Move docs/ package mirror into document-navigator plugin

Relocate the ~6k-file docs tree from the repo root into
plugins/document-navigator/docs/ so the plugin is self-contained and
portable. docs/superpowers/ (specs and plans) stays at the repo root.

Moved via cp+rm rather than git mv because directory rename() fails with
EPERM on this WSL /mnt DrvFs mount; git rename-detection pairs the
identical-content files at commit time.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

plugins/document-navigator/docs/security-stack/crypto/crypto-browser/CHANGELOG.md

@@ -0,0 +1,16 @@
+# @suaveplan/crypto-browser Changelog
+
+## 0.0.0 — suaveplan initial
+
+- Initial implementation: WebCrypto-backed AEAD, sign, and agree engines
+- `webCryptoAeadEngine` — AES-256-GCM via `crypto.subtle`
+- `webCryptoSignEngine` / `webCryptoEd25519Engine` / `webCryptoEcdsaP256Engine` — Ed25519 and ECDSA-P256
+- `webCryptoAgreeEngine` / `webCryptoX25519Engine` / `webCryptoEcdhP256Engine` — X25519 and ECDH-P256
+- `rsa` namespace — RSA-PSS, RSA-OAEP, RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5
+- `aesKw` namespace — AES Key Wrap (RFC 3394)
+- `ecdsaP384` namespace — ECDSA with P-384 / SHA-384
+- `ecdhP384` namespace — ECDH with P-384
+- `nonExtractableKey()` — non-extractable CryptoKey generation
+- `isWebCryptoAvailable()` / `assertWebCryptoAvailable()` — runtime checks
+- `BrowserCryptoError` with codes: `NOT_AVAILABLE`, `KEY.GENERATION_FAILED`, `OPERATION.FAILED`
+- 100% coverage threshold (statements, branches, functions, lines)

plugins/document-navigator/docs/security-stack/crypto/crypto-browser/src/aes-kw/aes-kw.md

@@ -0,0 +1,106 @@
+# aes-kw
+
+<!-- begin:auto-docs -->
+_(no submodules)_
+<!-- end:auto-docs -->
+## Purpose
+
+Provides AES Key Wrap (AES-KW, RFC 3394) operations via `crypto.subtle`. AES-KW is an authenticated key-wrapping algorithm that encapsulates cryptographic key material with integrity protection, producing output that is 8 bytes longer than the input. It is widely used in key management systems, JOSE (JSON Web Encryption), CMS enveloped-data, and TLS session ticket encryption.
+
+Unlike general-purpose AES-GCM, AES-KW is specifically designed for wrapping other cryptographic keys. The algorithm provides integrity verification — any tampering with the wrapped output will be detected during unwrapping.
+
+## Features
+
+- `wrapKey(wrappingKey, keyToWrap)` — wraps raw key bytes using AES-KW via `crypto.subtle.wrapKey`
+- `unwrapKey(wrappingKey, wrappedKey)` — unwraps and returns raw key bytes via `crypto.subtle.unwrapKey`
+- Supports 128, 192, and 256-bit (16, 24, 32-byte) wrapping keys
+- Input key must be a multiple of 8 bytes (AES-KW requirement)
+- Wrapped output is input length + 8 (integrity check value)
+- `assertWebCryptoAvailable()` guard on every call
+- Typed `BrowserCryptoError` on all failure paths
+
+## Usage: Basic Example
+
+```ts
+import { aesKw } from "@suaveplan/crypto-browser/aes-kw/aes-kw";
+
+const wrappingKey = crypto.getRandomValues(new Uint8Array(32)); // 256-bit KEK
+const aesKey = crypto.getRandomValues(new Uint8Array(32));      // 256-bit content key
+
+const wrapped = await aesKw.wrapKey(wrappingKey, aesKey);
+// wrapped.length === aesKey.length + 8 === 40
+
+const recovered = await aesKw.unwrapKey(wrappingKey, wrapped);
+// recovered deepEquals aesKey
+```
+
+## Usage: Advanced Example
+
+```ts
+import { aesKw } from "@suaveplan/crypto-browser/aes-kw/aes-kw";
+import { webCryptoAeadEngine } from "@suaveplan/crypto-browser/engines/webcrypto-aead-engine";
+import { BrowserCryptoError } from "@suaveplan/crypto-browser/errors";
+
+// Key Encryption Key (KEK) derived from a user password or stored securely
+declare const kek: Uint8Array; // 32-byte wrapping key
+
+// Wrap content encryption key for storage or transmission
+async function storeWrappedKey(contentKey: Uint8Array): Promise<Uint8Array> {
+  try {
+    return await aesKw.wrapKey(kek, contentKey);
+  } catch (err) {
+    if (err instanceof BrowserCryptoError && err.code === "BROWSER_CRYPTO.OPERATION.FAILED") {
+      throw new Error("Key wrapping failed — check wrapping key size");
+    }
+    throw err;
+  }
+}
+
+// Later: unwrap and use the content key
+async function loadAndEncrypt(
+  wrappedKey: Uint8Array,
+  plaintext: Uint8Array
+): Promise<Uint8Array> {
+  const contentKey = await aesKw.unwrapKey(kek, wrappedKey);
+  const nonce = crypto.getRandomValues(new Uint8Array(12));
+  return webCryptoAeadEngine.encrypt(contentKey, plaintext, nonce) as unknown as Promise<Uint8Array>;
+}
+```
+
+## API Reference
+
+### `aesKw.wrapKey(wrappingKey, keyToWrap): Promise<Uint8Array>`
+
+Wraps `keyToWrap` using AES-KW.
+
+| Parameter | Type | Description |
+|-----------|------|-------------|
+| `wrappingKey` | `Uint8Array` | 16, 24, or 32-byte AES Key Encryption Key (KEK) |
+| `keyToWrap` | `Uint8Array` | Key bytes to wrap; must be a multiple of 8 bytes |
+
+**Returns:** `Promise<Uint8Array>` — wrapped bytes, `keyToWrap.length + 8` bytes long.
+
+**Throws:** `BrowserCryptoError` — `BROWSER_CRYPTO.NOT_AVAILABLE` or `BROWSER_CRYPTO.OPERATION.FAILED`.
+
+---
+
+### `aesKw.unwrapKey(wrappingKey, wrappedKey): Promise<Uint8Array>`
+
+Unwraps `wrappedKey` using AES-KW and returns the original key bytes.
+
+| Parameter | Type | Description |
+|-----------|------|-------------|
+| `wrappingKey` | `Uint8Array` | 16, 24, or 32-byte KEK (must match wrapping key) |
+| `wrappedKey` | `Uint8Array` | Previously wrapped bytes from `wrapKey()` |
+
+**Returns:** `Promise<Uint8Array>` — original raw key bytes.
+
+**Throws:** `BrowserCryptoError` — `BROWSER_CRYPTO.OPERATION.FAILED` when integrity check fails (wrong key or tampered data).
+
+## Implementation Notes
+
+`crypto.subtle.wrapKey` requires a `CryptoKey` object as input (not a raw `Uint8Array`). The implementation imports `keyToWrap` as a temporary `AES-GCM` key with `extractable: true` before wrapping — this is the minimal ceremony needed to satisfy the `crypto.subtle` API. The temporary key is never exported directly; only the AES-KW wrapped form is returned.
+
+Similarly, `crypto.subtle.unwrapKey` produces a `CryptoKey` internally; the implementation immediately re-exports it as raw bytes via `exportKey("raw", ...)` so the caller receives a portable `Uint8Array`. This round-trip through `CryptoKey` is required by the Web Crypto API and adds negligible overhead.
+
+AES-KW does not use a nonce — it is deterministic for a given (wrapping-key, key-to-wrap) pair. This is intentional for RFC 3394 compliance; nonce-based confidentiality is provided by AES-GCM when encrypting arbitrary data.

plugins/document-navigator/docs/security-stack/crypto/crypto-browser/src/availability/availability.md

