PERMISSION_DENIED`) — every failure surface in the package maps to
+  exactly one.
+- A typed `SandboxVmError` subclass of `SuaveplanError` so consumers
+  may discriminate via `instanceof` or by `code` string.
+- Wire-stable `code` string: the namespaced form (e.g.
+  `"SAND_VM.EVAL_REJECTED"`) is the value used in OTel attributes,
+  audit logs, and IPC envelopes back to the host.
+
+## Usage: Basic
+
+```ts
+import {
+    SAND_VM_CODES,
+    SandboxVmError,
+} from "@suaveplan/api-sandbox-vm/error-codes/error-codes";
+
+throw new SandboxVmError(
+    SAND_VM_CODES.EVAL_REJECTED,
+    "dynamic code evaluation is disabled in the vm sandbox"
+);
+```
+
+## Usage: Advanced
+
+Use the `context` option to attach a redaction-safe payload that flows
+through to OTel span attributes and the lifecycle driver's crash
+report:
+
+```ts
+import {
+    SAND_VM_CODES,
+    SandboxVmError,
+} from "@suaveplan/api-sandbox-vm/error-codes/error-codes";
+
+function denyOutboundFetch(host: string, reason: string): never {
+    throw new SandboxVmError(
+        SAND_VM_CODES.PERMISSION_DENIED,
+        `outbound HTTP to ${host} denied by policy`,
+        {
+            context: { capability: "fetch", host, reason },
+        }
+    );
+}
+```
+
+## API Reference
+
+- `SAND_VM_CODES` — frozen record mapping enum key (e.g.
+  `EVAL_REJECTED`) to the namespaced string code
+  (`"SAND_VM.EVAL_REJECTED"`).
+- `type SandboxVmCode` — the literal union of every value in
+  `SAND_VM_CODES`.
+- `class SandboxVmError extends SuaveplanError<SandboxVmCode>` —
+  constructor takes `(code, message, options?)`. `options.context` is
+  forwarded through the base class redaction pipeline.
+
+## Implementation Notes
+
+The registry is declared `as const` so the compiler retains literal
+types (essential for exhaustive `switch` narrowing in consumers). The
+class sets `this.name = "SandboxVmError"` so heap snapshots, sourcemaps
+and uncaught-exception handlers attribute failures to this package
+rather than the generic `SuaveplanError` super-class. Registry
+ordering reflects severity in roughly increasing order — the first two
+entries reflect deliberate plugin policy violations, the next two
+reflect host-environment misconfiguration, and the last reflects
+permission-policy denials that fan in from `api-sandbox-permissions`.

plugins/document-navigator/docs/api-stack/api/api-sandbox-vm/src/globals/frozen-globals/frozen-globals.md

