Initial Commit

packages/identity/auth/macos-keychain/src/constants/index.ts

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+/**
+ * Constants for `@suaveplan/macos-keychain`.
+ *
+ * Exit codes match Apple's `errSec*` values from `<Security/SecBase.h>`.
+ * Stderr substring patterns are sourced from the macOS `security` CLI source
+ * tree and confirmed against live output captured in
+ * `tests/integration.test.ts` on macOS 14.
+ */
+
+/** Absolute path of the macOS `security` binary. */
+export const SECURITY_BINARY = "/usr/bin/security";
+
+/** Default per-CLI-call timeout in milliseconds. */
+export const DEFAULT_TIMEOUT_MS = 10_000;
+
+/** `errSecItemNotFound` — the keychain item could not be located. */
+export const EXIT_ITEM_NOT_FOUND = 44;
+
+/** `errSecDuplicateItem` — an item with the same primary key already exists. */
+export const EXIT_DUPLICATE_ITEM = 45;
+
+/** `errSecAuthFailed` — the user (or process) failed authentication. */
+export const EXIT_AUTH_FAILED = 36;
+
+/** `errSecInteractionNotAllowed` — non-interactive context blocked the call. */
+export const EXIT_INTERACTION_NOT_ALLOWED = 25_308;
+
+/** `errSecInvalidKeychain` — keychain reference is invalid or malformed. */
+export const EXIT_INVALID_KEYCHAIN = 25_295;
+
+/**
+ * Stderr substrings that indicate the keychain is locked. The classifier
+ * checks each pattern (case-insensitive) before falling back to exit-code
+ * mapping; a locked stderr beats an ambiguous exit code so callers see the
+ * actionable `KEYCHAIN.LOCKED` rather than a generic access failure.
+ */
+export const EXIT_LOCKED_PATTERNS: readonly string[] = [
+    "user interaction is not allowed",
+    "the user name or passphrase you entered is not correct",
+    "keychain is locked",
+    "keychain could not be unlocked",
+];
+
+/**
+ * Stderr substrings that indicate a `not-found` outcome. Apple's CLI emits
+ * different phrasings on different OS versions; the classifier accepts any
+ * of these as evidence the lookup target does not exist.
+ */
+export const NOT_FOUND_STDERR_PATTERNS: readonly string[] = [
+    "could not be found",
+    "not be found in the user's default keychain",
+    "no such keychain",
+    "the specified item could not be found",
+];
+
+/**
+ * Stderr substrings that indicate a duplicate-item outcome.
+ */
+export const DUPLICATE_STDERR_PATTERNS: readonly string[] = [
+    "duplicate",
+    "already exists",
+    "the specified item already exists",
+];
+
+/**
+ * Stderr substrings that indicate a permission / authorization failure.
+ */
+export const PERMISSION_STDERR_PATTERNS: readonly string[] = [
+    "permission",
+    "not authorized",
+    "access denied",
+    "user is not allowed",
+];
+
+/**
+ * Stderr substrings that indicate the keychain service itself is unavailable.
+ */
+export const UNAVAILABLE_STDERR_PATTERNS: readonly string[] = [
+    "keychain service unavailable",
+    "no such file or directory",
+    "/usr/bin/security: command not found",
+];
+
+/**
+ * Stderr substrings that indicate the keychain reference or item type is
+ * invalid (e.g. malformed primary key, non-string fields).
+ */
+export const INVALID_STDERR_PATTERNS: readonly string[] = [
+    "seckeychainitemref",
+    "invalid",
+    "malformed",
+];

packages/identity/auth/macos-keychain/src/core/error-classifier/error-classifier.md

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+# error-classifier
+
+<!-- begin:auto-docs -->
+_(no submodules)_
+<!-- end:auto-docs -->
+## Purpose
+
+Translates the noisy `(exitCode, stderr)` tuples emitted by the macOS
+`security` binary into a single `KeychainError` with a stable code. Apple's
+CLI returns the same numeric exit code for several distinct failure modes,
+so the classifier looks at stderr substrings first; the exit code only
+matters when stderr is silent or generic.
+
+This separation keeps the bridge implementation small — every CRUD method
+calls the classifier on a non-zero exit code and either rethrows the
+returned error or, when the classifier returns `null`, wraps the failure in
+`keychainAccessFailed` for the trace to retain the original stderr.
+
+## Features
+
+- Pure function — deterministic on its inputs, no globals, no allocations
+  beyond the returned error.
+- Stderr substring matching (case-insensitive) takes precedence over numeric
+  exit codes.
+- Five exit codes are mapped: `errSecItemNotFound`, `errSecDuplicateItem`,
+  `errSecAuthFailed`, `errSecInteractionNotAllowed`, `errSecInvalidKeychain`.
+- Returns `null` for unrecognised pairs so the caller can decide between a
+  generic fallback and a hard fail.
+
+## Usage: Basic Example
+
+```ts
+import { classifyError } from "@suaveplan/macos-keychain";
+
+const err = classifyError(44, "could not be found", "my-app", "alice");
+console.error(err?.code); // "KEYCHAIN.NOT_FOUND"
+```
+
+## Usage: Advanced Example
+
+```ts
+import {
+    classifyError,
+    keychainAccessFailed,
+} from "@suaveplan/macos-keychain";
+
+async function callSecurity(): Promise<void> {
+    const result = await runner("/usr/bin/security", ["find-generic-password"]);
+    if (result.exitCode === 0) return;
+    const classified = classifyError(
+        result.exitCode,
+        result.stderr,
+        "my-app",
+        "alice"
+    );
+    throw classified ?? keychainAccessFailed("my-app", "alice", result.stderr);
+}
+
+declare function runner(
+    cmd: string,
+    args: readonly string[]
+): Promise<{ stdout: string; stderr: string; exitCode: number }>;
+```
+
+## API Reference
+
+- **`classifyError(exitCode: number, stderr: string, service: string,
+  account: string): KeychainError | null`** — returns the matching
+  `KeychainError` or `null` for unknown combinations. Pure function.
+
+  Precedence:
+  1. Stderr matches `EXIT_LOCKED_PATTERNS` → `KEYCHAIN.LOCKED`.
+  2. Stderr matches `UNAVAILABLE_STDERR_PATTERNS` → `KEYCHAIN.UNAVAILABLE`.
+  3. Stderr matches `PERMISSION_STDERR_PATTERNS` →
+     `KEYCHAIN.PERMISSION_DENIED`.
+  4. Stderr matches `NOT_FOUND_STDERR_PATTERNS` → `KEYCHAIN.NOT_FOUND`.
+  5. Stderr matches `DUPLICATE_STDERR_PATTERNS` → `KEYCHAIN.ITEM_EXISTS`.
+  6. Stderr matches `INVALID_STDERR_PATTERNS` → `KEYCHAIN.ITEM_INVALID`.
+  7. Exit code `44` → `KEYCHAIN.NOT_FOUND`.
+  8. Exit code `45` → `KEYCHAIN.ITEM_EXISTS`.
+  9. Exit code `36` → `KEYCHAIN.ACCESS_FAILED`.
+  10. Exit code `25308` → `KEYCHAIN.LOCKED`.
+  11. Exit code `25295` → `KEYCHAIN.ITEM_INVALID`.
+  12. Otherwise → `null`.
+
+## Implementation Notes
+
+- Substring matching is case-insensitive; both the haystack and the needles
+  are lower-cased before `String.prototype.includes`.
+- The locked-pattern check runs first because Apple frequently surfaces a
+  locked-keychain failure with exit code `1`, which the numeric switch
+  cannot disambiguate.
+- The classifier never throws; on a malformed input (e.g. NaN exit code) it
+  returns `null` and lets the caller's fallback layer take over.
+- Adding a new `errSec*` constant requires three edits: a new entry in
+  `constants/index.ts`, a new branch in this file's `switch`, and a new
+  scenario in `error-classifier.test.ts`.

packages/identity/auth/macos-keychain/src/core/error-classifier/error-classifier.test.ts

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+import { describe, expect, it } from "@suaveplan/testing/runner";
+import {
+    EXIT_AUTH_FAILED,
+    EXIT_DUPLICATE_ITEM,
+    EXIT_INTERACTION_NOT_ALLOWED,
+    EXIT_INVALID_KEYCHAIN,
+    EXIT_ITEM_NOT_FOUND,
+} from "../../constants/index.js";
+import { classifyError } from "./error-classifier.js";
+
+describe("classifyError", () => {
+    it("classifies errSecItemNotFound as KEYCHAIN.NOT_FOUND", {
+        timeout: 5000,
+    }, () => {
+        const err = classifyError(
+            EXIT_ITEM_NOT_FOUND,
+            "could not be found",
+            "svc",
+            "user"
+        );
+        expect(err?.code).toBe("KEYCHAIN.NOT_FOUND");
+    });
+
+    it("classifies errSecDuplicateItem as KEYCHAIN.ITEM_EXISTS", {
+        timeout: 5000,
+    }, () => {
+        const err = classifyError(
+            EXIT_DUPLICATE_ITEM,
+            "duplicate item",
+            "svc",
+            "user"
+        );
+        expect(err?.code).toBe("KEYCHAIN.ITEM_EXISTS");
+    });
+
+    it("classifies errSecAuthFailed as KEYCHAIN.ACCESS_FAILED via exit code", {
+        timeout: 5000,
+    }, () => {
+        const err = classifyError(EXIT_AUTH_FAILED, "", "svc", "user");
+        expect(err?.code).toBe("KEYCHAIN.ACCESS_FAILED");
+    });
+
+    it("classifies errSecInteractionNotAllowed as KEYCHAIN.LOCKED via exit code", {
+        timeout: 5000,
+    }, () => {
+        const err = classifyError(
+            EXIT_INTERACTION_NOT_ALLOWED,
+            "non-interactive",
+            "svc",
+            "user"
+        );
+        expect(err?.code).toBe("KEYCHAIN.LOCKED");
+    });
+
+    it("classifies errSecInvalidKeychain as KEYCHAIN.ITEM_INVALID via exit code", {
+        timeout: 5000,
+    }, () => {
+        const err = classifyError(EXIT_INVALID_KEYCHAIN, "", "svc", "user");
+        expect(err?.code).toBe("KEYCHAIN.ITEM_INVALID");
+    });
+
+    it("prefers locked-stderr over ambiguous exit code", {
+        timeout: 5000,
+    }, () => {
+        const err = classifyError(
+            1,
+            "User interaction is not allowed; locked",
+            "svc",
+            "user"
+        );
+        expect(err?.code).toBe("KEYCHAIN.LOCKED");
+    });
+
+    it("prefers unavailable-stderr over ambiguous exit code", {
+        timeout: 5000,
+    }, () => {
+        const err = classifyError(
+            1,
+            "no such file or directory",
+            "svc",
+            "user"
+        );
+        expect(err?.code).toBe("KEYCHAIN.UNAVAILABLE");
+    });
+
+    it("prefers permission-stderr over ambiguous exit code", {
+        timeout: 5000,
+    }, () => {
+        const err = classifyError(1, "permission denied", "svc", "user");
+        expect(err?.code).toBe("KEYCHAIN.PERMISSION_DENIED");
+    });
+
+    it("prefers not-found-stderr over ambiguous exit code", {
+        timeout: 5000,
+    }, () => {
+        const err = classifyError(
+            1,
+            "the specified item could not be found",
+            "svc",
+            "user"
+        );
+        expect(err?.code).toBe("KEYCHAIN.NOT_FOUND");
+    });
+
+    it("prefers duplicate-stderr over ambiguous exit code", {
+        timeout: 5000,
+    }, () => {
+        const err = classifyError(1, "already exists", "svc", "user");
+        expect(err?.code).toBe("KEYCHAIN.ITEM_EXISTS");
+    });
+
+    it("prefers invalid-stderr over ambiguous exit code", {
+        timeout: 5000,
+    }, () => {
+        const err = classifyError(
+            1,
+            "SecKeychainItemRef invalid",
+            "svc",
+            "user"
+        );
+        expect(err?.code).toBe("KEYCHAIN.ITEM_INVALID");
+    });
+
+    it("returns null for unknown exit code and stderr combinations", {
+        timeout: 5000,
+    }, () => {
+        const err = classifyError(99999, "totally unknown", "svc", "user");
+        expect(err).toBeNull();
+    });
+
+    it("preserves service and account in the structured context", {
+        timeout: 5000,
+    }, () => {
+        const err = classifyError(EXIT_ITEM_NOT_FOUND, "", "svc-x", "user-y");
+        expect(err?.context).toMatchObject({
+            service: "svc-x",
+            account: "user-y",
+        });
+    });
+});

packages/identity/auth/macos-keychain/src/core/error-classifier/error-classifier.ts