@@ -0,0 +1,85 @@
+# availability
+
+<!-- begin:auto-docs -->
+_(no submodules)_
+<!-- end:auto-docs -->
+## Purpose
+
+Provides a runtime check for the presence of the Web Crypto API (`crypto.subtle`). The check is a prerequisite for every operation in `@suaveplan/crypto-browser`: all engine methods and primitives call `assertWebCryptoAvailable()` before attempting any `crypto.subtle` call, so callers receive a structured, typed `BrowserCryptoError` rather than an opaque `TypeError: Cannot read properties of undefined (reading 'subtle')`.
+
+The two exported helpers form a small contract: `isWebCryptoAvailable` is a pure predicate useful for conditional branching or feature-flag evaluation, while `assertWebCryptoAvailable` is the guard variant used internally throughout the package.
+
+## Features
+
+- `isWebCryptoAvailable(): boolean` — returns `true` when both `globalThis.crypto` and `globalThis.crypto.subtle` are defined; otherwise `false`
+- `assertWebCryptoAvailable(): void` — throws `BrowserCryptoError` with code `BROWSER_CRYPTO.NOT_AVAILABLE` if the check fails
+- Zero side effects — purely reads globals, never modifies them
+- Works across Node 20+, Bun, Deno, and modern browsers without polyfills
+
+## Usage: Basic Example
+
+```ts
+import { isWebCryptoAvailable } from "@suaveplan/crypto-browser/availability/availability";
+
+if (!isWebCryptoAvailable()) {
+  console.warn("WebCrypto not available — using fallback cipher");
+}
+```
+
+## Usage: Advanced Example
+
+```ts
+import { assertWebCryptoAvailable } from "@suaveplan/crypto-browser/availability/availability";
+import { BrowserCryptoError } from "@suaveplan/crypto-browser/errors";
+
+async function encryptUserData(key: Uint8Array, data: Uint8Array): Promise<Uint8Array> {
+  // Guard before any crypto.subtle calls
+  assertWebCryptoAvailable();
+
+  // ... proceed with crypto.subtle.encrypt
+  return new Uint8Array();
+}
+
+// Caller can catch the specific structured error
+try {
+  await encryptUserData(key, data);
+} catch (err) {
+  if (err instanceof BrowserCryptoError && err.code === "BROWSER_CRYPTO.NOT_AVAILABLE") {
+    // Fall back to a server-side encryption endpoint
+  }
+}
+```
+
+## API Reference
+
+### `isWebCryptoAvailable(): boolean`
+
+Returns `true` when `typeof crypto !== 'undefined' && typeof crypto.subtle !== 'undefined'`.
+
+| Parameter | Type | Description |
+|-----------|------|-------------|
+| _(none)_ | — | — |
+
+**Returns:** `boolean` — `true` if `crypto.subtle` is accessible.
+
+**Throws:** never.
+
+---
+
+### `assertWebCryptoAvailable(): void`
+
+Calls `isWebCryptoAvailable()` and throws if the result is `false`.
+
+| Parameter | Type | Description |
+|-----------|------|-------------|
+| _(none)_ | — | — |
+
+**Returns:** `void`
+
+**Throws:** `BrowserCryptoError` — code `BROWSER_CRYPTO.NOT_AVAILABLE` when `crypto.subtle` is absent.
+
+## Implementation Notes
+
+The check deliberately uses `typeof crypto !== 'undefined'` (rather than a `try/catch` or optional chaining on a possibly-unset global) to avoid triggering a `ReferenceError` in environments where `crypto` is not declared at all. Optional chaining `globalThis?.crypto?.subtle` is not used because `globalThis` itself might be unavailable in some older embedded runtimes.
+
+Both exports are side-effect-free and tree-shakeable: `"sideEffects": false` is set on the package, so bundlers that import only `isWebCryptoAvailable` will not include `BrowserCryptoError` in the output unless it is actually used.

plugins/document-navigator/docs/security-stack/crypto/crypto-browser/src/ecdh-p384/ecdh-p384.md

@@ -0,0 +1,105 @@
+# ecdh-p384
+
+<!-- begin:auto-docs -->
+_(no submodules)_
+<!-- end:auto-docs -->
+## Purpose
+
+Provides Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman key agreement using the NIST P-384 curve via `crypto.subtle`. P-384 ECDH delivers 192 bits of security, matching the security level of AES-256 and making it appropriate for long-term key agreement in high-security contexts. This module is the P-384 analogue of the `webCryptoEcdhP256Engine` provided in the engines module, exposed as a standalone namespace for direct use outside of the `AgreeEngine` interface.
+
+Key agreement produces a 48-byte (384-bit) shared secret by calling `crypto.subtle.deriveBits` with `length: 384`. Callers are responsible for passing this secret through a KDF before using it as an encryption key.
+
+## Features
+
+- `generateKeypair()` — generates a P-384 ECDH keypair via `crypto.subtle.generateKey`
+- `agree(privateKey, publicKey)` — derives 48-byte shared secret via `crypto.subtle.deriveBits`
+- Full DH symmetry: `agree(alice, bob.pub)` equals `agree(bob, alice.pub)`
+- Public key: 97-byte uncompressed point (raw format, 0x04 prefix)
+- Private key: PKCS8 DER bytes
+- `assertWebCryptoAvailable()` guard on every call
+- Typed `BrowserCryptoError` for all failure paths
+
+## Usage: Basic Example
+
+```ts
+import { ecdhP384 } from "@suaveplan/crypto-browser/ecdh-p384/ecdh-p384";
+
+const alice = await ecdhP384.generateKeypair();
+const bob   = await ecdhP384.generateKeypair();
+
+// Both sides independently compute the same 48-byte secret
+const aliceShared = await ecdhP384.agree(alice.privateKey, bob.publicKey);
+const bobShared   = await ecdhP384.agree(bob.privateKey, alice.publicKey);
+
+// aliceShared deepEquals bobShared — 48 bytes (384 bits)
+```
+
+## Usage: Advanced Example
+
+```ts
+import { ecdhP384 } from "@suaveplan/crypto-browser/ecdh-p384/ecdh-p384";
+
+// KDF using HKDF to derive a 32-byte AES key from the P-384 shared secret
+async function deriveAesKey(
+  privateKey: Uint8Array,
+  peerPublicKey: Uint8Array,
+  info: Uint8Array
+): Promise<Uint8Array> {
+  const sharedSecret = await ecdhP384.agree(privateKey, peerPublicKey);
+
+  // Import shared secret as HKDF key material
+  const hkdfKey = await crypto.subtle.importKey(
+    "raw",
+    sharedSecret,
+    "HKDF",
+    false,
+    ["deriveBits"]
+  );
+
+  const aesKeyBits = await crypto.subtle.deriveBits(
+    {
+      name: "HKDF",
+      hash: "SHA-384",
+      salt: new Uint8Array(48), // zero salt
+      info,
+    },
+    hkdfKey,
+    256
+  );
+
+  return new Uint8Array(aesKeyBits);
+}
+```
+
+## API Reference
+
+### `ecdhP384.generateKeypair(): Promise<{ publicKey: Uint8Array; privateKey: Uint8Array }>`
+
+Generates a P-384 ECDH keypair.
+
+**Returns:** `Promise<{ publicKey: Uint8Array; privateKey: Uint8Array }>` — 97-byte uncompressed public key and PKCS8 DER private key.
+
+**Throws:** `BrowserCryptoError` — `BROWSER_CRYPTO.KEY.GENERATION_FAILED` or `BROWSER_CRYPTO.NOT_AVAILABLE`.
+
+---
+
+### `ecdhP384.agree(privateKey, publicKey): Promise<Uint8Array>`
+
+Performs ECDH key agreement, deriving 384 bits from `deriveBits`.
+
+| Parameter | Type | Description |
+|-----------|------|-------------|
+| `privateKey` | `Uint8Array` | PKCS8 DER private key bytes |
+| `publicKey` | `Uint8Array` | 97-byte uncompressed P-384 public key |
+
+**Returns:** `Promise<Uint8Array>` — 48-byte (384-bit) shared secret.
+
+**Throws:** `BrowserCryptoError` — `BROWSER_CRYPTO.OPERATION.FAILED` or `BROWSER_CRYPTO.NOT_AVAILABLE`.
+
+## Implementation Notes
+
+P-384 `deriveBits` is called with `length: 384` to extract the full 384-bit shared secret. This matches the curve's security level and avoids the truncation that would occur if 256 bits were requested. Callers using the output as an AES-256 key should pass through HKDF first to properly condition the key material.
+
+The public key is exported from `crypto.subtle` via `"raw"` format, which produces the standard uncompressed point encoding. This is directly importable on any Web Crypto implementation that supports P-384.
+
+P-384 is approximately 2–3× slower than P-256 for key generation and agreement. For applications where P-256's 128-bit security is sufficient, `webCryptoEcdhP256Engine` provides the same API with better performance.