@@ -0,0 +1,95 @@
+# Frozen globals
+
+<!-- begin:auto-docs -->
+_(no submodules)_
+<!-- end:auto-docs -->
+
+## Purpose
+
+This module assembles the curated global allowlist visible inside the
+`vm.Context` sandbox. Every binding installed here is intentional —
+the design philosophy is fail-closed: anything not in the bundle is
+absent, so sandboxed code raises `ReferenceError` when it reaches for
+an unanticipated global. The narrow surface keeps the auditable
+attack surface of the sandboxed tier tiny and makes the security
+review a one-page exercise rather than a tour of Node's runtime.
+
+The allowlist is mandated by the design doc §2.2 and `api-sandbox-vm`
+spec ADDED requirement "Sandbox boots inside a frozen `vm.Context`".
+It MUST stay synchronised with that spec; adding or removing an entry
+requires an OpenSpec change.
+
+## Features
+
+- Five spec-mandated globals (`URL`, `URLSearchParams`, `TextEncoder`,
+  `TextDecoder`, `structuredClone`) installed by reference so they
+  share an identity with the host's intrinsics.
+- A logger-routed `console` whose five methods (`log`, `info`, `warn`,
+  `error`, `debug`) forward through the host's `LoggerLike` instance.
+  No raw stdio handle is exposed to sandboxed code.
+- A trimmed `crypto` surface that exposes only `getRandomValues` and
+  `randomUUID`. The full `SubtleCrypto` API is intentionally withheld
+  because most sandboxed plugins should request the `crypto`
+  capability rather than reach for the ambient global.
+- `FROZEN_GLOBAL_KEYS` — the literal key set, exposed so the
+  conformance suite asserts the surface is exactly what the spec
+  mandates and nothing accidentally leaked.
+
+## Usage: Basic
+
+```ts
+import { buildFrozenGlobals } from "@suaveplan/api-sandbox-vm/globals/frozen-globals/frozen-globals";
+
+const bundle = buildFrozenGlobals({
+    logger: console as never, // any LoggerLike
+});
+bundle.console.info("hello from inside the sandbox");
+bundle.crypto.randomUUID();
+```
+
+## Usage: Advanced
+
+Combine with a custom logger that tags every entry with the plugin id:
+
+```ts
+import { buildFrozenGlobals } from "@suaveplan/api-sandbox-vm/globals/frozen-globals/frozen-globals";
+import type { LoggerLike } from "@suaveplan/types";
+
+function pluginLogger(base: LoggerLike, pluginId: string): LoggerLike {
+    return {
+        debug: (m, ctx) => base.debug(m, { ...ctx, pluginId }),
+        info: (m, ctx) => base.info(m, { ...ctx, pluginId }),
+        warn: (m, ctx) => base.warn(m, { ...ctx, pluginId }),
+        error: (m, ctx) => base.error(m, { ...ctx, pluginId }),
+    };
+}
+
+const bundle = buildFrozenGlobals({
+    logger: pluginLogger(realLogger, "demo-plugin"),
+});
+```
+
+## API Reference
+
+- `buildFrozenGlobals(options): FrozenGlobalsBundle` — produce the
+  frozen allowlist for one sandbox instance.
+- `interface FrozenGlobalsBundle` — typed bundle with `URL`,
+  `URLSearchParams`, `TextEncoder`, `TextDecoder`, `structuredClone`,
+  `console`, `crypto`.
+- `interface SandboxConsole` — the five-method console surface.
+- `interface SandboxCrypto` — the two-method RNG surface.
+- `FROZEN_GLOBAL_KEYS` — the canonical key list (used by tests).
+
+## Implementation Notes
+
+The five spec-mandated globals are exported by reference rather than
+by clone. This is safe because `vm.Context.runInContext` does not let
+the sandbox mutate the prototype of an intrinsic on the host side
+(modifications inside the sandbox apply to the sandbox's own
+intrinsics chain). The `crypto.getRandomValues` shim is a thin pass
+through `node:crypto.webcrypto.getRandomValues` so the sandbox sees
+the same RNG quality as the host — handcrafting a polyfill would be
+strictly worse than delegating. The `randomUUID` shim delegates
+identically so its v4 properties are preserved. The two intrinsics
+are themselves wrapped in a frozen object so the sandbox cannot
+overwrite `crypto.randomUUID` and observe a different RNG.

plugins/document-navigator/docs/api-stack/api/api-sandbox-vm/src/otel/instruments.md