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+/**
+ * Maps `(exitCode, stderr)` tuples emitted by the macOS `security` CLI to the
+ * matching `KeychainError` factory. Stderr substrings take precedence over
+ * the exit code because Apple's CLI is more specific in stderr than in its
+ * numeric return code (e.g. exit `1` covers many distinct failure modes).
+ */
+
+import {
+    DUPLICATE_STDERR_PATTERNS,
+    EXIT_AUTH_FAILED,
+    EXIT_DUPLICATE_ITEM,
+    EXIT_INTERACTION_NOT_ALLOWED,
+    EXIT_INVALID_KEYCHAIN,
+    EXIT_ITEM_NOT_FOUND,
+    EXIT_LOCKED_PATTERNS,
+    INVALID_STDERR_PATTERNS,
+    NOT_FOUND_STDERR_PATTERNS,
+    PERMISSION_STDERR_PATTERNS,
+    UNAVAILABLE_STDERR_PATTERNS,
+} from "../../constants/index.js";
+import type { KeychainError } from "../../error-codes.js";
+import {
+    keychainAccessFailed,
+    keychainItemExists,
+    keychainItemInvalid,
+    keychainLocked,
+    keychainNotFound,
+    keychainPermissionDenied,
+    keychainUnavailable,
+} from "../../errors/keychain-errors.js";
+
+function matchesAny(haystack: string, patterns: readonly string[]): boolean {
+    const lower = haystack.toLowerCase();
+    for (const pattern of patterns) {
+        if (lower.includes(pattern.toLowerCase())) {
+            return true;
+        }
+    }
+    return false;
+}
+
+/**
+ * Classify a failed `security` CLI invocation.
+ *
+ * Order of precedence:
+ *   1. Stderr substring patterns (locked → unavailable → permission →
+ *      invalid → not-found → duplicate).
+ *   2. Numeric exit code (`errSecItemNotFound`, `errSecDuplicateItem`,
+ *      `errSecAuthFailed`, `errSecInteractionNotAllowed`,
+ *      `errSecInvalidKeychain`).
+ *   3. Return `null` to signal "unknown" — the caller wraps in a generic
+ *      `keychainAccessFailed` so the trace still surfaces.
+ */
+export function classifyError(
+    exitCode: number,
+    stderr: string,
+    service: string,
+    account: string
+): KeychainError | null {
+    if (matchesAny(stderr, EXIT_LOCKED_PATTERNS)) {
+        return keychainLocked(service, account);
+    }
+    if (matchesAny(stderr, UNAVAILABLE_STDERR_PATTERNS)) {
+        return keychainUnavailable(stderr);
+    }
+    if (matchesAny(stderr, PERMISSION_STDERR_PATTERNS)) {
+        return keychainPermissionDenied(service, account);
+    }
+    if (matchesAny(stderr, NOT_FOUND_STDERR_PATTERNS)) {
+        return keychainNotFound(service, account);
+    }
+    if (matchesAny(stderr, DUPLICATE_STDERR_PATTERNS)) {
+        return keychainItemExists(service, account);
+    }
+    if (matchesAny(stderr, INVALID_STDERR_PATTERNS)) {
+        return keychainItemInvalid(service, account, stderr);
+    }
+    switch (exitCode) {
+        case EXIT_ITEM_NOT_FOUND:
+            return keychainNotFound(service, account);
+        case EXIT_DUPLICATE_ITEM:
+            return keychainItemExists(service, account);
+        case EXIT_AUTH_FAILED:
+            return keychainAccessFailed(service, account, stderr);
+        case EXIT_INTERACTION_NOT_ALLOWED:
+            return keychainLocked(service, account);
+        case EXIT_INVALID_KEYCHAIN:
+            return keychainItemInvalid(service, account, stderr);
+        default:
+            return null;
+    }
+}

packages/identity/auth/macos-keychain/src/core/keychain-bridge/default-executor.md

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+# default-executor
+
+## Purpose
+
+Provides the runtime-aware default `CommandExecutor` used by the bridge when
+the consumer does not inject one. The executor encapsulates the only place
+in the package that reaches into `Bun.spawn` or `node:child_process.spawn`;
+every other module operates on the `CommandExecutor` abstraction so tests
+can substitute a deterministic stub.
+
+The factory chooses Bun when `globalThis.Bun` is present and falls back to
+Node's `spawn` otherwise. Neither path goes through a shell — the binary
+path and arguments are passed as a structured array.
+
+## Features
+
+- Runtime detection per call (so a host that lazily polyfills `globalThis.Bun`
+  still routes correctly).
+- AbortSignal propagation — `options.signal` is forwarded to the underlying
+  spawn API so caller-side cancellation reaches the child.
+- UTF-8 stdout/stderr capture — both streams are decoded as text before being
+  returned.
+- Graceful failure — `error` events on the Node path reject the promise; Bun
+  errors propagate via `child.exited`.
+
+## Usage: Basic Example
+
+```ts
+import { createDefaultExecutor } from "@suaveplan/macos-keychain";
+
+const runner = createDefaultExecutor();
+const result = await runner("/usr/bin/security", ["list-keychains"]);
+console.log(result.exitCode, result.stdout);
+```
+
+## Usage: Advanced Example
+
+```ts
+import {
+    MacOSKeychainBridge,
+    createDefaultExecutor,
+} from "@suaveplan/macos-keychain";
+
+const runner = createDefaultExecutor();
+const bridge = new MacOSKeychainBridge({ timeoutMs: 5_000 }, runner);
+
+const controller = new AbortController();
+const timeoutHandle = setTimeout(() => controller.abort(), 1_000);
+try {
+    await bridge.findItem("github", "alice", { signal: controller.signal });
+} finally {
+    clearTimeout(timeoutHandle);
+}
+```
+
+## API Reference
+
+- **`createDefaultExecutor(): CommandExecutor`** — returns an async
+  `(command, args, options) => Promise<CommandExecutorResult>`. The
+  resolved value contains `stdout`, `stderr`, and `exitCode`. Rejects only
+  when the runtime itself errors (binary missing, abort signal already
+  aborted).
+
+## Implementation Notes
+
+- The Bun branch reads the `stdout` / `stderr` `ReadableStream<Uint8Array>`
+  fully into memory before returning. For the `security` CLI this is fine
+  because the worst-case payload (a single keychain item plus surrounding
+  metadata) is a few kilobytes.
+- The Node branch uses `child.stdout.setEncoding("utf8")` so the `data`
+  events deliver decoded strings; the executor concatenates them rather
+  than buffering raw bytes.
+- Aborting the underlying child mid-call surfaces as either an `error`
+  event (Node) or a non-zero exit code (Bun). The bridge layer translates
+  both into `KEYCHAIN.TIMEOUT` when the combined signal indicates the
+  timeout fired.
+- No globals are mutated; the factory returns a fresh closure per call so
+  tests can construct multiple bridges with independent runtime detection.

packages/identity/auth/macos-keychain/src/core/keychain-bridge/default-executor.test.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,174 @@
+import { describe, expect, it } from "@suaveplan/testing/runner";
+import { createDefaultExecutor } from "./default-executor.js";
+
+describe("createDefaultExecutor", () => {
+    it("returns a callable async function", { timeout: 5000 }, () => {
+        const runner = createDefaultExecutor();
+        expect(typeof runner).toBe("function");
+    });
+
+    it("invokes a real harmless binary on the host (Node spawn path)", {
+        timeout: 30000,
+    }, async () => {
+        const runner = createDefaultExecutor();
+        const result = await runner("/bin/echo", ["hello", "world"]);
+        expect(result.exitCode).toBe(0);
+        expect(result.stdout.trim()).toBe("hello world");
+    });
+
+    it("captures stderr output", { timeout: 30000 }, async () => {
+        const runner = createDefaultExecutor();
+        // /bin/sh -c 'echo to-stderr 1>&2' deliberately uses a portable
+        // single-call invocation; the runner still passes args as an array.
+        const result = await runner("/bin/sh", ["-c", "echo error 1>&2"]);
+        expect(result.exitCode).toBe(0);
+        expect(result.stderr).toContain("error");
+    });
+
+    it("returns the non-zero exit code when the binary fails", {
+        timeout: 30000,
+    }, async () => {
+        const runner = createDefaultExecutor();
+        const result = await runner("/bin/sh", ["-c", "exit 7"]);
+        expect(result.exitCode).toBe(7);
+    });
+
+    it("rejects when the binary does not exist", {
+        timeout: 30000,
+    }, async () => {
+        const runner = createDefaultExecutor();
+        await expect(
+            runner("/this/path/does/not/exist/xyz", [])
+        ).rejects.toBeInstanceOf(Error);
+    });
+
+    it("propagates AbortSignal cancellation on the Node spawn path", {
+        timeout: 30000,
+    }, async () => {
+        // Force the Node path so this test exercises the spawnViaNode
+        // abort handling regardless of host runtime. Under Bun's native
+        // spawn, abort surfaces as a non-rejected exit code; the Node
+        // path consistently rejects, which is what callers depend on.
+        const runner = createDefaultExecutor({ resolveBun: () => undefined });
+        const ac = new AbortController();
+        const promise = runner("/bin/sh", ["-c", "sleep 5"], {
+            signal: ac.signal,
+        });
+        setTimeout(() => ac.abort(), 20);
+        await expect(promise).rejects.toBeDefined();
+    });
+
+    it("captures stdout and stderr on the Node spawn path", {
+        timeout: 30000,
+    }, async () => {
+        // Force the Node path and emit both stdout + stderr from the
+        // child so the spawnViaNode "data" handlers (stdout += chunk /
+        // stderr += chunk) execute. Under turbo's bun-node binary the
+        // default executor takes the Bun fast-path and bypasses those
+        // handlers, leaving them uncovered — this test pins them.
+        const runner = createDefaultExecutor({ resolveBun: () => undefined });
+        const result = await runner("/bin/sh", [
+            "-c",
+            "echo out && echo err 1>&2",
+        ]);
+        expect(result.exitCode).toBe(0);
+        expect(result.stdout).toContain("out");
+        expect(result.stderr).toContain("err");
+    });
+
+    it("uses the Bun fast-path when resolveBun returns a runtime", {
+        timeout: 5000,
+    }, async () => {
+        const fakeBun = {
+            spawn() {
+                return {
+                    stdout: new ReadableStream<Uint8Array>({
+                        start(controller) {
+                            controller.enqueue(
+                                new TextEncoder().encode("ok\n")
+                            );
+                            controller.close();
+                        },
+                    }),
+                    stderr: new ReadableStream<Uint8Array>({
+                        start(controller) {
+                            controller.close();
+                        },
+                    }),
+                    exited: Promise.resolve(0),
+                };
+            },
+        };
+        const runner = createDefaultExecutor({ resolveBun: () => fakeBun });
+        const result = await runner("/usr/bin/security", ["list-keychains"]);
+        expect(result.exitCode).toBe(0);
+        expect(result.stdout).toBe("ok\n");
+    });
+
+    it("returns 130 when the Node child terminates via signal (code === null)", {
+        timeout: 30000,
+    }, async () => {
+        // Spawn a long-running child, then kill it; the Node `close` event
+        // fires with `code === null` when termination is signal-driven, which
+        // the executor maps to exit code 130.
+        const cp = await import("node:child_process");
+        const child = cp.spawn("/bin/sh", ["-c", "sleep 5"]);
+        // Defer the kill so the child is fully spawned before we send SIGTERM.
+        setTimeout(() => child.kill("SIGTERM"), 10);
+        const result = await new Promise<number | null>((resolve) => {
+            child.on("close", resolve);
+        });
+        // Verify the underlying Node behaviour the executor relies on.
+        expect(result).toBeNull();
+    });
+
+    it("maps a signal-killed child to exitCode 130 on the Node path", {
+        timeout: 30000,
+    }, async () => {
+        // Force the Node path — Bun's native spawn surfaces signalled
+        // termination differently and is exercised separately.
+        const runner = createDefaultExecutor({ resolveBun: () => undefined });
+        const ac = new AbortController();
+        const promise = runner("/bin/sh", ["-c", "sleep 5"], {
+            signal: ac.signal,
+        });
+        // Trigger an abort that the Node spawn translates to a signal-driven
+        // close. Some Node versions surface this as an `error` event instead
+        // of a `close` with null code; tolerate both.
+        setTimeout(() => ac.abort(), 20);
+        try {
+            const result = await promise;
+            expect(result.exitCode).toBe(130);
+        } catch (err) {
+            expect(err).toBeDefined();
+        }
+    });
+
+    it("forwards signal option to the Bun spawn call", {
+        timeout: 5000,
+    }, async () => {
+        let receivedSignal: AbortSignal | undefined;
+        const fakeBun = {
+            spawn(options: { signal?: AbortSignal | undefined }) {
+                receivedSignal = options.signal;
+                return {
+                    stdout: new ReadableStream<Uint8Array>({
+                        start(c) {
+                            c.close();
+                        },
+                    }),
+                    stderr: new ReadableStream<Uint8Array>({
+                        start(c) {
+                            c.close();
+                        },
+                    }),
+                    exited: Promise.resolve(0),
+                };
+            },
+        };
+        const runner = createDefaultExecutor({ resolveBun: () => fakeBun });
+        const ac = new AbortController();
+        await runner("/usr/bin/security", [], { signal: ac.signal });
+        expect(receivedSignal).toBe(ac.signal);
+    });
+});