plugins/document-navigator/docs/security-stack/crypto/crypto-browser/src/ecdsa-p384/ecdsa-p384.md

@@ -0,0 +1,117 @@
+# ecdsa-p384
+
+<!-- begin:auto-docs -->
+_(no submodules)_
+<!-- end:auto-docs -->
+## Purpose
+
+Provides ECDSA (Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm) operations using the NIST P-384 curve and SHA-384 hash, backed by `crypto.subtle`. P-384 offers 192 bits of security — stronger than P-256's 128 bits — and is required by many compliance frameworks (NIST SP 800-57, CNSA Suite 2.0, NSA Suite B). This module is intended for contexts where P-384 is mandated by policy or interoperability requirements.
+
+The public key format is the 97-byte uncompressed point representation (0x04 prefix followed by 48-byte X and Y coordinates). The private key is PKCS8 DER. Both formats are standard and directly importable by other Web Crypto implementations.
+
+## Features
+
+- `generateKeypair()` — generates a P-384 ECDSA keypair using `crypto.subtle.generateKey`
+- `sign(privateKey, message)` — signs with ECDSA-P384 / SHA-384
+- `verify(publicKey, signature, message)` — verifies an ECDSA-P384 signature
+- Public key: 97-byte uncompressed point (raw format)
+- Private key: PKCS8 DER bytes
+- Signature format: IEEE P1363 (R || S) as returned by `crypto.subtle`
+- `assertWebCryptoAvailable()` guard on every call
+- Typed `BrowserCryptoError` for all failure paths
+
+## Usage: Basic Example
+
+```ts
+import { ecdsaP384 } from "@suaveplan/crypto-browser/ecdsa-p384/ecdsa-p384";
+
+const kp = await ecdsaP384.generateKeypair();
+// kp.publicKey is 97 bytes (uncompressed P-384 point)
+// kp.privateKey is PKCS8 DER bytes
+
+const message = new TextEncoder().encode("document to sign");
+const signature = await ecdsaP384.sign(kp.privateKey, message);
+const valid = await ecdsaP384.verify(kp.publicKey, signature, message);
+console.log(valid); // true
+```
+
+## Usage: Advanced Example
+
+```ts
+import { ecdsaP384 } from "@suaveplan/crypto-browser/ecdsa-p384/ecdsa-p384";
+import { BrowserCryptoError } from "@suaveplan/crypto-browser/errors";
+
+// Issue a signed certificate-like structure
+async function issueAttestation(
+  issuerPrivateKey: Uint8Array,
+  payload: Uint8Array
+): Promise<{ signature: Uint8Array; algorithm: string }> {
+  try {
+    const signature = await ecdsaP384.sign(issuerPrivateKey, payload);
+    return { signature, algorithm: "ECDSA-P384-SHA384" };
+  } catch (err) {
+    if (err instanceof BrowserCryptoError) {
+      throw new Error(`Signing failed: ${err.code}`);
+    }
+    throw err;
+  }
+}
+
+// Verify the attestation with a stored public key
+async function verifyAttestation(
+  publicKey: Uint8Array,
+  payload: Uint8Array,
+  signature: Uint8Array
+): Promise<boolean> {
+  return ecdsaP384.verify(publicKey, signature, payload);
+}
+```
+
+## API Reference
+
+### `ecdsaP384.generateKeypair(): Promise<{ publicKey: Uint8Array; privateKey: Uint8Array }>`
+
+Generates a P-384 ECDSA keypair.
+
+**Returns:** `Promise<{ publicKey: Uint8Array; privateKey: Uint8Array }>` — 97-byte uncompressed public key and PKCS8 DER private key.
+
+**Throws:** `BrowserCryptoError` — `BROWSER_CRYPTO.KEY.GENERATION_FAILED` or `BROWSER_CRYPTO.NOT_AVAILABLE`.
+
+---
+
+### `ecdsaP384.sign(privateKey, message): Promise<Uint8Array>`
+
+Signs `message` using ECDSA-P384 with SHA-384.
+
+| Parameter | Type | Description |
+|-----------|------|-------------|
+| `privateKey` | `Uint8Array` | PKCS8 DER private key bytes |
+| `message` | `Uint8Array` | Bytes to sign |
+
+**Returns:** `Promise<Uint8Array>` — IEEE P1363 signature (96 bytes for P-384).
+
+**Throws:** `BrowserCryptoError` — `BROWSER_CRYPTO.OPERATION.FAILED` or `BROWSER_CRYPTO.NOT_AVAILABLE`.
+
+---
+
+### `ecdsaP384.verify(publicKey, signature, message): Promise<boolean>`
+
+Verifies an ECDSA-P384 / SHA-384 signature.
+
+| Parameter | Type | Description |
+|-----------|------|-------------|
+| `publicKey` | `Uint8Array` | 97-byte uncompressed P-384 public key |
+| `signature` | `Uint8Array` | IEEE P1363 signature bytes |
+| `message` | `Uint8Array` | Original message bytes |
+
+**Returns:** `Promise<boolean>` — `true` if signature is valid.
+
+**Throws:** `BrowserCryptoError` — `BROWSER_CRYPTO.OPERATION.FAILED` or `BROWSER_CRYPTO.NOT_AVAILABLE`.
+
+## Implementation Notes
+
+SHA-384 is paired with P-384 because the security level of the hash should match that of the curve. Using SHA-256 with P-384 would create a mismatch: the 192-bit curve security would be limited to the 128-bit collision resistance of SHA-256.
+
+The signature output format from `crypto.subtle.sign` for ECDSA is IEEE P1363 (raw R || S concatenation), not DER/ASN.1. This differs from OpenSSL's default DER encoding. When interoperating with systems that expect DER signatures, a conversion layer is needed.
+
+P-384 key generation is typically 2–5× slower than P-256 due to the larger field size. For high-throughput signing workloads where P-256 security is sufficient, consider using `webCryptoEcdsaP256Engine` instead.

plugins/document-navigator/docs/security-stack/crypto/crypto-browser/src/engines/webcrypto-aead-engine/webcrypto-aead-engine.md