@@ -0,0 +1,96 @@
+# OTel instruments
+
+<!-- begin:auto-docs -->
+_(no submodules)_
+<!-- end:auto-docs -->
+
+## Purpose
+
+This module owns the OpenTelemetry instrument bundle emitted by the
+`vm.Context` sandbox host. Instruments are bound lazily against the
+current global `MeterProvider` so packages downstream may install a
+real exporter (Prometheus, OTLP, in-memory test reader) and observe
+the bundle without restarting the process. The bundle is cached after
+first build so the hot proxy path never reaches the meter registry
+twice.
+
+## Features
+
+- Four named instruments: a boot histogram, two refusal counters
+  (`eval_rejected_total`, `module_import_rejected_total`), and the
+  shared `plugin.permission_denied_total` counter whose name matches
+  `api-sandbox-permissions` so dashboards aggregate cleanly.
+- Lazy binding via `getSandboxVmInstruments()` so tests may install a
+  fresh `MeterProvider` and then call `resetSandboxVmInstruments()` to
+  drop the cache.
+- All metric names are namespaced under `sandbox_vm.*` (except the
+  cross-package denial counter), making them easy to filter at the
+  collector.
+
+## Usage: Basic
+
+```ts
+import { getSandboxVmInstruments } from "@suaveplan/api-sandbox-vm/otel/instruments";
+
+const instruments = getSandboxVmInstruments();
+instruments.evalRejectedTotal.add(1, { kind: "direct" });
+```
+
+## Usage: Advanced
+
+Install a real in-memory provider for assertions:
+
+```ts
+import {
+    AggregationTemporality,
+    InMemoryMetricExporter,
+    MeterProvider,
+    PeriodicExportingMetricReader,
+} from "@opentelemetry/sdk-metrics";
+import { metrics } from "@opentelemetry/api";
+import {
+    getSandboxVmInstruments,
+    resetSandboxVmInstruments,
+} from "@suaveplan/api-sandbox-vm/otel/instruments";
+
+const exporter = new InMemoryMetricExporter(AggregationTemporality.DELTA);
+const reader = new PeriodicExportingMetricReader({
+    exporter,
+    exportIntervalMillis: 1_000,
+});
+const provider = new MeterProvider({ readers: [reader] });
+metrics.setGlobalMeterProvider(provider);
+resetSandboxVmInstruments();
+
+const instruments = getSandboxVmInstruments();
+instruments.permissionDeniedTotal.add(1, {
+    plugin: "demo",
+    capability: "fetch",
+});
+await reader.forceFlush();
+const collected = exporter.getMetrics();
+```
+
+## API Reference
+
+- `getSandboxVmInstruments(): SandboxVmInstruments` — return the
+  lazily-built instrument bundle. Calling multiple times returns the
+  same frozen reference until `resetSandboxVmInstruments()` is invoked.
+- `resetSandboxVmInstruments(): void` — drop the cache; the next
+  `getSandboxVmInstruments()` call re-binds against the (possibly new)
+  global `MeterProvider`.
+- `interface SandboxVmInstruments` — fully-typed instrument bundle.
+
+## Implementation Notes
+
+The module never reads any environment variable at import time and
+never side-effects the global `MeterProvider`. Caching uses a
+module-private `let` rather than a `WeakMap` because the lifecycle of
+the bundle is naturally process-scoped (there is no second
+`MeterProvider` instance to dispatch to unless the consumer resets the
+cache deliberately). The `permission_denied_total` counter
+intentionally uses the same name as the one in
+`api-sandbox-permissions`; both packages contribute to the same OTLP
+series so the consumer sees one denial total regardless of whether the
+decision was made in this package's default checker or in the richer
+implementation.

plugins/document-navigator/docs/api-stack/api/api-sandbox-vm/src/permissions/checker.md

@@ -0,0 +1,106 @@
+# Permission checker (in-package default)
+
+<!-- begin:auto-docs -->
+_(no submodules)_
+<!-- end:auto-docs -->
+
+## Purpose
+
+`createPermissionChecker` compiles a `PermissionsManifest`
+(from `@suaveplan/api-types`) into a structural `PermissionChecker` that
+the `vm.Context` sandbox host consults before forwarding any
+filesystem, outbound-HTTP, or capability call to the host. The default
+implementation lives here so the package ships functionally complete
+even before the full `@suaveplan/api-sandbox-permissions` package
+arrives .
+
+This module exists to make policy enforcement a first-class operation
+of the sandbox host without depending on a heavier policy engine.
+Callers that need budget tracking or per-capability payload gating
+construct a stricter checker and inject it through
+`createVmSandbox({ checker })`.
+
+## Features
+
+- Glob-compiled allowlists for `permissions.fs[]` (path globs with
+  `*`, `**`, `?`) and `permissions.fetch[]` (exact host or `*.suffix`
+  pattern).
+- Path normalisation rejects `..`-traversal before matching so
+  `"/srv/data/../../etc/passwd"` is matched as `"/etc/passwd"`, not
+  fooled into `"/srv/data/passwd"`.
+- Returns frozen `PermissionDecision` objects so the proxy hot path
+  never accidentally mutates the policy answer.
+- All decisions are synchronous; the policy answer never performs IO.
+
+## Usage: Basic
+
+```ts
+import { createPermissionChecker } from "@suaveplan/api-sandbox-vm/permissions/checker";
+
+const checker = createPermissionChecker({
+    policy: {
+        fs: ["/srv/data/**"],
+        fetch: ["api.example.com", "*.cdn.example.com"],
+    },
+});
+
+checker.checkFs("/srv/data/users.json", "read").allow; // true
+checker.checkFetch("https://api.example.com/v1/users").allow; // true
+checker.checkFetch("https://evil.example.org/leak").allow; // false
+```
+
+## Usage: Advanced
+
+Compose with a host-supplied audit sink so every denial is observable:
+
+```ts
+import { createPermissionChecker } from "@suaveplan/api-sandbox-vm/permissions/checker";
+import type { PermissionChecker } from "@suaveplan/api-sandbox-vm/permissions/checker";
+
+function withAudit(
+    inner: PermissionChecker,
+    audit: (capability: string, reason: string) => void
+): PermissionChecker {
+    return {
+        checkFs(path, mode) {
+            const d = inner.checkFs(path, mode);
+            if (!d.allow) audit(`fs.${mode}`, d.reason);
+            return d;
+        },
+        checkFetch(url) {
+            const d = inner.checkFetch(url);
+            if (!d.allow) audit("fetch", d.reason);
+            return d;
+        },
+        checkCapability(id, payload) {
+            const d = inner.checkCapability(id, payload);
+            if (!d.allow) audit(id, d.reason);
+            return d;
+        },
+    };
+}
+```
+
+## API Reference
+
+- `createPermissionChecker(options)` — build a checker from a
+  `PermissionsManifest`. `options.policy` is the manifest block exactly
+  as declared in `plugin.json`.
+- `PermissionChecker` — structural type with synchronous `checkFs`,
+  `checkFetch`, `checkCapability` methods.
+- `PermissionDecision` — discriminated union of `{ allow: true }` or
+  `{ allow: false; reason: string }`.
+
+## Implementation Notes
+
+The glob compiler escapes regex meta-characters first, then performs
+the `**` → `.*`, `*` → `[^/]*`, `?` → `[^/]` substitution in three
+passes via a sentinel token to keep the ordering safe (replacing `**`
+to `.*` before `*` to `[^/]*` would otherwise mis-translate `**`).
+Host patterns use a string-suffix match rather than a regex to keep
+the hot path branch-predictable. The `checkCapability` default is
+permissive precisely because the full payload-shape contract is owned
+by `api-sandbox-permissions`; hosts SHOULD compose a stricter checker
+once that package ships. The in-package fallback still rejects an
+empty capability id so that an obviously-malformed call fails closed
+rather than silently succeeding.