packages/identity/auth/macos-keychain/src/core/keychain-bridge/default-executor.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,165 @@
+/**
+ * Default `CommandExecutor` factory.
+ *
+ * On the Bun runtime we use `Bun.spawn` for low-overhead child process
+ * launches; on Node.js we delegate to `node:child_process.spawn`. Neither
+ * code path goes through a shell — arguments are passed as an array and
+ * the macOS `security` binary is launched directly by file path.
+ *
+ * This file is the only place in the package that reaches into the runtime
+ * for child-process APIs; everything else operates on the `CommandExecutor`
+ * abstraction so tests can substitute a deterministic stub.
+ */
+
+import type {
+    CommandExecutor,
+    CommandExecutorOptions,
+    CommandExecutorResult,
+} from "../../types/macos-keychain.types.js";
+
+interface BunGlobalShape {
+    spawn: (options: BunSpawnOptions) => BunChild;
+}
+
+interface BunSpawnOptions {
+    cmd: readonly string[];
+    stdout: "pipe";
+    stderr: "pipe";
+    signal?: AbortSignal | undefined;
+}
+
+interface BunChild {
+    exited: Promise<number>;
+    stdout: ReadableStream<Uint8Array>;
+    stderr: ReadableStream<Uint8Array>;
+}
+
+declare const Bun: BunGlobalShape | undefined;
+
+async function readStreamToString(
+    stream: ReadableStream<Uint8Array>
+): Promise<string> {
+    const decoder = new TextDecoder();
+    const reader = stream.getReader();
+    let out = "";
+    for (;;) {
+        const { done, value } = await reader.read();
+        if (done) break;
+        // ReadableStream<Uint8Array> never yields `undefined` chunks alongside
+        // `done: false`, but the coercion keeps us safe under odd polyfills.
+        out += decoder.decode(value as Uint8Array, { stream: true });
+    }
+    out += decoder.decode();
+    return out;
+}
+
+async function spawnViaBun(
+    bun: BunGlobalShape,
+    command: string,
+    args: readonly string[],
+    options?: CommandExecutorOptions
+): Promise<CommandExecutorResult> {
+    const child = bun.spawn({
+        cmd: [command, ...args],
+        stdout: "pipe",
+        stderr: "pipe",
+        ...(options?.signal !== undefined ? { signal: options.signal } : {}),
+    });
+    const [stdout, stderr, exitCode] = await Promise.all([
+        readStreamToString(child.stdout),
+        readStreamToString(child.stderr),
+        child.exited,
+    ]);
+    return { stdout, stderr, exitCode };
+}
+
+interface NodeChildProcessShape {
+    spawn: (
+        command: string,
+        args: readonly string[],
+        options: { stdio: "pipe"; signal?: AbortSignal | undefined }
+    ) => NodeChild;
+}
+
+interface NodeChild {
+    stdout: NodeReadable;
+    stderr: NodeReadable;
+    on(event: "close", cb: (code: number | null) => void): NodeChild;
+    on(event: "error", cb: (err: Error) => void): NodeChild;
+}
+
+interface NodeReadable {
+    on(event: "data", cb: (chunk: Buffer | string) => void): NodeReadable;
+    setEncoding(enc: "utf8"): void;
+}
+
+async function spawnViaNode(
+    command: string,
+    args: readonly string[],
+    options?: CommandExecutorOptions
+): Promise<CommandExecutorResult> {
+    const cp = (await import(
+        "node:child_process"
+    )) as unknown as NodeChildProcessShape;
+    return new Promise<CommandExecutorResult>((resolve, reject) => {
+        const spawnOptions: {
+            stdio: "pipe";
+            signal?: AbortSignal | undefined;
+        } =
+            options?.signal !== undefined
+                ? { stdio: "pipe", signal: options.signal }
+                : { stdio: "pipe" };
+        const child = cp.spawn(command, args, spawnOptions);
+        let stdout = "";
+        let stderr = "";
+        child.stdout.setEncoding("utf8");
+        child.stderr.setEncoding("utf8");
+        child.stdout.on("data", (chunk) => {
+            stdout += String(chunk);
+        });
+        child.stderr.on("data", (chunk) => {
+            stderr += String(chunk);
+        });
+        child.on("error", reject);
+        child.on("close", (code) => {
+            // `code` is `null` only when the child was killed by signal; treat
+            // signalled termination as a non-zero exit so the caller cannot
+            // mistake a SIGTERM for success.
+            const exitCode = code === null ? 130 : code;
+            resolve({ stdout, stderr, exitCode });
+        });
+    });
+}
+
+/** Read the runtime `Bun` global without TypeScript type-narrowing churn. */
+function detectBun(): BunGlobalShape | undefined {
+    return (globalThis as unknown as { Bun?: BunGlobalShape }).Bun;
+}
+
+/** Options for `createDefaultExecutor`. */
+export interface CreateDefaultExecutorOptions {
+    /**
+     * Resolve the `Bun` runtime, or `undefined` to force the Node path.
+     * Defaults to reading `globalThis.Bun`. Tests inject a fake to
+     * exercise the Bun fast-path under any host.
+     */
+    readonly resolveBun?: () => BunGlobalShape | undefined;
+}
+
+/**
+ * Create the default runtime executor. The decision between `Bun.spawn`
+ * and `node:child_process` is made once per call so a host that polyfills
+ * `globalThis.Bun` mid-run still routes correctly.
+ */
+export function createDefaultExecutor(
+    options: CreateDefaultExecutorOptions = {}
+): CommandExecutor {
+    const resolveBun = options.resolveBun ?? detectBun;
+    return async (command, args, callOptions) => {
+        const bun = resolveBun();
+        if (bun !== undefined) {
+            return spawnViaBun(bun, command, args, callOptions);
+        }
+        return spawnViaNode(command, args, callOptions);
+    };
+}

packages/identity/auth/macos-keychain/src/core/keychain-bridge/keychain-bridge.md

@@ -0,0 +1,109 @@
+# keychain-bridge
+
+<!-- begin:auto-docs -->
+_(no submodules)_
+<!-- end:auto-docs -->
+## Purpose
+
+Hosts `MacOSKeychainBridge`, the single class consumers of the package
+construct. It composes the executor, parser, error classifier, and OTel
+meter into a strongly-typed CRUD surface for macOS generic-password items.
+Every method either resolves with a typed result or rejects with a
+`KeychainError` whose `code` is one of the eight registered literals.
+
+The class is deliberately thin — most of the policy work (output parsing,
+error classification, runtime detection) lives in sibling modules so it can
+be tested in isolation. The bridge's job is to thread the
+configuration / abort signal / timeout / OTel concerns through every CLI
+invocation.
+
+## Features
+
+- CRUD methods: `addItem`, `findItem`, `updateItem`, `deleteItem`,
+  `listItems`, `itemExists`.
+- Per-call `KeychainCallOptions.signal` cancellation, combined with the
+  configured `timeoutMs` deadline.
+- Pluggable `CommandExecutor` constructor argument; defaults to
+  `createDefaultExecutor()` for the running runtime.
+- Zod-validated config; an invalid `timeoutMs` throws a `ZodError` from the
+  constructor before any CLI is invoked.
+- OTel emission on every call: `keychain.<op>` span (via the global
+  provider), `keychain.ops_total` counter, `keychain.cli_duration_ms`
+  histogram, and `keychain.items_returned` histogram (on `listItems`).
+- Logger pass-through — when `config.logger` is provided the bridge emits a
+  `debug` record per invocation.
+
+## Usage: Basic Example
+
+```ts
+import { MacOSKeychainBridge } from "@suaveplan/macos-keychain";
+
+const bridge = new MacOSKeychainBridge();
+await bridge.addItem({ service: "my-app", account: "alice", password: "hunter2" });
+const item = await bridge.findItem("my-app", "alice");
+console.log(item.password);
+```
+
+## Usage: Advanced Example
+
+```ts
+import {
+    MacOSKeychainBridge,
+    type CommandExecutor,
+} from "@suaveplan/macos-keychain";
+
+// Deterministic stub for tests — no real keychain, no `vi.mock`.
+const stubRunner: CommandExecutor = async (cmd, args) => {
+    if (args[0] === "find-generic-password") {
+        return { stdout: "", stderr: 'password: "stored"', exitCode: 0 };
+    }
+    return { stdout: "", stderr: "", exitCode: 0 };
+};
+
+const bridge = new MacOSKeychainBridge({ timeoutMs: 1_000 }, stubRunner);
+const controller = new AbortController();
+const item = await bridge.findItem("svc", "user", { signal: controller.signal });
+console.log(item.password); // "stored"
+```
+
+## API Reference
+
+- **`new MacOSKeychainBridge(config?: KeychainConfig, runner?:
+  CommandExecutor)`** — validates `config` via `KeychainConfigSchema` and
+  installs the runner. Calls `registerKeychainErrorCodes()` before
+  returning.
+- **`addItem(item, options?): Promise<KeychainResult>`** — throws
+  `KEYCHAIN.ITEM_EXISTS` on duplicate; otherwise routes through
+  `classifyError` for failure mapping.
+- **`findItem(service, account, options?): Promise<KeychainItem>`** —
+  parses `find-generic-password -g` output via `parseKeychainItem`. Throws
+  `KEYCHAIN.NOT_FOUND` when the item is absent.
+- **`updateItem(service, account, newPassword, options?): Promise<
+  KeychainResult>`** — performs delete-then-add. Tolerates a missing
+  pre-existing item.
+- **`deleteItem(service, account, options?): Promise<KeychainResult>`** —
+  throws `KEYCHAIN.NOT_FOUND` when the item does not exist.
+- **`listItems(service?, options?): Promise<readonly KeychainListEntry[]>`** —
+  filters the dump output by service when provided. Records
+  `keychain.items_returned` with the post-filter count.
+- **`itemExists(service, account, options?): Promise<boolean>`** — `true`
+  on success, `false` on `KEYCHAIN.NOT_FOUND`, rethrows other errors.
+
+## Implementation Notes
+
+- AbortSignal handling is centralised in `combineSignals`: a fresh
+  `AbortController` is constructed per call and aborts on whichever fires
+  first — the caller's signal or the configured `timeoutMs`. The `dispose`
+  callback removes the listener and clears the timeout to avoid leaking
+  handles.
+- Timeout detection inspects the combined signal's `aborted` flag; this
+  ensures both caller-aborts and timer-aborts surface as
+  `KEYCHAIN.TIMEOUT`.
+- Stderr placement of the password is a quirk of `find-generic-password
+  -g`; the bridge concatenates stdout and stderr before handing the buffer
+  to `parseKeychainItem` so the regex matches regardless of CLI version.
+- `listItems` post-filters in TypeScript rather than relying on the CLI's
+  attribute filtering, which is unreliable across macOS versions.
+- The default runner deliberately lives in a separate file so the bridge
+  itself stays under the file-size budget and so the test suite can
+  construct bridges without touching child-process imports.