@@ -0,0 +1,108 @@
+# webcrypto-aead-engine
+
+<!-- begin:auto-docs -->
+_(no submodules)_
+<!-- end:auto-docs -->
+## Purpose
+
+Provides an `AeadEngine` implementation that delegates all AES-256-GCM operations to the browser's (or Node's) native `crypto.subtle` API. This lets `@suaveplan/crypto` facade functions — `encrypt()` and `decrypt()` from the `aead` sub-module — run on hardware-accelerated paths wherever the Web Crypto API is available, instead of the default pure-JavaScript `@noble/ciphers` path.
+
+The engine is designed for environments where minimising bundle size matters most: importing it adds zero third-party cryptography code because everything is provided by the host runtime.
+
+## Features
+
+- `encrypt(key, plaintext, nonce, aad?)` — AES-256-GCM encryption via `crypto.subtle.encrypt`, including automatic 16-byte authentication tag appended to ciphertext
+- `decrypt(key, ciphertext, nonce, aad?)` — AES-256-GCM decryption via `crypto.subtle.decrypt` with authenticated tag verification
+- Optional additional authenticated data (AAD) for binding ciphertext to a context
+- Throws typed `BrowserCryptoError` with stable codes for every failure path
+- Returns `Promise<Uint8Array>` — engine methods are async even though the `AeadEngine` interface declares sync return types; facade functions accept Promise results
+- Guards every call with `assertWebCryptoAvailable()` to produce a structured error instead of a runtime `TypeError`
+
+## Usage: Basic Example
+
+```ts
+import { webCryptoAeadEngine } from "@suaveplan/crypto-browser/engines/webcrypto-aead-engine";
+
+const key = crypto.getRandomValues(new Uint8Array(32));
+const nonce = crypto.getRandomValues(new Uint8Array(12));
+const plaintext = new TextEncoder().encode("hello world");
+
+const ciphertext = await (webCryptoAeadEngine.encrypt(key, plaintext, nonce) as unknown as Promise<Uint8Array>);
+const recovered  = await (webCryptoAeadEngine.decrypt(key, ciphertext, nonce) as unknown as Promise<Uint8Array>);
+
+console.log(new TextDecoder().decode(recovered)); // "hello world"
+```
+
+## Usage: Advanced Example
+
+```ts
+import { encrypt } from "@suaveplan/crypto/aead";
+import { webCryptoAeadEngine } from "@suaveplan/crypto-browser/engines/webcrypto-aead-engine";
+import { BrowserCryptoError } from "@suaveplan/crypto-browser/errors";
+
+async function sealPayload(
+  key: Uint8Array,
+  payload: Uint8Array,
+  context: Uint8Array  // AAD binds the ciphertext to e.g. a session ID
+): Promise<Uint8Array> {
+  try {
+    const nonce = crypto.getRandomValues(new Uint8Array(12));
+    const sealed = await (webCryptoAeadEngine.encrypt(key, payload, nonce, context) as unknown as Promise<Uint8Array>);
+    // Prepend nonce for transport: [12 bytes nonce | ciphertext+tag]
+    const out = new Uint8Array(12 + sealed.length);
+    out.set(nonce, 0);
+    out.set(sealed, 12);
+    return out;
+  } catch (err) {
+    if (err instanceof BrowserCryptoError) {
+      // err.code is one of: BROWSER_CRYPTO.NOT_AVAILABLE | BROWSER_CRYPTO.OPERATION.FAILED
+      throw err;
+    }
+    throw err;
+  }
+}
+```
+
+## API Reference
+
+### `webCryptoAeadEngine: AeadEngine`
+
+An object conforming to the `AeadEngine` interface from `@suaveplan/crypto/engines`.
+
+#### `.encrypt(key, plaintext, nonce, aad?): Uint8Array`
+
+Encrypts plaintext using AES-256-GCM.
+
+| Parameter | Type | Description |
+|-----------|------|-------------|
+| `key` | `Uint8Array` | 32-byte (256-bit) AES key |
+| `plaintext` | `Uint8Array` | Bytes to encrypt |
+| `nonce` | `Uint8Array` | 12-byte IV (use a fresh random nonce per message) |
+| `aad` | `Uint8Array \| undefined` | Optional additional authenticated data |
+
+**Returns:** `Uint8Array` (runtime: `Promise<Uint8Array>`) — ciphertext with 16-byte GCM tag appended.
+
+**Throws:** `BrowserCryptoError` — `BROWSER_CRYPTO.NOT_AVAILABLE` or `BROWSER_CRYPTO.OPERATION.FAILED`.
+
+#### `.decrypt(key, ciphertext, nonce, aad?): Uint8Array`
+
+Decrypts ciphertext and verifies the GCM authentication tag.
+
+| Parameter | Type | Description |
+|-----------|------|-------------|
+| `key` | `Uint8Array` | 32-byte AES key (must match encryption key) |
+| `ciphertext` | `Uint8Array` | Ciphertext with 16-byte GCM tag appended |
+| `nonce` | `Uint8Array` | 12-byte IV used during encryption |
+| `aad` | `Uint8Array \| undefined` | Optional AAD (must match encryption AAD exactly) |
+
+**Returns:** `Uint8Array` (runtime: `Promise<Uint8Array>`) — decrypted plaintext.
+
+**Throws:** `BrowserCryptoError` — `BROWSER_CRYPTO.OPERATION.FAILED` on authentication failure or bad key.
+
+## Implementation Notes
+
+`crypto.subtle.importKey` is called on every encrypt/decrypt invocation rather than being cached, because raw `Uint8Array` keys are the idiomatic interface in `AeadEngine` and caching a `CryptoKey` across calls would require a `Map<Uint8Array, CryptoKey>` with careful lifecycle management. The overhead of `importKey` is dominated by the actual AES-GCM operation for typical payload sizes.
+
+The `AeadEngine` interface uses synchronous return types (`Uint8Array`), while `crypto.subtle` is entirely asynchronous. The implementation returns `Promise<Uint8Array>` cast to `Uint8Array` at the type level. Facade functions in `@suaveplan/crypto` use `await` on engine results, so this is transparent to consumers using those facades.
+
+The 12-byte nonce is the NIST-recommended IV length for AES-GCM and provides the best performance with `crypto.subtle`. Longer IVs (96–128 bits) would work but require internal counter splitting which is not done here — callers must supply exactly a 12-byte nonce for maximum compatibility.

plugins/document-navigator/docs/security-stack/crypto/crypto-browser/src/engines/webcrypto-agree-engine/webcrypto-agree-engine.md