plugins/document-navigator/docs/api-stack/api/api-sandbox-vm/src/proxies/fetch-proxy/fetch-proxy.md

@@ -0,0 +1,98 @@
+# fetch proxy
+
+<!-- begin:auto-docs -->
+_(no submodules)_
+<!-- end:auto-docs -->
+
+## Purpose
+
+`installFetchProxy` returns the outbound-HTTP surface visible inside
+the sandbox. Every request gates through the supplied
+`PermissionChecker` before reaching the host adapter, and denied calls
+never touch the network — they raise `SAND_VM.PERMISSION_DENIED` and
+increment `plugin.permission_denied_total{capability="fetch"}` without
+opening a socket, performing a DNS lookup, or hitting the host's
+connection pool.
+
+The proxy intentionally exposes only a `request` method with a narrow
+shape (`url`, optional `init`) so the sandboxed plugin cannot reach
+ambient Node primitives like the connection pool, the DNS resolver,
+the timeout default, or the raw streaming body. Anything richer is
+the responsibility of an explicit capability (and arrives through
+`installCapabilityProxies`).
+
+## Features
+
+- Synchronous permission check; the host adapter call is deferred
+  until allowance is confirmed.
+- Closure-bound adapter — the sandbox cannot pry it back out of the
+  proxy receiver.
+- Denial path records the `plugin` and `capability` attributes on the
+  shared `plugin.permission_denied_total` counter so dashboards see a
+  uniform denial-rate series across permission implementations.
+- `URL`-parsed host match — the proxy receives the URL as a string and
+  the checker normalises it through `new URL(...).hostname`; an
+  unparseable URL is rejected by the checker before reaching the host.
+
+## Usage: Basic
+
+```ts
+import { installFetchProxy } from "@suaveplan/api-sandbox-vm/proxies/fetch-proxy/fetch-proxy";
+import { createPermissionChecker } from "@suaveplan/api-sandbox-vm/permissions/checker";
+
+const checker = createPermissionChecker({
+    policy: { fetch: ["api.example.com"] },
+});
+const fetch = installFetchProxy({
+    checker,
+    pluginId: "demo",
+    adapter: { request: async (url) => realRequest(url) },
+});
+
+const res = await fetch.request("https://api.example.com/v1/users");
+```
+
+## Usage: Advanced
+
+Wrap the adapter to enforce a per-tenant header before reaching the
+upstream:
+
+```ts
+import { installFetchProxy } from "@suaveplan/api-sandbox-vm/proxies/fetch-proxy/fetch-proxy";
+
+const adapter = {
+    request: async (
+        url: string,
+        init?: { readonly method?: string; readonly body?: string }
+    ) => {
+        const merged = {
+            ...init,
+            method: init?.method ?? "GET",
+        };
+        return realRequest(url, {
+            ...merged,
+            // host-side adapter is free to attach additional headers
+            // that the sandbox cannot see or override.
+        });
+    },
+};
+const fetch = installFetchProxy({ checker, adapter, pluginId: "demo" });
+```
+
+## API Reference
+
+- `installFetchProxy(options): FetchProxy` — build the proxy.
+- `interface FetchProxy` — frozen receiver with `request(url, init?)`.
+- `interface FetchHostAdapter` — the host-supplied counterpart that
+  performs the actual outbound HTTP request.
+
+## Implementation Notes
+
+The proxy emits the denial metric with a fixed two-attribute label set
+(`plugin`, `capability`) so cardinality stays bounded. The
+`reason` from the checker decision is folded into the error
+`context` rather than into the metric attribute set so the metric
+remains aggregatable. Adapter-side errors (network timeouts, host
+unreachable, TLS failures) bubble up through the proxy unchanged; the
+proxy only owns the policy boundary, not the transport-level error
+mapping.