packages/identity/auth/macos-keychain/src/core/keychain-bridge/keychain-bridge.test.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,520 @@
+import {
+    afterEach,
+    beforeEach,
+    describe,
+    expect,
+    it,
+} from "@suaveplan/testing/runner";
+import { KeychainError } from "../../error-codes.js";
+import type {
+    CommandExecutor,
+    CommandExecutorResult,
+    KeychainConfig,
+} from "../../types/macos-keychain.types.js";
+import { MacOSKeychainBridge } from "./keychain-bridge.js";
+
+interface ExecutorCall {
+    command: string;
+    args: readonly string[];
+    signal?: AbortSignal | undefined;
+}
+
+interface StubBuilder {
+    runner: CommandExecutor;
+    calls: ExecutorCall[];
+    queue: CommandExecutorResult[];
+}
+
+function makeStub(...results: CommandExecutorResult[]): StubBuilder {
+    const calls: ExecutorCall[] = [];
+    const queue = [...results];
+    const runner: CommandExecutor = async (command, args, options) => {
+        calls.push({ command, args, signal: options?.signal });
+        const next = queue.shift();
+        if (next === undefined) {
+            return { stdout: "", stderr: "", exitCode: 0 };
+        }
+        return next;
+    };
+    return { runner, calls, queue };
+}
+
+describe("MacOSKeychainBridge constructor", () => {
+    it("validates config via KeychainConfigSchema in the constructor", {
+        timeout: 5000,
+    }, () => {
+        expect(() => new MacOSKeychainBridge({ timeoutMs: -1 })).toThrow();
+    });
+
+    it("accepts a valid config and a custom executor", {
+        timeout: 5000,
+    }, () => {
+        const stub = makeStub();
+        const bridge = new MacOSKeychainBridge(
+            { timeoutMs: 1_000 },
+            stub.runner
+        );
+        expect(bridge).toBeInstanceOf(MacOSKeychainBridge);
+    });
+
+    it("constructs without arguments using runtime defaults", {
+        timeout: 5000,
+    }, () => {
+        const bridge = new MacOSKeychainBridge();
+        expect(bridge).toBeInstanceOf(MacOSKeychainBridge);
+    });
+});
+
+describe("MacOSKeychainBridge.addItem", () => {
+    it("adds a new keychain item successfully", { timeout: 5000 }, async () => {
+        const stub = makeStub({ stdout: "", stderr: "", exitCode: 0 });
+        const bridge = new MacOSKeychainBridge({}, stub.runner);
+        const result = await bridge.addItem({
+            service: "svc",
+            account: "user",
+            password: "p",
+        });
+        expect(result.success).toBe(true);
+        expect(stub.calls[0]?.args).toEqual([
+            "add-generic-password",
+            "-s",
+            "svc",
+            "-a",
+            "user",
+            "-w",
+            "p",
+        ]);
+    });
+
+    it("appends -l label and -j comment when supplied", {
+        timeout: 5000,
+    }, async () => {
+        const stub = makeStub({ stdout: "", stderr: "", exitCode: 0 });
+        const bridge = new MacOSKeychainBridge({}, stub.runner);
+        await bridge.addItem({
+            service: "svc",
+            account: "user",
+            password: "p",
+            label: "L",
+            comment: "C",
+        });
+        expect(stub.calls[0]?.args).toContain("-l");
+        expect(stub.calls[0]?.args).toContain("L");
+        expect(stub.calls[0]?.args).toContain("-j");
+        expect(stub.calls[0]?.args).toContain("C");
+    });
+
+    it("throws KEYCHAIN.ITEM_EXISTS on duplicate add", {
+        timeout: 5000,
+    }, async () => {
+        const stub = makeStub({
+            stdout: "",
+            stderr: "duplicate item",
+            exitCode: 45,
+        });
+        const bridge = new MacOSKeychainBridge({}, stub.runner);
+        await expect(
+            bridge.addItem({ service: "svc", account: "user", password: "p" })
+        ).rejects.toMatchObject({ code: "KEYCHAIN.ITEM_EXISTS" });
+    });
+
+    it("throws keychainAccessFailed when classifier returns null", {
+        timeout: 5000,
+    }, async () => {
+        const stub = makeStub({
+            stdout: "",
+            stderr: "weird",
+            exitCode: 99999,
+        });
+        const bridge = new MacOSKeychainBridge({}, stub.runner);
+        await expect(
+            bridge.addItem({ service: "svc", account: "user", password: "p" })
+        ).rejects.toMatchObject({ code: "KEYCHAIN.ACCESS_FAILED" });
+    });
+
+    it("forwards a parameterised argv to the executor (no shell interpolation)", {
+        timeout: 5000,
+    }, async () => {
+        const stub = makeStub({ stdout: "", stderr: "", exitCode: 0 });
+        const bridge = new MacOSKeychainBridge({}, stub.runner);
+        await bridge.addItem({
+            service: "a; rm -rf /",
+            account: "user",
+            password: "p",
+        });
+        expect(stub.calls[0]?.command).toBe("/usr/bin/security");
+        expect(stub.calls[0]?.args).toContain("a; rm -rf /");
+    });
+
+    it("argv preserves shell metacharacters as literal payload", {
+        timeout: 5000,
+    }, async () => {
+        const stub = makeStub({ stdout: "", stderr: "", exitCode: 0 });
+        const bridge = new MacOSKeychainBridge({}, stub.runner);
+        await bridge.addItem({
+            service: "svc",
+            account: "user",
+            password: "$(whoami)",
+        });
+        expect(stub.calls[0]?.args).toContain("$(whoami)");
+    });
+});
+
+describe("MacOSKeychainBridge.findItem", () => {
+    it("finds an existing keychain item and returns parsed password", {
+        timeout: 5000,
+    }, async () => {
+        const stub = makeStub({
+            stdout: '"svce"<blob>="svc"\n"acct"<blob>="user"',
+            stderr: 'password: "secret"',
+            exitCode: 0,
+        });
+        const bridge = new MacOSKeychainBridge({}, stub.runner);
+        const item = await bridge.findItem("svc", "user");
+        expect(item.password).toBe("secret");
+    });
+
+    it("rejects with KEYCHAIN.NOT_FOUND when missing", {
+        timeout: 5000,
+    }, async () => {
+        const stub = makeStub({
+            stdout: "",
+            stderr: "could not be found",
+            exitCode: 44,
+        });
+        const bridge = new MacOSKeychainBridge({}, stub.runner);
+        await expect(bridge.findItem("svc", "user")).rejects.toMatchObject({
+            code: "KEYCHAIN.NOT_FOUND",
+        });
+    });
+
+    it("falls back to keychainAccessFailed when classifier returns null on find", {
+        timeout: 5000,
+    }, async () => {
+        const stub = makeStub({
+            stdout: "",
+            stderr: "totally novel",
+            exitCode: 12345,
+        });
+        const bridge = new MacOSKeychainBridge({}, stub.runner);
+        await expect(bridge.findItem("svc", "user")).rejects.toMatchObject({
+            code: "KEYCHAIN.ACCESS_FAILED",
+        });
+    });
+});
+
+describe("MacOSKeychainBridge.deleteItem", () => {
+    it("returns success on a clean delete", { timeout: 5000 }, async () => {
+        const stub = makeStub({ stdout: "", stderr: "", exitCode: 0 });
+        const bridge = new MacOSKeychainBridge({}, stub.runner);
+        const result = await bridge.deleteItem("svc", "user");
+        expect(result.success).toBe(true);
+    });
+
+    it("throws KEYCHAIN.NOT_FOUND when the item is missing", {
+        timeout: 5000,
+    }, async () => {
+        const stub = makeStub({
+            stdout: "",
+            stderr: "could not be found",
+            exitCode: 44,
+        });
+        const bridge = new MacOSKeychainBridge({}, stub.runner);
+        await expect(bridge.deleteItem("svc", "user")).rejects.toMatchObject({
+            code: "KEYCHAIN.NOT_FOUND",
+        });
+    });
+
+    it("falls back to keychainAccessFailed when delete classifier returns null", {
+        timeout: 5000,
+    }, async () => {
+        const stub = makeStub({
+            stdout: "",
+            stderr: "novel failure",
+            exitCode: 99999,
+        });
+        const bridge = new MacOSKeychainBridge({}, stub.runner);
+        await expect(bridge.deleteItem("svc", "user")).rejects.toMatchObject({
+            code: "KEYCHAIN.ACCESS_FAILED",
+        });
+    });
+});
+
+describe("MacOSKeychainBridge.updateItem", () => {
+    it("performs delete + add on update", { timeout: 5000 }, async () => {
+        const stub = makeStub(
+            { stdout: "", stderr: "", exitCode: 0 },
+            { stdout: "", stderr: "", exitCode: 0 }
+        );
+        const bridge = new MacOSKeychainBridge({}, stub.runner);
+        const result = await bridge.updateItem("svc", "user", "newp");
+        expect(result.success).toBe(true);
+        expect(stub.calls).toHaveLength(2);
+        expect(stub.calls[0]?.args[0]).toBe("delete-generic-password");
+        expect(stub.calls[1]?.args[0]).toBe("add-generic-password");
+    });
+
+    it("tolerates a missing pre-existing item before re-adding", {
+        timeout: 5000,
+    }, async () => {
+        const stub = makeStub(
+            {
+                stdout: "",
+                stderr: "could not be found",
+                exitCode: 44,
+            },
+            { stdout: "", stderr: "", exitCode: 0 }
+        );
+        const bridge = new MacOSKeychainBridge({}, stub.runner);
+        const result = await bridge.updateItem("svc", "user", "newp");
+        expect(result.success).toBe(true);
+    });
+
+    it("propagates non-not-found delete errors", {
+        timeout: 5000,
+    }, async () => {
+        const stub = makeStub({
+            stdout: "",
+            stderr: "permission denied",
+            exitCode: 1,
+        });
+        const bridge = new MacOSKeychainBridge({}, stub.runner);
+        await expect(
+            bridge.updateItem("svc", "user", "newp")
+        ).rejects.toMatchObject({ code: "KEYCHAIN.PERMISSION_DENIED" });
+    });
+});
+
+describe("MacOSKeychainBridge.listItems", () => {
+    it("returns parsed entries on success", { timeout: 5000 }, async () => {
+        const dump = `keychain: "/x"
+"svce"<blob>="svc"
+"acct"<blob>="alice"
+keychain: "/x"
+"svce"<blob>="other"
+"acct"<blob>="bob"`;
+        const stub = makeStub({ stdout: dump, stderr: "", exitCode: 0 });
+        const bridge = new MacOSKeychainBridge({}, stub.runner);
+        const entries = await bridge.listItems();
+        expect(entries).toHaveLength(2);
+    });
+
+    it("filters by service when provided", { timeout: 5000 }, async () => {
+        const dump = `keychain: "/x"
+"svce"<blob>="svc"
+"acct"<blob>="alice"
+keychain: "/x"
+"svce"<blob>="other"
+"acct"<blob>="bob"`;
+        const stub = makeStub({ stdout: dump, stderr: "", exitCode: 0 });
+        const bridge = new MacOSKeychainBridge({}, stub.runner);
+        const entries = await bridge.listItems("svc");
+        expect(entries).toEqual([{ service: "svc", account: "alice" }]);
+    });
+
+    it("throws on non-zero exit", { timeout: 5000 }, async () => {
+        const stub = makeStub({
+            stdout: "",
+            stderr: "permission denied",
+            exitCode: 1,
+        });
+        const bridge = new MacOSKeychainBridge({}, stub.runner);
+        await expect(bridge.listItems()).rejects.toMatchObject({
+            code: "KEYCHAIN.PERMISSION_DENIED",
+        });
+    });
+
+    it("falls back to keychainAccessFailed on unknown list error", {
+        timeout: 5000,
+    }, async () => {
+        const stub = makeStub({
+            stdout: "",
+            stderr: "unknown",
+            exitCode: 99999,
+        });
+        const bridge = new MacOSKeychainBridge({}, stub.runner);
+        await expect(bridge.listItems()).rejects.toMatchObject({
+            code: "KEYCHAIN.ACCESS_FAILED",
+        });
+    });
+});
+
+describe("MacOSKeychainBridge.itemExists", () => {
+    it("returns true when findItem succeeds", { timeout: 5000 }, async () => {
+        const stub = makeStub({
+            stdout: "",
+            stderr: 'password: "p"',
+            exitCode: 0,
+        });
+        const bridge = new MacOSKeychainBridge({}, stub.runner);
+        expect(await bridge.itemExists("svc", "user")).toBe(true);
+    });
+
+    it("returns false on KEYCHAIN.NOT_FOUND", { timeout: 5000 }, async () => {
+        const stub = makeStub({
+            stdout: "",
+            stderr: "could not be found",
+            exitCode: 44,
+        });
+        const bridge = new MacOSKeychainBridge({}, stub.runner);
+        expect(await bridge.itemExists("svc", "user")).toBe(false);
+    });
+
+    it("rethrows other errors", { timeout: 5000 }, async () => {
+        const stub = makeStub({
+            stdout: "",
+            stderr: "permission denied",
+            exitCode: 1,
+        });
+        const bridge = new MacOSKeychainBridge({}, stub.runner);
+        await expect(bridge.itemExists("svc", "user")).rejects.toBeInstanceOf(
+            KeychainError
+        );
+    });
+});
+
+describe("AbortSignal and timeout handling", () => {
+    it("rejects with KEYCHAIN.TIMEOUT when caller signal aborts", {
+        timeout: 5000,
+    }, async () => {
+        const slowRunner: CommandExecutor = (_cmd, _args, options) =>
+            new Promise<CommandExecutorResult>((_, reject) => {
+                options?.signal?.addEventListener("abort", () =>
+                    reject(new Error("aborted"))
+                );
+            });
+        const bridge = new MacOSKeychainBridge(
+            { timeoutMs: 1_000 },
+            slowRunner
+        );
+        const ac = new AbortController();
+        setTimeout(() => ac.abort(), 5);
+        await expect(
+            bridge.findItem("svc", "user", { signal: ac.signal })
+        ).rejects.toMatchObject({ code: "KEYCHAIN.TIMEOUT" });
+    });
+
+    it("rejects with KEYCHAIN.TIMEOUT when timeoutMs deadline elapses", {
+        timeout: 5000,
+    }, async () => {
+        const slowRunner: CommandExecutor = (_cmd, _args, options) =>
+            new Promise<CommandExecutorResult>((_, reject) => {
+                options?.signal?.addEventListener("abort", () =>
+                    reject(new Error("aborted"))
+                );
+            });
+        const bridge = new MacOSKeychainBridge({ timeoutMs: 5 }, slowRunner);
+        await expect(bridge.findItem("svc", "user")).rejects.toMatchObject({
+            code: "KEYCHAIN.TIMEOUT",
+        });
+    });
+
+    it("supports a pre-aborted signal", { timeout: 5000 }, async () => {
+        const slowRunner: CommandExecutor = (_cmd, _args, options) =>
+            new Promise<CommandExecutorResult>((_, reject) => {
+                if (options?.signal?.aborted) reject(new Error("pre-aborted"));
+                options?.signal?.addEventListener("abort", () =>
+                    reject(new Error("aborted"))
+                );
+            });
+        const bridge = new MacOSKeychainBridge(
+            { timeoutMs: 5_000 },
+            slowRunner
+        );
+        const ac = new AbortController();
+        ac.abort();
+        await expect(
+            bridge.findItem("svc", "user", { signal: ac.signal })
+        ).rejects.toMatchObject({ code: "KEYCHAIN.TIMEOUT" });
+    });
+
+    it("propagates KeychainError causes from the runner unchanged", {
+        timeout: 5000,
+    }, async () => {
+        const failingRunner: CommandExecutor = async () => {
+            throw new KeychainError(
+                "KEYCHAIN.UNAVAILABLE",
+                "keychain.error.unavailable"
+            );
+        };
+        const bridge = new MacOSKeychainBridge({}, failingRunner);
+        await expect(bridge.findItem("svc", "user")).rejects.toMatchObject({
+            code: "KEYCHAIN.UNAVAILABLE",
+        });
+    });
+
+    it("wraps plain Error from the runner as KEYCHAIN.UNAVAILABLE", {
+        timeout: 5000,
+    }, async () => {
+        const failingRunner: CommandExecutor = async () => {
+            throw new Error("boom");
+        };
+        const bridge = new MacOSKeychainBridge({}, failingRunner);
+        await expect(bridge.findItem("svc", "user")).rejects.toMatchObject({
+            code: "KEYCHAIN.UNAVAILABLE",
+        });
+    });
+
+    it("wraps non-Error thrown values as KEYCHAIN.UNAVAILABLE", {
+        timeout: 5000,
+    }, async () => {
+        const failingRunner: CommandExecutor = async () => {
+            const failure: unknown = "literal";
+            throw failure;
+        };
+        const bridge = new MacOSKeychainBridge({}, failingRunner);
+        await expect(bridge.findItem("svc", "user")).rejects.toMatchObject({
+            code: "KEYCHAIN.UNAVAILABLE",
+        });
+    });
+});
+
+describe("Logger integration", () => {
+    let captured: { level: string; msg: string }[];
+    const logger: KeychainConfig["logger"] = {
+        debug: (msg) => captured.push({ level: "debug", msg }),
+        info: () => {},
+        warn: () => {},
+        error: () => {},
+    };
+
+    beforeEach(() => {
+        captured = [];
+    });
+    afterEach(() => {
+        captured = [];
+    });
+
+    it("emits a debug log per invocation when a logger is provided", {
+        timeout: 5000,
+    }, async () => {
+        const stub = makeStub({ stdout: "", stderr: "", exitCode: 0 });
+        const bridge = new MacOSKeychainBridge({ logger }, stub.runner);
+        await bridge.addItem({
+            service: "svc",
+            account: "user",
+            password: "p",
+        });
+        expect(captured.some((c) => c.msg === "keychain.invoke")).toBe(true);
+    });
+});
+
+describe("Clock injection", () => {
+    it("uses the injected clock for duration measurement (no Date.now in src)", {
+        timeout: 5000,
+    }, async () => {
+        let calls = 0;
+        const clock = () => {
+            calls += 1;
+            return 100 * calls;
+        };
+        const stub = makeStub({ stdout: "", stderr: "", exitCode: 0 });
+        const bridge = new MacOSKeychainBridge({ clock }, stub.runner);
+        await bridge.addItem({
+            service: "svc",
+            account: "user",
+            password: "p",
+        });
+        expect(calls).toBeGreaterThan(0);
+    });
+});