@@ -0,0 +1,118 @@
+# webcrypto-agree-engine
+
+<!-- begin:auto-docs -->
+_(no submodules)_
+<!-- end:auto-docs -->
+## Purpose
+
+Provides two `AgreeEngine` implementations — `webCryptoX25519Engine` (X25519 Diffie-Hellman) and `webCryptoEcdhP256Engine` (ECDH with P-256) — both backed by the native `crypto.subtle` API. A convenience alias `webCryptoAgreeEngine` resolves to the X25519 engine. These engines implement the `AgreeEngine` interface from `@suaveplan/crypto/engines`, making them drop-in substitutes for the default `@noble/curves`-backed engine in environments where `crypto.subtle` is available.
+
+Key agreement is the foundation of forward-secrecy protocols (TLS, Noise, Signal). Using `crypto.subtle` for ECDH ensures hardware acceleration is used when the runtime supports it, and the key material never leaves the key management subsystem if non-extractable keys are used.
+
+## Features
+
+- `generateKeypair()` — generates an ephemeral X25519 or ECDH-P256 keypair; returns portable raw bytes
+- `agree(mySecret, theirPublic)` — derives a 32-byte shared secret via `crypto.subtle.deriveBits`
+- Full DH symmetry: `agree(alice, bob.pub) === agree(bob, alice.pub)` for any keypair pair
+- All methods are async at runtime despite `AgreeEngine` sync declarations
+- `assertWebCryptoAvailable()` guard on every call
+- Typed `BrowserCryptoError` on generation or agreement failure
+
+## Usage: Basic Example
+
+```ts
+import { webCryptoX25519Engine } from "@suaveplan/crypto-browser/engines/webcrypto-agree-engine";
+
+const alice = await (webCryptoX25519Engine.generateKeypair() as unknown as Promise<{
+  publicKey: Uint8Array;
+  secretKey: Uint8Array;
+}>);
+const bob = await (webCryptoX25519Engine.generateKeypair() as unknown as Promise<{
+  publicKey: Uint8Array;
+  secretKey: Uint8Array;
+}>);
+
+const aliceSecret = await (webCryptoX25519Engine.agree(alice.secretKey, bob.publicKey) as unknown as Promise<Uint8Array>);
+const bobSecret   = await (webCryptoX25519Engine.agree(bob.secretKey, alice.publicKey) as unknown as Promise<Uint8Array>);
+
+// aliceSecret deepEquals bobSecret — both parties derived the same 32 bytes
+```
+
+## Usage: Advanced Example
+
+```ts
+import { webCryptoX25519Engine } from "@suaveplan/crypto-browser/engines/webcrypto-agree-engine";
+import { webCryptoAeadEngine } from "@suaveplan/crypto-browser/engines/webcrypto-aead-engine";
+
+// Simple Diffie-Hellman key exchange followed by AES-GCM encryption
+async function ephemeralEncrypt(
+  recipientPublicKey: Uint8Array,
+  plaintext: Uint8Array
+): Promise<{ ephemeralPublic: Uint8Array; ciphertext: Uint8Array }> {
+  const ephemeral = await (webCryptoX25519Engine.generateKeypair() as unknown as Promise<{
+    publicKey: Uint8Array;
+    secretKey: Uint8Array;
+  }>);
+
+  const sharedSecret = await (webCryptoX25519Engine.agree(
+    ephemeral.secretKey,
+    recipientPublicKey
+  ) as unknown as Promise<Uint8Array>);
+
+  const nonce = crypto.getRandomValues(new Uint8Array(12));
+  const ciphertext = await (webCryptoAeadEngine.encrypt(
+    sharedSecret,
+    plaintext,
+    nonce
+  ) as unknown as Promise<Uint8Array>);
+
+  const out = new Uint8Array(12 + ciphertext.length);
+  out.set(nonce, 0);
+  out.set(ciphertext, 12);
+
+  return { ephemeralPublic: ephemeral.publicKey, ciphertext: out };
+}
+```
+
+## API Reference
+
+### `webCryptoX25519Engine: AgreeEngine`
+
+X25519 engine via `crypto.subtle` with `{ name: "X25519" }`.
+
+#### `.generateKeypair(): AgreeKeypair`
+
+Returns `Promise<AgreeKeypair>` at runtime. Public key is 32 raw bytes. Secret key is 32-byte scalar.
+
+**Throws:** `BrowserCryptoError` — `BROWSER_CRYPTO.NOT_AVAILABLE` or `BROWSER_CRYPTO.KEY.GENERATION_FAILED`.
+
+#### `.agree(mySecret, theirPublic): Uint8Array`
+
+Returns `Promise<Uint8Array>` (32 bytes) at runtime.
+
+| Parameter | Type | Description |
+|-----------|------|-------------|
+| `mySecret` | `Uint8Array` | 32-byte X25519 private scalar |
+| `theirPublic` | `Uint8Array` | 32-byte X25519 public key |
+
+**Throws:** `BrowserCryptoError` — `BROWSER_CRYPTO.NOT_AVAILABLE` or `BROWSER_CRYPTO.OPERATION.FAILED`.
+
+---
+
+### `webCryptoEcdhP256Engine: AgreeEngine`
+
+ECDH-P256 engine via `crypto.subtle`. Public key is 65-byte uncompressed point. Secret key is PKCS8 DER. `agree()` returns 32 bytes via `deriveBits(..., 256)`.
+
+---
+
+### `webCryptoAgreeEngine: AgreeEngine`
+
+Alias for `webCryptoX25519Engine`.
+
+## Implementation Notes
+
+X25519 public keys are exported from `crypto.subtle` in SPKI format and the raw 32-byte scalar is extracted from the last 32 bytes of the DER envelope. On import the scalar is re-wrapped with a minimal 48-byte PKCS8 structure. This keeps the external representation simple (just 32 bytes) while satisfying `crypto.subtle`'s requirement for DER-encoded keys.
+
+For ECDH-P256 the key agreement produces a 256-bit shared secret by calling `deriveBits` with `length: 256`. The raw shared secret should be passed through a KDF (e.g., HKDF) before use as an encryption key; this is not done inside the engine so callers retain full control over key derivation.
+
+X25519 requires Node 20+, Bun 1.0+, or Chrome 113+/Firefox 130+/Safari 15.4+. Older environments will receive `BROWSER_CRYPTO.KEY.GENERATION_FAILED`.

plugins/document-navigator/docs/security-stack/crypto/crypto-browser/src/engines/webcrypto-sign-engine/webcrypto-sign-engine.md

@@ -0,0 +1,119 @@
+# webcrypto-sign-engine
+
+<!-- begin:auto-docs -->
+_(no submodules)_
+<!-- end:auto-docs -->
+## Purpose
+
+Provides two `SignEngine` implementations — `webCryptoEd25519Engine` (Ed25519) and `webCryptoEcdsaP256Engine` (ECDSA with P-256) — both backed by `crypto.subtle`. The module also exports a convenience alias `webCryptoSignEngine` that resolves to the Ed25519 engine. These engines implement the `SignEngine` interface from `@suaveplan/crypto/engines`, making them drop-in replacements for the default `@noble/curves`-backed engine wherever `crypto.subtle` is available.
+
+Ed25519 provides faster key generation, smaller signatures (64 bytes), and stronger security properties for most use-cases. ECDSA-P256 is provided for interoperability with systems that require NIST curves.
+
+## Features
+
+- `generateKeypair()` — generates an ephemeral Ed25519 or ECDSA-P256 keypair; returns raw public key bytes and raw/PKCS8 private key bytes
+- `sign(secretKey, message)` — signs an arbitrary byte array using `crypto.subtle.sign`
+- `verify(publicKey, signature, message)` — verifies a signature using `crypto.subtle.verify`
+- All methods are async at runtime despite the `SignEngine` interface's sync declarations
+- All methods guard with `assertWebCryptoAvailable()` before any `crypto.subtle` calls
+- Typed `BrowserCryptoError` thrown on generation failures and operation failures
+
+## Usage: Basic Example
+
+```ts
+import { webCryptoEd25519Engine } from "@suaveplan/crypto-browser/engines/webcrypto-sign-engine";
+
+const kp = await (webCryptoEd25519Engine.generateKeypair() as unknown as Promise<{
+  publicKey: Uint8Array;
+  secretKey: Uint8Array;
+}>);
+
+const message = new TextEncoder().encode("hello");
+const signature = await (webCryptoEd25519Engine.sign(kp.secretKey, message) as unknown as Promise<Uint8Array>);
+const valid = await (webCryptoEd25519Engine.verify(kp.publicKey, signature, message) as unknown as Promise<boolean>);
+console.log(valid); // true
+```
+
+## Usage: Advanced Example
+
+```ts
+import {
+  webCryptoEcdsaP256Engine,
+  webCryptoEd25519Engine,
+} from "@suaveplan/crypto-browser/engines/webcrypto-sign-engine";
+import { BrowserCryptoError } from "@suaveplan/crypto-browser/errors";
+
+// Use P-256 for JWS / JOSE interoperability
+async function signJwsPayload(payload: Uint8Array): Promise<{ publicKey: Uint8Array; signature: Uint8Array }> {
+  try {
+    const kp = await (webCryptoEcdsaP256Engine.generateKeypair() as unknown as Promise<{
+      publicKey: Uint8Array;
+      secretKey: Uint8Array;
+    }>);
+    const signature = await (webCryptoEcdsaP256Engine.sign(kp.secretKey, payload) as unknown as Promise<Uint8Array>);
+    return { publicKey: kp.publicKey, signature };
+  } catch (err) {
+    if (err instanceof BrowserCryptoError) {
+      // Structured error with err.code = "BROWSER_CRYPTO.KEY.GENERATION_FAILED"
+      //                              or "BROWSER_CRYPTO.OPERATION.FAILED"
+      throw err;
+    }
+    throw err;
+  }
+}
+```
+
+## API Reference
+
+### `webCryptoEd25519Engine: SignEngine`
+
+Ed25519 engine via `crypto.subtle` with `{ name: "Ed25519" }` algorithm.
+
+#### `.generateKeypair(): SignKeypair`
+
+Returns `Promise<SignKeypair>` at runtime. Public key is 32 raw bytes. Secret key is the 32-byte Ed25519 seed.
+
+**Throws:** `BrowserCryptoError` — `BROWSER_CRYPTO.NOT_AVAILABLE` or `BROWSER_CRYPTO.KEY.GENERATION_FAILED`.
+
+#### `.sign(secretKey, message): Uint8Array`
+
+Returns `Promise<Uint8Array>` at runtime. Signature is 64 bytes.
+
+| Parameter | Type | Description |
+|-----------|------|-------------|
+| `secretKey` | `Uint8Array` | 32-byte Ed25519 seed |
+| `message` | `Uint8Array` | Arbitrary bytes to sign |
+
+**Throws:** `BrowserCryptoError` — `BROWSER_CRYPTO.NOT_AVAILABLE` or `BROWSER_CRYPTO.OPERATION.FAILED`.
+
+#### `.verify(publicKey, signature, message): boolean`
+
+Returns `Promise<boolean>` at runtime.
+
+| Parameter | Type | Description |
+|-----------|------|-------------|
+| `publicKey` | `Uint8Array` | 32-byte Ed25519 public key |
+| `signature` | `Uint8Array` | 64-byte signature |
+| `message` | `Uint8Array` | Original message bytes |
+
+**Throws:** `BrowserCryptoError` — `BROWSER_CRYPTO.NOT_AVAILABLE` or `BROWSER_CRYPTO.OPERATION.FAILED`.
+
+---
+
+### `webCryptoEcdsaP256Engine: SignEngine`
+
+ECDSA-P256 engine via `crypto.subtle` with `{ name: "ECDSA", namedCurve: "P-256" }`. Same method signatures as above. Public key is 65-byte uncompressed (0x04 prefix). Secret key is PKCS8 DER.
+
+---
+
+### `webCryptoSignEngine: SignEngine`
+
+Alias for `webCryptoEd25519Engine`. Use this when you want the recommended default.
+
+## Implementation Notes
+
+Key export: `crypto.subtle.exportKey("pkcs8", privateKey)` returns the PKCS8 DER-encoded private key. For Ed25519, the 32-byte seed is located at byte offset 16 within the DER envelope; this is extracted to produce the compact secret key stored and transported by callers. On import, the seed is re-wrapped into the minimal 48-byte PKCS8 ASN.1 structure before calling `crypto.subtle.importKey`.
+
+For ECDSA-P256, public keys are exported via `"raw"` format (65-byte uncompressed point), which is directly importable via `"raw"` as well. This avoids SPKI round-trip complexity.
+
+Ed25519 support requires Node 20+, Bun 1.0+, or a modern browser (Chrome 113+, Firefox 129+, Safari 17+). Calling these engines in older environments will produce a `BrowserCryptoError.KEY.GENERATION_FAILED` from the `crypto.subtle.generateKey` rejection.