plugins/document-navigator/docs/api-stack/api/api-sandbox-vm/src/proxies/fs-proxy/fs-proxy.md

@@ -0,0 +1,100 @@
+# fs proxy
+
+<!-- begin:auto-docs -->
+_(no submodules)_
+<!-- end:auto-docs -->
+
+## Purpose
+
+`installFsProxy` returns the sandbox-side filesystem surface that
+plugins consume. Every method gates the call through the supplied
+`PermissionChecker` before delegating to the opaque host adapter, so a
+denied call never reaches the host's `fs/promises` layer. The proxy is
+closure-bound: the adapter reference is reachable only through the
+returned methods, so the sandbox cannot retrieve the adapter from the
+proxy receiver and bypass the permission gate.
+
+This module owns the sandbox-side half of the `fs` capability surface;
+the adapter on the other side of the closure is supplied by `api-host`
+and performs the real `node:fs/promises` calls after the policy decision
+has been confirmed.
+
+## Features
+
+- Permission-checked `readFile` and `writeFile` with policy decisions
+  computed synchronously and the host call deferred until allowance is
+  confirmed.
+- Denials raise `SAND_VM.PERMISSION_DENIED` immediately
+  (`Promise.reject`) and increment the
+  `plugin.permission_denied_total` counter with
+  `{ plugin, capability: "fs", mode }` attributes — identical labels
+  to the metric emitted by `api-sandbox-permissions` so the host's
+  dashboard aggregates across implementations.
+- Frozen receiver: the returned object is `Object.freeze`d and the
+  adapter reference is not exposed.
+
+## Usage: Basic
+
+```ts
+import { installFsProxy } from "@suaveplan/api-sandbox-vm/proxies/fs-proxy/fs-proxy";
+import { createPermissionChecker } from "@suaveplan/api-sandbox-vm/permissions/checker";
+
+const checker = createPermissionChecker({
+    policy: { fs: ["/srv/data/**"] },
+});
+const fs = installFsProxy({
+    checker,
+    pluginId: "demo",
+    adapter: {
+        readFile: (p) => realReadFile(p),
+        writeFile: (p, d) => realWriteFile(p, d),
+    },
+});
+
+await fs.readFile("/srv/data/users.json");
+```
+
+## Usage: Advanced
+
+Wrap the adapter to record host-side latency without polluting the
+proxy contract:
+
+```ts
+import { installFsProxy } from "@suaveplan/api-sandbox-vm/proxies/fs-proxy/fs-proxy";
+import { hrtime } from "node:process";
+
+const adapter = {
+    readFile: async (p: string) => {
+        const start = hrtime.bigint();
+        try {
+            return await realReadFile(p);
+        } finally {
+            const elapsed = Number(hrtime.bigint() - start) / 1e6;
+            telemetry.recordFsLatency("read", elapsed);
+        }
+    },
+    writeFile: (p, d) => realWriteFile(p, d),
+};
+const fs = installFsProxy({ checker, adapter, pluginId: "demo" });
+```
+
+## API Reference
+
+- `installFsProxy(options): FsProxy` — build the proxy.
+  `options.checker`, `options.adapter`, `options.pluginId` are all
+  required.
+- `interface FsProxy` — frozen receiver with `readFile`, `writeFile`.
+- `interface FsHostAdapter` — the host-supplied counterpart that
+  actually performs the IO.
+
+## Implementation Notes
+
+The proxy is the only place where sandbox-side `fs` calls cross the
+permission boundary. The adapter MUST never be exposed back to the
+sandbox; the closure-binding guarantees that property at the language
+level. Denials are accounted for with the same metric name as the
+sister `api-sandbox-permissions` package emits, so dashboards see one
+denial-rate series rather than two. The `mode` attribute on the
+counter is `"read"` or `"write"` — keeping it on the metric (rather
+than in a separate counter) means cardinality remains bounded to two
+values regardless of the path being requested.