packages/identity/auth/macos-keychain/src/core/keychain-bridge/keychain-bridge.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,339 @@
+/**
+ * `MacOSKeychainBridge` — the entry-point class for the package.
+ *
+ * Wraps the macOS `security` CLI behind a strongly-typed CRUD surface with
+ * AbortSignal cancellation, configurable timeouts, OTel instrumentation,
+ * and a pluggable `CommandExecutor` so tests can run without touching the
+ * real keychain.
+ */
+
+import { metrics } from "@opentelemetry/api";
+import type { Clock } from "@suaveplan/types";
+import { DEFAULT_TIMEOUT_MS, SECURITY_BINARY } from "../../constants/index.js";
+import {
+    KEYCHAIN_CODES,
+    KeychainError,
+    registerKeychainErrorCodes,
+} from "../../error-codes.js";
+import {
+    keychainAccessFailed,
+    keychainItemExists,
+    keychainTimeout,
+    keychainUnavailable,
+} from "../../errors/keychain-errors.js";
+import { KeychainConfigSchema } from "../../schemas/macos-keychain.schemas.js";
+import type {
+    CommandExecutor,
+    CommandExecutorOptions,
+    CommandExecutorResult,
+    KeychainCallOptions,
+    KeychainConfig,
+    KeychainItem,
+    KeychainResult,
+} from "../../types/macos-keychain.types.js";
+import { classifyError } from "../error-classifier/error-classifier.js";
+import {
+    type KeychainListEntry,
+    parseKeychainItem,
+    parseKeychainList,
+} from "../output-parser/output-parser.js";
+import { createDefaultExecutor } from "./default-executor.js";
+
+const meter = metrics.getMeter("@suaveplan/macos-keychain");
+const opsCounter = meter.createCounter("keychain.ops_total", {
+    description: "Total keychain CRUD operations",
+});
+const cliDurationHist = meter.createHistogram("keychain.cli_duration_ms", {
+    description: "Duration of the underlying `security` CLI invocation",
+    unit: "ms",
+});
+const itemsReturnedHist = meter.createHistogram("keychain.items_returned", {
+    description: "Number of items returned by listItems()",
+});
+
+interface ResolvedConfig {
+    readonly timeoutMs: number;
+    readonly clock: Clock;
+}
+
+/** Public API of the bridge. Every method may throw `KeychainError`. */
+export class MacOSKeychainBridge {
+    private readonly resolved: ResolvedConfig;
+    private readonly runner: CommandExecutor;
+    private readonly logger: KeychainConfig["logger"];
+
+    public constructor(config: KeychainConfig = {}, runner?: CommandExecutor) {
+        registerKeychainErrorCodes();
+        const parsed = KeychainConfigSchema.parse(config);
+        this.resolved = {
+            timeoutMs: parsed.timeoutMs ?? DEFAULT_TIMEOUT_MS,
+            clock: (parsed.clock as Clock | undefined) ?? (() => Date.now()),
+        };
+        this.runner = runner ?? createDefaultExecutor();
+        this.logger = parsed.logger as KeychainConfig["logger"];
+    }
+
+    public async addItem(
+        item: Pick<KeychainItem, "service" | "account" | "password"> &
+            Partial<Pick<KeychainItem, "label" | "comment">>,
+        options: KeychainCallOptions = {}
+    ): Promise<KeychainResult> {
+        const { service, account, password } = item;
+        const args = [
+            "add-generic-password",
+            "-s",
+            service,
+            "-a",
+            account,
+            "-w",
+            password,
+        ];
+        if (item.label !== undefined) args.push("-l", item.label);
+        if (item.comment !== undefined) args.push("-j", item.comment);
+        const result = await this.invoke(
+            "add",
+            service,
+            account,
+            args,
+            options
+        );
+        if (result.exitCode === 0) {
+            return { success: true };
+        }
+        const classified = classifyError(
+            result.exitCode,
+            result.stderr,
+            service,
+            account
+        );
+        if (
+            classified !== null &&
+            classified.code === KEYCHAIN_CODES.ITEM_EXISTS
+        ) {
+            throw keychainItemExists(service, account);
+        }
+        throw (
+            classified ?? keychainAccessFailed(service, account, result.stderr)
+        );
+    }
+
+    public async findItem(
+        service: string,
+        account: string,
+        options: KeychainCallOptions = {}
+    ): Promise<KeychainItem> {
+        const args = [
+            "find-generic-password",
+            "-s",
+            service,
+            "-a",
+            account,
+            "-g",
+        ];
+        const result = await this.invoke(
+            "find",
+            service,
+            account,
+            args,
+            options
+        );
+        if (result.exitCode !== 0) {
+            const classified = classifyError(
+                result.exitCode,
+                result.stderr,
+                service,
+                account
+            );
+            throw (
+                classified ??
+                keychainAccessFailed(service, account, result.stderr)
+            );
+        }
+        // `security` prints the password line on stderr, attributes on stdout.
+        return parseKeychainItem(
+            `${result.stdout}\n${result.stderr}`,
+            service,
+            account
+        );
+    }
+
+    public async updateItem(
+        service: string,
+        account: string,
+        newPassword: string,
+        options: KeychainCallOptions = {}
+    ): Promise<KeychainResult> {
+        await this.deleteItem(service, account, options).catch((err) => {
+            if (
+                err instanceof KeychainError &&
+                err.code === KEYCHAIN_CODES.NOT_FOUND
+            ) {
+                return;
+            }
+            throw err;
+        });
+        return this.addItem(
+            { service, account, password: newPassword },
+            options
+        );
+    }
+
+    public async deleteItem(
+        service: string,
+        account: string,
+        options: KeychainCallOptions = {}
+    ): Promise<KeychainResult> {
+        const args = ["delete-generic-password", "-s", service, "-a", account];
+        const result = await this.invoke(
+            "delete",
+            service,
+            account,
+            args,
+            options
+        );
+        if (result.exitCode === 0) {
+            return { success: true };
+        }
+        const classified = classifyError(
+            result.exitCode,
+            result.stderr,
+            service,
+            account
+        );
+        throw (
+            classified ?? keychainAccessFailed(service, account, result.stderr)
+        );
+    }
+
+    public async listItems(
+        service?: string,
+        options: KeychainCallOptions = {}
+    ): Promise<readonly KeychainListEntry[]> {
+        const args =
+            service !== undefined
+                ? ["dump-keychain", "-d"]
+                : ["dump-keychain", "-d"];
+        const result = await this.invoke(
+            "list",
+            service ?? "*",
+            "*",
+            args,
+            options
+        );
+        if (result.exitCode !== 0) {
+            const classified = classifyError(
+                result.exitCode,
+                result.stderr,
+                service ?? "*",
+                "*"
+            );
+            throw (
+                classified ??
+                keychainAccessFailed(service ?? "*", "*", result.stderr)
+            );
+        }
+        const all = parseKeychainList(result.stdout);
+        const filtered =
+            service === undefined
+                ? all
+                : all.filter((e) => e.service === service);
+        itemsReturnedHist.record(filtered.length);
+        return filtered;
+    }
+
+    public async itemExists(
+        service: string,
+        account: string,
+        options: KeychainCallOptions = {}
+    ): Promise<boolean> {
+        try {
+            await this.findItem(service, account, options);
+            return true;
+        } catch (err) {
+            if (
+                err instanceof KeychainError &&
+                err.code === KEYCHAIN_CODES.NOT_FOUND
+            ) {
+                return false;
+            }
+            throw err;
+        }
+    }
+
+    private async invoke(
+        op: "add" | "find" | "update" | "delete" | "list",
+        service: string,
+        account: string,
+        args: readonly string[],
+        options: KeychainCallOptions
+    ): Promise<CommandExecutorResult> {
+        const start = this.resolved.clock();
+        this.logger?.debug("keychain.invoke", { op, service, account });
+        const combined = combineSignals(
+            options.signal,
+            this.resolved.timeoutMs
+        );
+        const runOptions: CommandExecutorOptions = { signal: combined.signal };
+        try {
+            const result = await this.runner(SECURITY_BINARY, args, runOptions);
+            cliDurationHist.record(this.resolved.clock() - start, { op });
+            opsCounter.add(1, { op, success: result.exitCode === 0 });
+            return result;
+        } catch (cause) {
+            cliDurationHist.record(this.resolved.clock() - start, { op });
+            opsCounter.add(1, { op, success: false });
+            if (combined.aborted()) {
+                throw keychainTimeout(
+                    service,
+                    account,
+                    this.resolved.timeoutMs
+                );
+            }
+            if (cause instanceof KeychainError) {
+                throw cause;
+            }
+            throw keychainUnavailable(
+                cause instanceof Error ? cause.message : String(cause)
+            );
+        } finally {
+            combined.dispose();
+        }
+    }
+}
+
+interface CombinedSignal {
+    readonly signal: AbortSignal;
+    readonly aborted: () => boolean;
+    readonly dispose: () => void;
+}
+
+function combineSignals(
+    user: AbortSignal | undefined,
+    timeoutMs: number
+): CombinedSignal {
+    const controller = new AbortController();
+    let timeoutFired = false;
+    const handle = setTimeout(() => {
+        timeoutFired = true;
+        controller.abort(new Error("keychain.timeout"));
+    }, timeoutMs);
+    let userListener: (() => void) | undefined;
+    if (user !== undefined) {
+        if (user.aborted) {
+            controller.abort(user.reason);
+        } else {
+            userListener = () => controller.abort(user.reason);
+            user.addEventListener("abort", userListener, { once: true });
+        }
+    }
+    return {
+        signal: controller.signal,
+        aborted: () => controller.signal.aborted || timeoutFired,
+        dispose: () => {
+            clearTimeout(handle);
+            if (userListener !== undefined && user !== undefined) {
+                user.removeEventListener("abort", userListener);
+            }
+        },
+    };
+}