plugins/document-navigator/docs/security-stack/crypto/crypto-browser/src/errors/browser-crypto-error/browser-crypto-error.md

@@ -0,0 +1,91 @@
+# browser-crypto-error
+
+<!-- begin:auto-docs -->
+_(no submodules)_
+<!-- end:auto-docs -->
+## Purpose
+
+Defines `BrowserCryptoError`, the structured error class for all `@suaveplan/crypto-browser` failure paths. It extends `SuaveplanError<BrowserCryptoCode>` from `@suaveplan/error`, inheriting cause-chain traversal, OTel span-event adapter support, and wire-format serialization. Every thrown error in this package is an instance of `BrowserCryptoError` with a stable `BrowserCryptoCode` string code, enabling callers to discriminate failure modes with type-safe `instanceof` + `err.code` checks.
+
+The error class follows the project convention: a package-scoped error with a typed code union, `cause`, `context`, and `timestamp` fields. This makes crypto failures observable, loggable, and serializable without depending on runtime-specific error formats.
+
+## Features
+
+- Extends `SuaveplanError<BrowserCryptoCode>` — participates in all project error infrastructure
+- `code` is one of the stable `BROWSER_CRYPTO.*` codes from `codes.ts`
+- `cause` captures the underlying `DOMException` or `Error` from `crypto.subtle`
+- `context` carries optional structured diagnostic data
+- `timestamp` records when the error was thrown
+- Stacktrace captured via `Error.captureStackTrace` where available (V8/Node)
+
+## Usage: Basic Example
+
+```ts
+import { BrowserCryptoError } from "@suaveplan/crypto-browser/errors";
+
+try {
+  await webCryptoAeadEngine.decrypt(wrongKey, ciphertext, nonce);
+} catch (err) {
+  if (err instanceof BrowserCryptoError) {
+    console.error(err.code);    // "BROWSER_CRYPTO.OPERATION.FAILED"
+    console.error(err.cause);   // DOMException: The operation failed ...
+  }
+}
+```
+
+## Usage: Advanced Example
+
+```ts
+import { BrowserCryptoError, BROWSER_CRYPTO_CODES } from "@suaveplan/crypto-browser/errors";
+
+function isNotAvailable(err: unknown): boolean {
+  return (
+    err instanceof BrowserCryptoError &&
+    err.code === BROWSER_CRYPTO_CODES["NOT_AVAILABLE"]
+  );
+}
+
+async function encryptOrFallback(
+  key: Uint8Array,
+  data: Uint8Array
+): Promise<Uint8Array> {
+  try {
+    return await (webCryptoAeadEngine.encrypt(key, data, nonce) as unknown as Promise<Uint8Array>);
+  } catch (err) {
+    if (isNotAvailable(err)) {
+      // Fall back to @noble/ciphers-backed implementation
+      return nobleAeadFallback(key, data);
+    }
+    throw err;
+  }
+}
+```
+
+## API Reference
+
+### `class BrowserCryptoError extends SuaveplanError<BrowserCryptoCode>`
+
+**Constructor:**
+
+```ts
+new BrowserCryptoError(code: BrowserCryptoCode, messageKey: string, options?: SuaveplanErrorOptions)
+```
+
+| Parameter | Type | Description |
+|-----------|------|-------------|
+| `code` | `BrowserCryptoCode` | Stable error code, e.g. `"BROWSER_CRYPTO.NOT_AVAILABLE"` |
+| `messageKey` | `string` | i18n key for the human-readable message |
+| `options` | `SuaveplanErrorOptions` | Optional `{ cause, context, traceId, clock }` |
+
+**Inherited properties:**
+
+- `code: BrowserCryptoCode` — stable error code
+- `cause?: Error` — underlying cause
+- `context?: ErrorContext` — structured diagnostic data
+- `timestamp: number` — `Date.now()` at throw time
+
+## Implementation Notes
+
+The constructor is declared `public` despite mirroring the protected base — Biome lint would flag a "useless constructor" but the intent is to widen visibility. The `biome-ignore` comment is present to document this intent.
+
+All `crypto.subtle` rejections produce `DOMException` instances. These are captured as the `cause` field, making the original platform error available for debugging while presenting a structured `BrowserCryptoError` to callers.

plugins/document-navigator/docs/security-stack/crypto/crypto-browser/src/errors/codes/codes.md