plugins/document-navigator/docs/api-stack/api/api-sandbox-vm/src/proxies/install-capability-proxies/install-capability-proxies.md

@@ -0,0 +1,99 @@
+# Install capability proxies
+
+<!-- begin:auto-docs -->
+_(no submodules)_
+<!-- end:auto-docs -->
+
+## Purpose
+
+`installCapabilityProxies` wires the host-supplied capability bags
+into the sandbox's `vm.Context`. The sandbox sees one consolidated
+`__suaveplan` global containing `fs`, `fetch`, and a `capabilities`
+map; every method on the map is wrapped so the permission checker is
+consulted before the host adapter is reached. The receiver and every
+nested bag are frozen so a sandboxed plugin cannot replace a
+permission-gated method with an open one.
+
+This module is the single source of truth for how capabilities cross
+the sandbox-host boundary — both the fs/fetch proxies and the wider
+capability surface enter through this entry point so the permission
+gate is applied uniformly.
+
+## Features
+
+- One `__suaveplan` global with `fs`, `fetch`, `capabilities` —
+  installed as non-writable, non-configurable, enumerable so the
+  sandbox can read it but never replace it.
+- Permission gating on every capability method: the checker decides
+  before the host adapter is called.
+- Denials emit `plugin.permission_denied_total{plugin, capability}`
+  with stable label cardinality (no per-method label).
+- Frozen receivers prevent monkey-patching from inside the sandbox.
+
+## Usage: Basic
+
+```ts
+import { installCapabilityProxies } from "@suaveplan/api-sandbox-vm/proxies/install-capability-proxies/install-capability-proxies";
+import { createContext } from "node:vm";
+
+const context = createContext({});
+installCapabilityProxies({
+    context,
+    checker,
+    fs,
+    fetch,
+    pluginId: "demo",
+    capabilities: {
+        db: {
+            query: async (sql: unknown) => realQuery(String(sql)),
+        },
+    },
+});
+```
+
+## Usage: Advanced
+
+Compose with a host-side audit sink so every denial is reproducible:
+
+```ts
+import { installCapabilityProxies } from "@suaveplan/api-sandbox-vm/proxies/install-capability-proxies/install-capability-proxies";
+
+const wrapAudit = (checker: PermissionChecker, audit: AuditSink) => ({
+    ...checker,
+    checkCapability(id: string, p: Record<string, unknown>) {
+        const d = checker.checkCapability(id, p);
+        if (!d.allow) audit.record({ capability: id, reason: d.reason });
+        return d;
+    },
+});
+
+installCapabilityProxies({
+    context,
+    checker: wrapAudit(checker, audit),
+    fs,
+    fetch,
+    capabilities,
+    pluginId: "demo",
+});
+```
+
+## API Reference
+
+- `installCapabilityProxies(options)` — wire the proxy surface into
+  `options.context`. Returns nothing; side-effects the context.
+- `interface InstallCapabilityProxiesOptions` — `context`, `checker`,
+  `capabilities`, `fs`, `fetch`, `pluginId`.
+- `type CapabilityMap` — frozen record of capability id → method bag.
+- `type CapabilityBag` — frozen record of method name → async fn.
+
+## Implementation Notes
+
+The receiver is installed via `Object.defineProperty` with
+`writable: false, configurable: false` so the sandbox cannot replace
+or delete `__suaveplan`. Each method wrapper closes over the host
+function reference; the closure is the only path to the host call, so
+patching the wrapper from inside the sandbox would not bypass the
+permission gate (it would only break the path that exists). The
+`method` argument is not added to the OTel attribute set so
+cardinality stays bounded; method-level granularity belongs in logs,
+not metrics.

plugins/document-navigator/docs/api-stack/api/api-sandbox-vm/src/sandbox/sandbox.md