packages/identity/auth/macos-keychain/src/core/output-parser/output-parser.md

@@ -0,0 +1,101 @@
+# output-parser
+
+<!-- begin:auto-docs -->
+_(no submodules)_
+<!-- end:auto-docs -->
+## Purpose
+
+Parses the macOS `security` CLI output formats consumed by the bridge into
+strongly-typed records. The CLI emits attribute-style output with quoted
+strings, hex blobs, and timestamps; this module is the only place that
+understands those wire formats so the rest of the package operates on
+`KeychainItem` instances.
+
+The parser is also the package's only sensitive-data handler: it materialises
+the password bytes into a temporary `Uint8Array` long enough to decode UTF-8,
+zeroes the buffer immediately, and returns only a JS string view. Callers
+control how long the string lives.
+
+## Features
+
+- `parseKeychainItem` — parses combined stdout/stderr from `find-generic-
+  password -g`, supporting both quoted-string (`password: "value"`) and
+  hex-blob (`password: 0xDEADBEEF`) password formats.
+- Attribute extraction — recognises `svce`, `acct`, `labl`, `icmt`, `cdat`,
+  `mdat` attribute lines and decodes Apple's date-time format.
+- Buffer zeroization — the working `Uint8Array` produced by `TextEncoder`
+  and the hex-decode buffer are zeroed via `@suaveplan/crypto-utils`.
+- `parseKeychainList` — walks `dump-keychain` records and returns
+  `{ service, account }` pairs, skipping entries that lack a `svce` or
+  `acct` attribute.
+- Throws `KEYCHAIN.ITEM_INVALID` on malformed input rather than returning
+  undefined or null.
+
+## Usage: Basic Example
+
+```ts
+import { parseKeychainItem } from "@suaveplan/macos-keychain";
+
+const item = parseKeychainItem(
+    'password: "hunter2"\n"svce"<blob>="my-app"\n"acct"<blob>="alice"',
+    "my-app",
+    "alice"
+);
+console.log(item.password); // "hunter2"
+```
+
+## Usage: Advanced Example
+
+```ts
+import {
+    parseKeychainItem,
+    parseKeychainList,
+} from "@suaveplan/macos-keychain";
+
+const dump = `keychain: "/Users/alice/Library/Keychains/login.keychain-db"
+"svce"<blob>="github"
+"acct"<blob>="alice"
+keychain: "/Users/alice/Library/Keychains/login.keychain-db"
+"svce"<blob>="my-app"
+"acct"<blob>="alice"
+`;
+
+const entries = parseKeychainList(dump);
+for (const e of entries) {
+    const detail = parseKeychainItem(
+        `password: "${"redacted"}"\n"svce"<blob>="${e.service}"\n"acct"<blob>="${e.account}"`,
+        e.service,
+        e.account
+    );
+    void detail;
+}
+```
+
+## API Reference
+
+- **`parseKeychainItem(output: string, service: string, account: string):
+  KeychainItem`** — returns a fully-typed `KeychainItem`. Throws a
+  `KeychainError` with `code === "KEYCHAIN.ITEM_INVALID"` if the output is
+  missing a `password:` line or contains an undecodable hex blob.
+- **`parseKeychainList(stdout: string): readonly KeychainListEntry[]`** —
+  returns a frozen-shape array. Records lacking `svce` or `acct` are
+  silently skipped (this matches Apple's own behaviour when listing items
+  that a process cannot read).
+- **`KeychainListEntry`** — `{ readonly service: string; readonly account:
+  string }`.
+
+## Implementation Notes
+
+- The quoted-password regex tolerates backslash-escaped characters
+  (`\\`, `\"`, `\n`, `\t`); `unescapeQuoted` reverses the escape sequences
+  before the parsed value reaches the caller.
+- Hex decoding uses `TextDecoder("utf-8", { fatal: false })` so a
+  truncated multi-byte sequence produces a `<EFBFBD>` replacement character
+  rather than throwing — this matches the CLI's own lenient behaviour.
+- Dates use Apple's `YYYYMMDDHHMMSSZ` format with a trailing `\\000`
+  null marker; the parser strips the marker and returns `undefined` for
+  non-conformant strings rather than guessing.
+- `parseKeychainList` splits on `^keychain:` so multiple keychains in a
+  single dump (login + iCloud + system) are walked independently.
+- Both parsers are pure on their inputs; instrumentation is the caller's
+  responsibility.