@@ -0,0 +1,81 @@
+# BROWSER_CRYPTO_CODES
+
+<!-- begin:auto-docs -->
+_(no submodules)_
+<!-- end:auto-docs -->
+## Purpose
+
+`codes.ts` defines the complete set of stable error codes used throughout `@suaveplan/crypto-browser`. Each code is a namespaced string constant produced by `defineCodes` from `@suaveplan/error`, ensuring codes are unique within the `"BROWSER_CRYPTO"` namespace and that the `BrowserCryptoCode` union type is always in sync with the registered values at compile time. All WebCrypto-related failures in this package surface under one of these codes, allowing consumers to branch deterministically without parsing message strings.
+
+## Features
+
+- Three codes covering the main WebCrypto failure domains: API unavailability, key generation, and general operation failures
+- Generated via `defineCodes("BROWSER_CRYPTO", [...])` which prefixes each entry and freezes the resulting object
+- `BrowserCryptoCode` is derived as a `typeof` union for compile-time exhaustive narrowing
+- No runtime dependencies beyond `@suaveplan/error`
+
+## Usage: Basic Example
+
+```typescript
+import { BROWSER_CRYPTO_CODES } from "@suaveplan/crypto-browser/errors/codes";
+import { BrowserCryptoError } from "@suaveplan/crypto-browser/errors/browser-crypto-error";
+
+throw new BrowserCryptoError(
+  BROWSER_CRYPTO_CODES["NOT_AVAILABLE"],
+  "error.crypto-browser.not-available"
+);
+```
+
+## Usage: Advanced Example
+
+```typescript
+import {
+  BROWSER_CRYPTO_CODES,
+  type BrowserCryptoCode,
+} from "@suaveplan/crypto-browser/errors/codes";
+import { BrowserCryptoError } from "@suaveplan/crypto-browser/errors/browser-crypto-error";
+
+function handleBrowserCryptoError(err: BrowserCryptoError): string {
+  switch (err.code as BrowserCryptoCode) {
+    case BROWSER_CRYPTO_CODES["NOT_AVAILABLE"]:
+      return "WebCrypto API is not available in this environment (requires HTTPS or localhost).";
+    case BROWSER_CRYPTO_CODES["KEY.GENERATION_FAILED"]:
+      return "Key generation failed — the requested algorithm may not be supported by this browser.";
+    case BROWSER_CRYPTO_CODES["OPERATION.FAILED"]:
+      return "Cryptographic operation failed — check key type, algorithm, and input size.";
+    default:
+      return "Unknown browser crypto error.";
+  }
+}
+```
+
+## API Reference
+
+### `BROWSER_CRYPTO_CODES`
+
+```typescript
+const BROWSER_CRYPTO_CODES: Readonly<Record<string, string>>
+```
+
+A frozen map from short code keys to their namespaced string values. All values are prefixed with `"BROWSER_CRYPTO."` by `defineCodes`.
+
+| Key                    | Namespaced value                             | When thrown                                                       |
+|------------------------|----------------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------|
+| `NOT_AVAILABLE`        | `"BROWSER_CRYPTO.NOT_AVAILABLE"`             | `globalThis.crypto.subtle` is `undefined` or `null`              |
+| `KEY.GENERATION_FAILED`| `"BROWSER_CRYPTO.KEY.GENERATION_FAILED"`     | `SubtleCrypto.generateKey` or `importKey` rejects                |
+| `OPERATION.FAILED`     | `"BROWSER_CRYPTO.OPERATION.FAILED"`          | Any `SubtleCrypto` operation (`encrypt`, `decrypt`, `sign`, `verify`, `deriveBits`, `wrapKey`, `unwrapKey`) rejects |
+
+### `BrowserCryptoCode`
+
+```typescript
+type BrowserCryptoCode =
+  (typeof BROWSER_CRYPTO_CODES)[keyof typeof BROWSER_CRYPTO_CODES];
+```
+
+Union of all namespaced code strings. Use this type to annotate `err.code` when narrowing `BrowserCryptoError` in typed catch blocks.
+
+## Implementation Notes
+
+`defineCodes` returns a plain frozen object and the `BrowserCryptoCode` type collapses to a string literal union. Adding a new entry to the array automatically widens the union without requiring any manual type maintenance.
+
+`OPERATION.FAILED` intentionally covers a broad set of `SubtleCrypto` rejections rather than splitting each operation into its own code. The distinction between, say, a failed `encrypt` and a failed `sign` is captured in the structured `context` field on the thrown `BrowserCryptoError` rather than in the code itself, which keeps the code registry small and stable across algorithm additions.

plugins/document-navigator/docs/security-stack/crypto/crypto-browser/src/non-extractable-key/non-extractable-key.md

@@ -0,0 +1,97 @@
+# non-extractable-key
+
+<!-- begin:auto-docs -->
+_(no submodules)_
+<!-- end:auto-docs -->
+## Purpose
+
+Provides `nonExtractableKey()`, a helper that generates a `CryptoKey` with `extractable: false`. Key material generated this way never leaves the cryptographic engine — it cannot be read by JavaScript code via `crypto.subtle.exportKey`. The key handle can be used for cryptographic operations but its raw bytes are permanently inaccessible, providing a hardware-security-module-like boundary in software.
+
+This is the correct approach whenever keys must remain hardware-bound or compliance requirements prohibit key export. Examples include session-scoped encryption keys, FIDO2-style signing keys, and keys derived from hardware-backed key material in PWA contexts. The non-extractability also means that if an adversary gains script execution access, they cannot exfiltrate the key bytes — they can only use the key handle for operations it was created for.
+
+## Features
+
+- Generates a `CryptoKey` with `extractable: false` for any `crypto.subtle`-supported algorithm
+- Supports symmetric algorithms: AES-GCM, AES-CBC, AES-KW, HMAC
+- Supports asymmetric algorithms: ECDSA (P-256, P-384), ECDH (P-256, P-384), Ed25519, X25519
+- For asymmetric algorithms, returns only the private key (the non-extractable half)
+- `assertWebCryptoAvailable()` guard before any `crypto.subtle` call
+- Typed `BrowserCryptoError` on generation failure
+
+## Usage: Basic Example
+
+```ts
+import { nonExtractableKey } from "@suaveplan/crypto-browser/non-extractable-key/non-extractable-key";
+
+// Generate a non-extractable AES-256-GCM key for session encryption
+const sessionKey = await nonExtractableKey(
+  { name: "AES-GCM", length: 256 },
+  ["encrypt", "decrypt"]
+);
+
+// sessionKey.extractable === false
+// crypto.subtle.exportKey("raw", sessionKey) will throw
+
+const nonce = crypto.getRandomValues(new Uint8Array(12));
+const ciphertext = await crypto.subtle.encrypt(
+  { name: "AES-GCM", iv: nonce },
+  sessionKey,
+  new TextEncoder().encode("private data")
+);
+```
+
+## Usage: Advanced Example
+
+```ts
+import { nonExtractableKey } from "@suaveplan/crypto-browser/non-extractable-key/non-extractable-key";
+
+// Hardware-bound ECDSA signing key — private key material never leaves the engine
+async function createBoundSigningKey(): Promise<CryptoKey> {
+  return nonExtractableKey(
+    { name: "ECDSA", namedCurve: "P-256" },
+    ["sign"]
+  );
+}
+
+// Use the key for signing without any risk of key extraction
+async function signChallenge(
+  key: CryptoKey,
+  challenge: Uint8Array
+): Promise<Uint8Array> {
+  const sig = await crypto.subtle.sign(
+    { name: "ECDSA", hash: "SHA-256" },
+    key,
+    challenge
+  );
+  return new Uint8Array(sig);
+}
+
+// Store the key in IndexedDB for persistence (CryptoKey is structured-cloneable)
+// async function storeKey(db: IDBDatabase, key: CryptoKey): Promise<void> { ... }
+```
+
+## API Reference
+
+### `nonExtractableKey(algorithm, usages): Promise<CryptoKey>`
+
+Generates a non-extractable `CryptoKey`.
+
+| Parameter | Type | Description |
+|-----------|------|-------------|
+| `algorithm` | `AlgorithmIdentifier \| RsaHashedKeyGenParams \| EcKeyGenParams \| HmacKeyGenParams \| AesKeyGenParams` | Key generation algorithm descriptor |
+| `usages` | `KeyUsage[]` | Intended key operations, e.g. `["encrypt", "decrypt"]` |
+
+**Returns:** `Promise<CryptoKey>` with `extractable === false`.
+
+- For symmetric algorithms: returns the `CryptoKey` directly.
+- For asymmetric algorithms: returns the `privateKey` from the generated `CryptoKeyPair`.
+
+**Throws:** `BrowserCryptoError` — `BROWSER_CRYPTO.KEY.GENERATION_FAILED` or `BROWSER_CRYPTO.NOT_AVAILABLE`.
+
+## Implementation Notes
+
+The implementation calls `crypto.subtle.generateKey` with `extractable: false`. The Web Crypto API guarantees that once a key is created non-extractable, no subsequent API call can extract the raw bytes — `exportKey` will throw `InvalidAccessError` unconditionally.
+
+For asymmetric algorithms, `generateKey` returns a `CryptoKeyPair`. The function detects this via `"privateKey" in result` and returns only the private key. The public key is discarded; if callers need the public key they should use the specific engine modules (`ecdsaP384.generateKeypair()`, etc.) which export both.
+
+Non-extractable keys are structured-cloneable and can be persisted to `IndexedDB`, shared with `BroadcastChannel`, or transferred to `Worker` contexts via `postMessage` — without ever exposing the raw key bytes. This makes them suitable for long-lived application keys that survive page reloads.