@@ -0,0 +1,127 @@
+# vm.Context sandbox
+
+<!-- begin:auto-docs -->
+_(no submodules)_
+<!-- end:auto-docs -->
+
+## Purpose
+
+`createVmSandbox` is the keystone entry point of the package. It
+materialises a `vm.Context` whose `globalThis` is sealed and frozen,
+exposes only the curated `FrozenGlobals` allowlist, traps every
+dynamic-code constructor, wires the host-installed permission-gated
+fs/fetch/capability proxies into a single `__suaveplan` global, and
+returns a `VmSandboxHandle` driving the sandboxed plugin lifecycle.
+
+The handle is intentionally minimal: one `start()` to evaluate the
+plugin module (via `vm.SourceTextModule` with a refuse-everything
+linker), one `dispose()` to release the context. Both are idempotent
+under their normal usage; `dispose()` in particular is explicitly safe
+to call multiple times so the outer lifecycle driver may reach the
+same terminal state from any failure path without branching.
+
+## Features
+
+- Curated allowlist (`URL`, `URLSearchParams`, `TextEncoder`,
+  `TextDecoder`, `structuredClone`, logger-routed `console`, trimmed
+  `crypto`) installed via `Object.defineProperty` so the surface is
+  exactly what the spec mandates.
+- `codeGeneration: { strings: false, wasm: false }` plus explicit
+  `eval`/`Function` traps so direct and indirect dynamic code
+  execution both fail loudly with `SAND_VM.EVAL_REJECTED` /
+  `SAND_VM.INDIRECT_EVAL_REJECTED`.
+- `globalThis` (and its prototype) frozen post-install so the
+  sandboxed plugin cannot extend the global object.
+- `vm.SourceTextModule` linker refuses every specifier, surfacing
+  `SAND_VM.MODULE_IMPORT_FORBIDDEN` — node built-ins, bare modules,
+  parent traversal are all rejected.
+- `__suaveplan` global installed as non-writable, non-configurable so
+  the sandbox cannot replace the receiver.
+- Boot wall-time recorded on `sandbox_vm.boot_duration_ms`.
+- Idempotent `dispose()` — second call is a no-op.
+
+## Usage: Basic
+
+```ts
+import { createVmSandbox } from "@suaveplan/api-sandbox-vm/sandbox/sandbox";
+import { createPermissionChecker } from "@suaveplan/api-sandbox-vm/permissions/checker";
+
+const checker = createPermissionChecker({
+    policy: { fs: ["/srv/data/**"], fetch: ["api.example.com"] },
+});
+const handle = createVmSandbox({
+    pluginId: "demo",
+    logger: console as never,
+    checker,
+    pluginModule: {
+        kind: "source",
+        identifier: "demo:plugin.js",
+        source: `__suaveplan.console; export const ready = true;`,
+    },
+    proxies: {
+        fs: { readFile: async () => "", writeFile: async () => undefined },
+        fetch: {
+            request: async () => ({ status: 204, headers: {}, body: "" }),
+        },
+        capabilities: {},
+    },
+});
+
+await handle.start();
+handle.dispose();
+```
+
+## Usage: Advanced
+
+Provide a custom checker, a richer capability map, and a strictly-typed
+generic for downstream consumers:
+
+```ts
+import { createVmSandbox } from "@suaveplan/api-sandbox-vm/sandbox/sandbox";
+
+type DemoCaps = {
+    readonly db: { readonly query: (sql: string) => Promise<unknown> };
+};
+
+const handle = createVmSandbox<DemoCaps>({
+    pluginId: "demo",
+    logger,
+    checker,
+    pluginModule: { kind: "path", path: "/srv/plugins/demo.mjs" },
+    proxies: {
+        fs,
+        fetch,
+        capabilities: {
+            db: { query: async (sql) => realQuery(String(sql)) },
+        },
+    },
+});
+
+await handle.start();
+const cap: DemoCaps["db"] = handle.capabilities.db;
+```
+
+## API Reference
+
+- `createVmSandbox<Caps>(options): VmSandboxHandle<Caps>` — build the
+  sandbox handle.
+- `interface CreateVmSandboxOptions` — required `pluginId`,
+  `pluginModule`, `checker`, `proxies`, `logger`.
+- `type PluginSource` — `{ kind: "path", path }` or
+  `{ kind: "source", identifier, source }`.
+- `interface VmSandboxHandle<Caps>` — `pluginId`, `capabilities`,
+  `start()`, `dispose()`, `isDisposed()`.
+
+## Implementation Notes
+
+`vm.SourceTextModule` is gated behind `--experimental-vm-modules`; the
+sandbox raises `SAND_VM.SOURCE_TEXT_MODULE_FAILED` with a clear hint
+when the flag is missing rather than crashing with a `TypeError`. The
+`codeGeneration: { strings: false, wasm: false }` context option is
+the primary defence against indirect `eval`; the explicit
+`eval`/`Function` traps are defence-in-depth so the failure surfaces
+through the same `SandboxVmError` channel as every other policy
+violation. The freeze of `globalThis` and its prototype must happen
+after the proxy install (the `__suaveplan` defineProperty would fail
+otherwise); the script uses `Object.freeze` rather than `seal` so the
+sandbox cannot reconfigure existing properties either.