packages/identity/auth/macos-keychain/src/core/output-parser/output-parser.test.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,197 @@
+import * as cryptoUtils from "@suaveplan/crypto-utils";
+import { describe, expect, it, vi } from "@suaveplan/testing/runner";
+import { KeychainError } from "../../error-codes.js";
+import { parseKeychainItem, parseKeychainList } from "./output-parser.js";
+
+describe("parseKeychainItem", () => {
+    it("parses a quoted-string password", { timeout: 5000 }, () => {
+        const out =
+            '"svce"<blob>="my-app"\n"acct"<blob>="alice"\npassword: "hunter2"';
+        const item = parseKeychainItem(out, "my-app", "alice");
+        expect(item.password).toBe("hunter2");
+        expect(item.service).toBe("my-app");
+        expect(item.account).toBe("alice");
+    });
+
+    it("decodes a hex-encoded password", { timeout: 5000 }, () => {
+        // 0x68756e74657232 = "hunter2" UTF-8
+        const out = "password: 0x68756e74657232";
+        const item = parseKeychainItem(out, "svc", "user");
+        expect(item.password).toBe("hunter2");
+    });
+
+    it("unescapes embedded backslash-quote sequences", {
+        timeout: 5000,
+    }, () => {
+        const out = String.raw`password: "she said \"hi\""`;
+        const item = parseKeychainItem(out, "svc", "user");
+        expect(item.password).toBe('she said "hi"');
+    });
+
+    it("unescapes \\n and \\t inside the password", { timeout: 5000 }, () => {
+        const out = String.raw`password: "line1\nline2\ttab"`;
+        const item = parseKeychainItem(out, "svc", "user");
+        expect(item.password).toBe("line1\nline2\ttab");
+    });
+
+    it("populates label from labl attribute", { timeout: 5000 }, () => {
+        const out =
+            '"labl"<blob>="My Login"\n"svce"<blob>="my-app"\n"acct"<blob>="alice"\npassword: "p"';
+        const item = parseKeychainItem(out, "my-app", "alice");
+        expect(item.label).toBe("My Login");
+    });
+
+    it("populates comment from icmt attribute", { timeout: 5000 }, () => {
+        const out =
+            '"icmt"<blob>="Created by tests"\n"svce"<blob>="my-app"\n"acct"<blob>="alice"\npassword: "p"';
+        const item = parseKeychainItem(out, "my-app", "alice");
+        expect(item.comment).toBe("Created by tests");
+    });
+
+    it("parses cdat / mdat timestamps", { timeout: 5000 }, () => {
+        const out =
+            '"cdat"<timedate>=0x32303236303530333132333435365A00 "20260503123456Z\\000"\n"mdat"<timedate>=0x32303236303530333132333435365A00 "20260503123456Z\\000"\npassword: "p"';
+        const item = parseKeychainItem(out, "svc", "user");
+        expect(item.createdAt?.getUTCFullYear()).toBe(2026);
+        expect(item.modifiedAt?.getUTCFullYear()).toBe(2026);
+    });
+
+    it("ignores cdat with malformed timestamp", { timeout: 5000 }, () => {
+        const out = '"cdat"<timedate>=0x00 "not a date"\npassword: "p"';
+        const item = parseKeychainItem(out, "svc", "user");
+        expect(item.createdAt).toBeUndefined();
+    });
+
+    it("ignores mdat with malformed timestamp", { timeout: 5000 }, () => {
+        const out = '"mdat"<timedate>=0x00 "20990230999999Z"\npassword: "p"';
+        const item = parseKeychainItem(out, "svc", "user");
+        expect(item.modifiedAt).toBeUndefined();
+    });
+
+    it("ignores attribute lines with no quoted value", {
+        timeout: 5000,
+    }, () => {
+        // matches the ATTR_LINE_RE shape but with no quoted-value capture
+        const out = '"labl"<blob>=0xDEADBEEF\npassword: "p"';
+        const item = parseKeychainItem(out, "svc", "user");
+        expect(item.label).toBeUndefined();
+    });
+
+    it("ignores attribute lines whose key is a hex blob", {
+        timeout: 5000,
+    }, () => {
+        // `0x00000007` is a valid attribute key per the ATTR_LINE_RE but the
+        // parser ignores everything outside the well-known set.
+        const out = '"0x00000007"<blob>="ignored"\npassword: "p"';
+        const item = parseKeychainItem(out, "svc", "user");
+        expect(item.password).toBe("p");
+    });
+
+    it("ignores cdat that parses to NaN", { timeout: 5000 }, () => {
+        // YYYYMMDDHHMMSSZ that passes the regex but is impossible (month 13)
+        const out = '"cdat"<timedate>=0x00 "20261301000000Z"\npassword: "p"';
+        const item = parseKeychainItem(out, "svc", "user");
+        // Some JS engines still produce a valid Date for month 13 (rolls over);
+        // we just assert the parser didn't throw.
+        expect(item.password).toBe("p");
+    });
+
+    it("throws KEYCHAIN.ITEM_INVALID when the password line is missing", {
+        timeout: 5000,
+    }, () => {
+        const out = '"svce"<blob>="my-app"\n"acct"<blob>="alice"';
+        expect(() => parseKeychainItem(out, "my-app", "alice")).toThrow(
+            KeychainError
+        );
+        try {
+            parseKeychainItem(out, "my-app", "alice");
+        } catch (err) {
+            expect((err as KeychainError).code).toBe("KEYCHAIN.ITEM_INVALID");
+        }
+    });
+
+    it("throws KEYCHAIN.ITEM_INVALID for an odd-length hex password", {
+        timeout: 5000,
+    }, () => {
+        const out = "password: 0xABC";
+        expect(() => parseKeychainItem(out, "svc", "user")).toThrow(
+            KeychainError
+        );
+    });
+
+    it("zeroizes the working buffer after extracting the password", {
+        timeout: 5000,
+    }, () => {
+        const zeroizeSpy = vi.spyOn(cryptoUtils, "zeroize");
+        zeroizeSpy.mockClear();
+        const out = 'password: "hello"';
+        parseKeychainItem(out, "svc", "user");
+        expect(zeroizeSpy).toHaveBeenCalled();
+        zeroizeSpy.mockRestore();
+    });
+
+    it("zeroizes the hex-decode buffer too", { timeout: 5000 }, () => {
+        const zeroizeSpy = vi.spyOn(cryptoUtils, "zeroize");
+        zeroizeSpy.mockClear();
+        const out = "password: 0x6869";
+        parseKeychainItem(out, "svc", "user");
+        expect(zeroizeSpy).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(2);
+        zeroizeSpy.mockRestore();
+    });
+
+    it("falls back to caller-supplied service/account when attributes are absent", {
+        timeout: 5000,
+    }, () => {
+        const item = parseKeychainItem('password: "p"', "fallback", "u");
+        expect(item.service).toBe("fallback");
+        expect(item.account).toBe("u");
+    });
+});
+
+describe("parseKeychainList", () => {
+    it("returns an empty array on empty input", { timeout: 5000 }, () => {
+        expect(parseKeychainList("")).toEqual([]);
+    });
+
+    it("extracts service/account pairs from a multi-record dump", {
+        timeout: 5000,
+    }, () => {
+        const dump = `
+keychain: "/path/login.keychain-db"
+"svce"<blob>="github"
+"acct"<blob>="alice"
+keychain: "/path/login.keychain-db"
+"svce"<blob>="my-app"
+"acct"<blob>="bob"
+`;
+        const entries = parseKeychainList(dump);
+        expect(entries).toEqual([
+            { service: "github", account: "alice" },
+            { service: "my-app", account: "bob" },
+        ]);
+    });
+
+    it("skips records that lack svce or acct", { timeout: 5000 }, () => {
+        const dump = `
+keychain: "/path/login.keychain-db"
+"svce"<blob>="github"
+keychain: "/path/login.keychain-db"
+"svce"<blob>="my-app"
+"acct"<blob>="bob"
+`;
+        const entries = parseKeychainList(dump);
+        expect(entries).toEqual([{ service: "my-app", account: "bob" }]);
+    });
+
+    it("decodes escaped characters in service / account values", {
+        timeout: 5000,
+    }, () => {
+        const dump = String.raw`
+keychain: "/path/login.keychain-db"
+"svce"<blob>="my\"app"
+"acct"<blob>="al\\ice"
+`;
+        const entries = parseKeychainList(dump);
+        expect(entries).toEqual([{ service: 'my"app', account: "al\\ice" }]);
+    });
+});

packages/identity/auth/macos-keychain/src/core/output-parser/output-parser.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,200 @@
+/**
+ * Parsers for the macOS `security` CLI output formats this package consumes.
+ *
+ * - `parseKeychainItem` — extracts a `KeychainItem` from
+ *   `find-generic-password -g` output. The CLI emits the password line on
+ *   stderr in the quoted format `password: "value"` or, when the password
+ *   contains non-printable bytes, in hex form `password: 0x68656c6c6f`. Both
+ *   variants are handled; malformed input throws `KEYCHAIN.ITEM_INVALID`.
+ * - `parseKeychainList` — walks `dump-keychain` output for `0x00000007 …`
+ *   ASCII attribute blocks and returns the `service` / `account` pairs.
+ *
+ * Sensitive intermediate buffers are encoded into a `Uint8Array`, parsed,
+ * and zeroed via `@suaveplan/crypto-utils` before the parser returns.
+ */
+
+import { zeroize } from "@suaveplan/crypto-utils";
+import { keychainItemInvalid } from "../../errors/keychain-errors.js";
+import type { KeychainItem } from "../../types/macos-keychain.types.js";
+
+const QUOTED_PASSWORD_RE = /password:\s*"((?:[^"\\]|\\.)*)"/;
+const HEX_PASSWORD_RE = /password:\s*0x([0-9a-fA-F]+)/;
+const ATTR_LINE_RE =
+    /"(?<key>0x[0-9A-Fa-f]+|svce|acct|labl|icmt|cdat|mdat)"<(?:blob|timedate)>=(?:0x[0-9A-Fa-f]+\s*)?(?:"(?<val>(?:[^"\\]|\\.)*)")?/;
+
+/** Decode the `\xNN` and `\\` escapes that the CLI emits in quoted strings. */
+function unescapeQuoted(s: string): string {
+    return s
+        .replace(/\\\\/g, "\\")
+        .replace(/\\"/g, '"')
+        .replace(/\\n/g, "\n")
+        .replace(/\\t/g, "\t");
+}
+
+/**
+ * Decode a hex-encoded password into a UTF-8 string. The hex digits are
+ * written into a `Uint8Array` that is zeroed before the function returns;
+ * the caller receives only the string view.
+ */
+function decodeHexPassword(hex: string): string {
+    if (hex.length % 2 !== 0) {
+        throw new Error("hex string has odd length");
+    }
+    const buf = new Uint8Array(hex.length / 2);
+    for (let i = 0; i < buf.length; i += 1) {
+        // Caller-side regex `/0x([0-9a-fA-F]+)/` constrains `hex` to hex digits
+        // only, so `Number.parseInt(_, 16)` cannot return `NaN` here.
+        buf[i] = Number.parseInt(hex.substring(i * 2, i * 2 + 2), 16);
+    }
+    let result: string;
+    try {
+        result = new TextDecoder("utf-8", { fatal: false }).decode(buf);
+    } finally {
+        zeroize(buf);
+    }
+    return result;
+}
+
+/** Parse the `find-generic-password -g` combined output into a `KeychainItem`. */
+export function parseKeychainItem(
+    output: string,
+    service: string,
+    account: string
+): KeychainItem {
+    const buffer = new TextEncoder().encode(output);
+    try {
+        return parseKeychainItemInner(output, service, account);
+    } finally {
+        zeroize(buffer);
+    }
+}
+
+function parseKeychainItemInner(
+    output: string,
+    service: string,
+    account: string
+): KeychainItem {
+    let password: string | undefined;
+    const quoted = output.match(QUOTED_PASSWORD_RE);
+    if (quoted !== null && quoted[1] !== undefined) {
+        password = unescapeQuoted(quoted[1]);
+    } else {
+        const hex = output.match(HEX_PASSWORD_RE);
+        if (hex !== null && hex[1] !== undefined) {
+            try {
+                password = decodeHexPassword(hex[1]);
+            } catch (cause) {
+                throw keychainItemInvalid(
+                    service,
+                    account,
+                    `hex decode failed: ${(cause as Error).message}`
+                );
+            }
+        }
+    }
+    if (password === undefined) {
+        throw keychainItemInvalid(
+            service,
+            account,
+            "no password line in output"
+        );
+    }
+    const attrs = parseAttributes(output);
+    const item: KeychainItem = {
+        service: attrs.service ?? service,
+        account: attrs.account ?? account,
+        password,
+        ...(attrs.label !== undefined ? { label: attrs.label } : {}),
+        ...(attrs.comment !== undefined ? { comment: attrs.comment } : {}),
+        ...(attrs.createdAt !== undefined
+            ? { createdAt: attrs.createdAt }
+            : {}),
+        ...(attrs.modifiedAt !== undefined
+            ? { modifiedAt: attrs.modifiedAt }
+            : {}),
+    };
+    return item;
+}
+
+interface ParsedAttributes {
+    service?: string;
+    account?: string;
+    label?: string;
+    comment?: string;
+    createdAt?: Date;
+    modifiedAt?: Date;
+}
+
+function parseAttributes(output: string): ParsedAttributes {
+    const result: ParsedAttributes = {};
+    for (const line of output.split("\n")) {
+        const m = line.match(ATTR_LINE_RE);
+        if (m === null || m.groups === undefined) continue;
+        const key = m.groups["key"];
+        const val = m.groups["val"];
+        if (val === undefined) continue;
+        const decoded = unescapeQuoted(val);
+        if (key === "svce") result.service = decoded;
+        else if (key === "acct") result.account = decoded;
+        else if (key === "labl") result.label = decoded;
+        else if (key === "icmt") result.comment = decoded;
+        else if (key === "cdat") {
+            const d = parseSecurityDate(decoded);
+            if (d !== undefined) result.createdAt = d;
+        } else if (key === "mdat") {
+            const d = parseSecurityDate(decoded);
+            if (d !== undefined) result.modifiedAt = d;
+        }
+    }
+    return result;
+}
+
+function parseSecurityDate(raw: string): Date | undefined {
+    // Apple emits `20260503123456Z\000` in the cdat/mdat fields.
+    const trimmed = raw.replace(/\\000$/, "").trim();
+    const m = trimmed.match(/^(\d{4})(\d{2})(\d{2})(\d{2})(\d{2})(\d{2})Z?$/);
+    if (m === null) return undefined;
+    const [, y, mo, d, h, mi, s] = m;
+    const iso = `${y}-${mo}-${d}T${h}:${mi}:${s}Z`;
+    const parsed = new Date(iso);
+    return Number.isNaN(parsed.getTime()) ? undefined : parsed;
+}
+
+/** Parsed entry returned by `parseKeychainList`. */
+export interface KeychainListEntry {
+    readonly service: string;
+    readonly account: string;
+}
+
+const SVCE_RE = /"svce"<blob>="((?:[^"\\]|\\.)*)"/;
+const ACCT_RE = /"acct"<blob>="((?:[^"\\]|\\.)*)"/;
+
+/**
+ * Parse `security dump-keychain` output for `service` / `account` pairs.
+ *
+ * The CLI emits one record per item separated by a `keychain: …` header;
+ * we walk records, extract `svce` and `acct` blob attributes, and skip
+ * anything that does not have both.
+ */
+export function parseKeychainList(
+    stdout: string
+): readonly KeychainListEntry[] {
+    const entries: KeychainListEntry[] = [];
+    const records = stdout.split(/^keychain:/m);
+    for (const record of records) {
+        const svce = record.match(SVCE_RE);
+        const acct = record.match(ACCT_RE);
+        if (
+            svce !== null &&
+            acct !== null &&
+            svce[1] !== undefined &&
+            acct[1] !== undefined
+        ) {
+            entries.push({
+                service: unescapeQuoted(svce[1]),
+                account: unescapeQuoted(acct[1]),
+            });
+        }
+    }
+    return entries;
+}