plugins/document-navigator/docs/security-stack/crypto/crypto-browser/src/rsa/rsa.md

@@ -0,0 +1,138 @@
+# rsa
+
+<!-- begin:auto-docs -->
+_(no submodules)_
+<!-- end:auto-docs -->
+## Purpose
+
+Provides a high-level `rsa` namespace object wrapping RSA cryptographic operations from `crypto.subtle`. Supports three algorithm variants — `RSA-PSS`, `RSA-OAEP`, and `RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5` — for signing/verification and asymmetric encryption/decryption. Keys are represented as standard DER byte arrays (SPKI for public keys, PKCS8 for private keys), which are universally portable across platforms and easy to store and transmit.
+
+RSA is provided alongside the elliptic-curve engines for interoperability with legacy systems, PKI infrastructure, and protocols that require RSA (e.g., certain TLS cipher suites, JWT RSA algorithms, legacy JOSE). For new designs, Ed25519 and ECDH-X25519 are preferred.
+
+## Features
+
+- `generateKeypair(algorithm, modulusLength?)` — generates an RSA keypair; default 2048-bit modulus, configurable up to 4096 bits
+- `sign(algorithm, privateKey, message)` — RSA-PSS or RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5 signature generation
+- `verify(algorithm, publicKey, signature, message)` — RSA signature verification
+- `encrypt(publicKey, plaintext)` — RSA-OAEP encryption (public-key encryption)
+- `decrypt(privateKey, ciphertext)` — RSA-OAEP decryption
+- SHA-256 hash used for all operations
+- RSA-PSS uses 32-byte salt length
+- All methods guard with `assertWebCryptoAvailable()`
+- Typed `BrowserCryptoError` for all failure paths
+
+## Usage: Basic Example
+
+```ts
+import { rsa } from "@suaveplan/crypto-browser/rsa/rsa";
+
+// Generate and use RSA-PSS for signing
+const { publicKey, privateKey } = await rsa.generateKeypair("RSA-PSS");
+const message = new TextEncoder().encode("document to sign");
+
+const signature = await rsa.sign("RSA-PSS", privateKey, message);
+const valid = await rsa.verify("RSA-PSS", publicKey, signature, message);
+console.log(valid); // true
+```
+
+## Usage: Advanced Example
+
+```ts
+import { rsa, type RsaAlgorithm } from "@suaveplan/crypto-browser/rsa/rsa";
+import { BrowserCryptoError } from "@suaveplan/crypto-browser/errors";
+
+// RSA-OAEP for encrypting a small payload (e.g., a symmetric key)
+async function wrapAesKey(
+  recipientPublicKey: Uint8Array,
+  aesKey: Uint8Array  // must be <= ~190 bytes for RSA-2048
+): Promise<Uint8Array> {
+  try {
+    return await rsa.encrypt(recipientPublicKey, aesKey);
+  } catch (err) {
+    if (err instanceof BrowserCryptoError) {
+      console.error(`Crypto failure: ${err.code}`);
+    }
+    throw err;
+  }
+}
+
+async function unwrapAesKey(
+  recipientPrivateKey: Uint8Array,
+  wrappedKey: Uint8Array
+): Promise<Uint8Array> {
+  return await rsa.decrypt(recipientPrivateKey, wrappedKey);
+}
+
+// 4096-bit keypair for higher-security contexts
+const { publicKey, privateKey } = await rsa.generateKeypair("RSA-OAEP", 4096);
+```
+
+## API Reference
+
+### `rsa.generateKeypair(algorithm, modulusLength?): Promise<{ publicKey, privateKey }>`
+
+Generates an RSA keypair.
+
+| Parameter | Type | Default | Description |
+|-----------|------|---------|-------------|
+| `algorithm` | `RsaAlgorithm` | — | `"RSA-PSS"` \| `"RSA-OAEP"` \| `"RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5"` |
+| `modulusLength` | `number` | `2048` | Key bit length (2048 or 4096 recommended) |
+
+**Returns:** `Promise<{ publicKey: Uint8Array; privateKey: Uint8Array }>` — SPKI/PKCS8 DER bytes.
+
+**Throws:** `BrowserCryptoError` — `BROWSER_CRYPTO.KEY.GENERATION_FAILED`.
+
+---
+
+### `rsa.sign(algorithm, privateKey, message): Promise<Uint8Array>`
+
+Signs a message. Use with `"RSA-PSS"` or `"RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5"`.
+
+| Parameter | Type | Description |
+|-----------|------|-------------|
+| `algorithm` | `RsaAlgorithm` | Must match keypair generation algorithm |
+| `privateKey` | `Uint8Array` | PKCS8 DER private key |
+| `message` | `Uint8Array` | Message to sign |
+
+**Returns:** `Promise<Uint8Array>` — signature bytes.
+
+**Throws:** `BrowserCryptoError` — `BROWSER_CRYPTO.OPERATION.FAILED`.
+
+---
+
+### `rsa.verify(algorithm, publicKey, signature, message): Promise<boolean>`
+
+| Parameter | Type | Description |
+|-----------|------|-------------|
+| `algorithm` | `RsaAlgorithm` | Must match signing algorithm |
+| `publicKey` | `Uint8Array` | SPKI DER public key |
+| `signature` | `Uint8Array` | Signature bytes |
+| `message` | `Uint8Array` | Original message |
+
+**Returns:** `Promise<boolean>`.
+
+---
+
+### `rsa.encrypt(publicKey, plaintext): Promise<Uint8Array>`
+
+RSA-OAEP encryption. For RSA-2048, plaintext must be ≤ 190 bytes (2048-bit modulus minus OAEP overhead).
+
+---
+
+### `rsa.decrypt(privateKey, ciphertext): Promise<Uint8Array>`
+
+RSA-OAEP decryption.
+
+---
+
+### `type RsaAlgorithm`
+
+`"RSA-PSS" | "RSA-OAEP" | "RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5"`
+
+## Implementation Notes
+
+All RSA operations use SHA-256 as the hash algorithm, which is the most widely supported and appropriate choice for 2048- and 4096-bit RSA. RSA-PSS uses a 32-byte (256-bit) salt, matching the hash output length, which is the PKCS#1v2.2 recommendation.
+
+The `encrypt()` and `decrypt()` methods are hardcoded to RSA-OAEP — only RSA-OAEP provides semantic security for asymmetric encryption. `RSA-PSS` and `RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5` are signing-only algorithms and cannot be used with `encrypt`/`decrypt`.
+
+Key generation for RSA-2048 typically takes 50–200 ms in `crypto.subtle`; RSA-4096 can take 500–2000 ms. This is significantly slower than elliptic-curve key generation (< 5 ms). All operations use `await` and do not block the main thread.