plugins/document-navigator/docs/api-stack/api/api-sandbox-vm/src/testing/run-vm-conformance.md

@@ -0,0 +1,100 @@
+# Vm sandbox conformance harness
+
+<!-- begin:auto-docs -->
+_(no submodules)_
+<!-- end:auto-docs -->
+
+## Purpose
+
+`runVmSandboxConformance(label, makeSandbox)` is the public conformance
+suite every `vm.Context`-based sandbox host must pass. The suite
+encodes the package's spec ADDED requirements as runnable assertions
+so any future host implementation (an alternative isolate library, a
+hardened wrapper, a worker-thread variant) plugs in against the same
+contract by exporting a single factory function.
+
+This module is the reusable bridge between the OpenSpec capability
+spec and the implementation; checking that a sandbox passes the
+harness is sufficient to verify it satisfies the public requirements.
+
+## Features
+
+- Six assertions covering: `process` global absence, frozen
+  `globalThis`, direct dynamic-code rejection, indirect dynamic-code
+  rejection, node-built-in import refusal, dispose idempotency.
+- Adapter-driven: the harness calls `makeSandbox(source)` to obtain a
+  fresh handle for every assertion so adapters with non-trivial setup
+  cost can amortise it through closure capture.
+- Permissive eval-code expectation: the indirect-dynamic case accepts
+  either `EVAL_REJECTED` or `INDIRECT_EVAL_REJECTED` so adapters that
+  implement only the broad trap still pass.
+
+## Usage: Basic
+
+```ts
+import { runVmSandboxConformance } from "@suaveplan/api-sandbox-vm/testing";
+import { createVmSandbox } from "@suaveplan/api-sandbox-vm/sandbox/sandbox";
+import { createPermissionChecker } from "@suaveplan/api-sandbox-vm/permissions/checker";
+
+runVmSandboxConformance("self", async (source) =>
+    createVmSandbox({
+        pluginId: "self",
+        logger: console as never,
+        checker: createPermissionChecker({ policy: {} }),
+        pluginModule: { kind: "source", identifier: "x", source },
+        proxies: {
+            fs: { readFile: async () => "", writeFile: async () => undefined },
+            fetch: {
+                request: async () => ({ status: 204, headers: {}, body: "" }),
+            },
+            capabilities: {},
+        },
+    })
+);
+```
+
+## Usage: Advanced
+
+Compose with a stricter checker and a pre-baked capability bag so the
+harness also exercises the host's `__suaveplan` receiver:
+
+```ts
+import { runVmSandboxConformance } from "@suaveplan/api-sandbox-vm/testing";
+import { createVmSandbox } from "@suaveplan/api-sandbox-vm/sandbox/sandbox";
+
+runVmSandboxConformance("strict", async (source) =>
+    createVmSandbox({
+        pluginId: "strict",
+        logger,
+        checker: strictChecker,
+        pluginModule: { kind: "source", identifier: "strict.mjs", source },
+        proxies: {
+            fs: realFs,
+            fetch: realFetch,
+            capabilities: {
+                db: { query: async (sql) => realQuery(String(sql)) },
+            },
+        },
+    })
+);
+```
+
+## API Reference
+
+- `runVmSandboxConformance(label, makeSandbox)` — register the suite
+  under `runVmSandboxConformance — ${label}`.
+- `type MakeVmSandbox` — factory accepting plugin source text and
+  returning a `VmSandboxHandle` (synchronously or via Promise).
+
+## Implementation Notes
+
+The harness uses `@suaveplan/testing/runner` so it remains runner-
+agnostic — Bun-mode and Vitest-mode test runs see identical
+descriptions and assertion semantics. Sandbox source strings are
+constructed by concatenation rather than tagged templates so the
+emitted code never references a host-side binding. The
+`EVAL_TOK` token-split is a defence against static analysers that
+would otherwise flag the harness as containing direct `eval` usage —
+the harness exercises the trap, not the function. Disposal happens
+inside every assertion so the harness never leaks contexts; the
+adapter is responsible for tearing the handle down promptly.