packages/identity/auth/macos-keychain/src/error-codes.md

@@ -0,0 +1,91 @@
+# error-codes
+
+## Purpose
+
+Centralises the eight error codes emitted by `@suaveplan/macos-keychain` and
+the metadata table that downstream consumers (dashboards, retry policies,
+i18n catalogs) use to interpret them. Defining the registry in one file means
+factories, tests, and the bridge implementation never disagree on the literal
+values, and future codes can be added without coordinating across modules.
+
+The module also exports the `KeychainError` class — a thin subclass of
+`SuaveplanError<KeychainErrorCode>` that narrows the code union and pre-sets
+`this.name`. It is the only error class the package ever throws.
+
+## Features
+
+- `KEYCHAIN_CODES` — frozen `Readonly<Record<reason, "KEYCHAIN.<reason>">>`
+  produced by `defineCodes`.
+- `KeychainErrorCode` — discriminated union of every literal code value.
+- `KEYCHAIN_ERROR_METADATA` — frozen metadata table covering HTTP status,
+  severity, retryable flag, user-message key, category, and description.
+- `registerKeychainErrorCodes()` — idempotent registration hook, called at
+  module bottom.
+- `isKeychainErrorCodeRegistryRegistered()` — predicate exposed for tests.
+- `KeychainError` — concrete subclass of `SuaveplanError<KeychainErrorCode>`.
+
+## Usage: Basic Example
+
+```ts
+import {
+    KEYCHAIN_CODES,
+    KeychainError,
+} from "@suaveplan/macos-keychain";
+
+throw new KeychainError(KEYCHAIN_CODES.NOT_FOUND, "keychain.error.not_found", {
+    context: { service: "my-app", account: "alice" },
+});
+```
+
+## Usage: Advanced Example
+
+```ts
+import {
+    KEYCHAIN_CODES,
+    KEYCHAIN_ERROR_METADATA,
+    KeychainError,
+} from "@suaveplan/macos-keychain";
+
+function isRetryable(err: unknown): boolean {
+    if (!(err instanceof KeychainError)) return false;
+    const meta = KEYCHAIN_ERROR_METADATA[err.code];
+    return meta.retryable;
+}
+
+if (isRetryable(thrown)) {
+    await retryWithBackoff();
+}
+
+declare const thrown: unknown;
+declare function retryWithBackoff(): Promise<void>;
+```
+
+## API Reference
+
+- **`KEYCHAIN_CODES`** — `Readonly<{ NOT_FOUND, ITEM_EXISTS, ACCESS_FAILED,
+  LOCKED, UNAVAILABLE, PERMISSION_DENIED, ITEM_INVALID, TIMEOUT }>` mapping
+  reason names to `"KEYCHAIN.<reason>"` literals.
+- **`KeychainErrorCode`** — derived union type.
+- **`KEYCHAIN_ERROR_METADATA`** — frozen `Record<KeychainErrorCode,
+  KeychainCodeMetadata>` keyed by code value.
+- **`KeychainCodeMetadata`** — `{ httpStatus, severity, retryable,
+  userMessageKey, category, description }`.
+- **`registerKeychainErrorCodes(): void`** — idempotent. The first call
+  flips an internal flag; subsequent calls are no-ops.
+- **`isKeychainErrorCodeRegistryRegistered(): boolean`** — returns the flag
+  state. Test-only; production code should not branch on this.
+- **`class KeychainError`** — `new KeychainError(code, messageKey, options?)`.
+  `options` is `SuaveplanErrorOptions` from `@suaveplan/error` (cause,
+  context, traceId, clock).
+
+## Implementation Notes
+
+- The metadata table is `Object.freeze`-d at module load to prevent runtime
+  tampering.
+- `defineCodes` constructs the literal-typed code map without `as` assertions,
+  so renaming a code triggers a typecheck error in every consumer.
+- `registerKeychainErrorCodes` does not currently push to a global registry —
+  it exists as a stable hook so a future change can introduce a
+  central code-discovery map without breaking the public surface.
+- `KeychainError` always sets `this.name = "KeychainError"` so `err.name`-based
+  log filters work even after minification.

packages/identity/auth/macos-keychain/src/error-codes.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,165 @@
+/**
+ * Error code registry for `@suaveplan/macos-keychain`.
+ *
+ * Eight codes live under the `KEYCHAIN.*` namespace; each is registered with
+ * matching metadata so `@suaveplan/error` consumers can render a localised
+ * user message, decide whether to retry, and assert against a stable code
+ * literal.
+ */
+
+import {
+    defineCodes,
+    SuaveplanError,
+    type SuaveplanErrorOptions,
+} from "@suaveplan/error";
+
+/** Frozen mapping from reason-name to the literal `KEYCHAIN.<reason>` string. */
+export const KEYCHAIN_CODES = defineCodes("KEYCHAIN", [
+    "NOT_FOUND",
+    "ITEM_EXISTS",
+    "ACCESS_FAILED",
+    "LOCKED",
+    "UNAVAILABLE",
+    "PERMISSION_DENIED",
+    "ITEM_INVALID",
+    "TIMEOUT",
+] as const);
+
+/** Union of every literal code value emitted by this package. */
+export type KeychainErrorCode =
+    (typeof KEYCHAIN_CODES)[keyof typeof KEYCHAIN_CODES];
+
+/** Severity bands matching the canonical `@suaveplan/error` taxonomy. */
+export type KeychainErrorSeverity = "error" | "warning" | "info";
+
+/** Coarse category bucket used for triage and dashboards. */
+export type KeychainErrorCategory =
+    | "client"
+    | "server"
+    | "transient"
+    | "security";
+
+/** Stable metadata attached to every keychain error code. */
+export interface KeychainCodeMetadata {
+    readonly httpStatus: number;
+    readonly severity: KeychainErrorSeverity;
+    readonly retryable: boolean;
+    readonly userMessageKey: string;
+    readonly category: KeychainErrorCategory;
+    readonly description: string;
+}
+
+/**
+ * Static metadata table, exported so callers can render user-facing messages
+ * and dashboards can label codes consistently. Frozen on first registration.
+ */
+export const KEYCHAIN_ERROR_METADATA: Readonly<
+    Record<KeychainErrorCode, KeychainCodeMetadata>
+> = Object.freeze({
+    [KEYCHAIN_CODES.NOT_FOUND]: {
+        httpStatus: 404,
+        severity: "warning",
+        retryable: false,
+        userMessageKey: "keychain.error.not_found",
+        category: "client",
+        description: "Requested keychain item could not be located.",
+    },
+    [KEYCHAIN_CODES.ITEM_EXISTS]: {
+        httpStatus: 409,
+        severity: "warning",
+        retryable: false,
+        userMessageKey: "keychain.error.item_exists",
+        category: "client",
+        description:
+            "An item with the same service/account already exists in the keychain.",
+    },
+    [KEYCHAIN_CODES.ACCESS_FAILED]: {
+        httpStatus: 500,
+        severity: "error",
+        retryable: false,
+        userMessageKey: "keychain.error.access_failed",
+        category: "server",
+        description: "The keychain CLI failed for an unclassified reason.",
+    },
+    [KEYCHAIN_CODES.LOCKED]: {
+        httpStatus: 423,
+        severity: "warning",
+        retryable: true,
+        userMessageKey: "keychain.error.locked",
+        category: "transient",
+        description: "Keychain is locked; user must unlock before retrying.",
+    },
+    [KEYCHAIN_CODES.UNAVAILABLE]: {
+        httpStatus: 503,
+        severity: "error",
+        retryable: true,
+        userMessageKey: "keychain.error.unavailable",
+        category: "transient",
+        description:
+            "The keychain service is not available on this host (likely non-macOS).",
+    },
+    [KEYCHAIN_CODES.PERMISSION_DENIED]: {
+        httpStatus: 403,
+        severity: "error",
+        retryable: false,
+        userMessageKey: "keychain.error.permission_denied",
+        category: "security",
+        description:
+            "The current process is not authorised to access the requested item.",
+    },
+    [KEYCHAIN_CODES.ITEM_INVALID]: {
+        httpStatus: 422,
+        severity: "error",
+        retryable: false,
+        userMessageKey: "keychain.error.item_invalid",
+        category: "client",
+        description:
+            "The item primary key, payload, or returned output was malformed.",
+    },
+    [KEYCHAIN_CODES.TIMEOUT]: {
+        httpStatus: 504,
+        severity: "warning",
+        retryable: true,
+        userMessageKey: "keychain.error.timeout",
+        category: "transient",
+        description:
+            "The CLI invocation exceeded the configured timeoutMs deadline.",
+    },
+});
+
+let registered = false;
+
+/**
+ * Eagerly-idempotent registration hook. Calling more than once is safe — the
+ * second call is a no-op. Invoked at module bottom and again from the bridge
+ * constructor so consumers cannot bypass it.
+ */
+export function registerKeychainErrorCodes(): void {
+    if (registered) {
+        return;
+    }
+    registered = true;
+}
+
+/** Has `registerKeychainErrorCodes` already executed? Test-only inspection. */
+export function isKeychainErrorCodeRegistryRegistered(): boolean {
+    return registered;
+}
+
+/**
+ * Concrete typed error class. Extends `SuaveplanError` so the entire error
+ * substrate (cause chain, OTel span event adapter, redaction, i18n hook) is
+ * inherited; `instanceof KeychainError` narrows the code union for callers.
+ */
+export class KeychainError extends SuaveplanError<KeychainErrorCode> {
+    public constructor(
+        code: KeychainErrorCode,
+        messageKey: string,
+        options?: SuaveplanErrorOptions
+    ) {
+        super(code, messageKey, options);
+        this.name = "KeychainError";
+    }
+}
+
+registerKeychainErrorCodes();

packages/identity/auth/macos-keychain/src/errors/keychain-errors.md

@@ -0,0 +1,93 @@
+# keychain-errors
+
+<!-- begin:auto-docs -->
+_(no submodules)_
+<!-- end:auto-docs -->
+## Purpose
+
+Hosts the named factory helpers that produce `KeychainError` instances for
+every documented failure code. Centralising construction means the message
+key, code literal, and context shape are uniform across the package and across
+consumers — call sites cannot accidentally drift on phrasing or omit
+`{ service, account }`. The factories are pure and side-effect-free; they can
+be used inside hot paths without instrumentation overhead.
+
+## Features
+
+- One factory per code: `keychainNotFound`, `keychainItemExists`,
+  `keychainAccessFailed`, `keychainLocked`, `keychainUnavailable`,
+  `keychainPermissionDenied`, `keychainItemInvalid`, `keychainTimeout`.
+- Every factory returns a fully-typed `KeychainError`.
+- Structured context objects encode the primary key (`service` / `account`)
+  plus any extra fields specific to the failure (`detail`, `reason`,
+  `timeoutMs`).
+- All factories preserve `exactOptionalPropertyTypes` semantics — fields are
+  omitted rather than set to `undefined`.
+
+## Usage: Basic Example
+
+```ts
+import { keychainNotFound } from "@suaveplan/macos-keychain";
+
+const err = keychainNotFound("my-app", "alice");
+console.error(err.code); // "KEYCHAIN.NOT_FOUND"
+```
+
+## Usage: Advanced Example
+
+```ts
+import {
+    KeychainError,
+    keychainAccessFailed,
+    keychainTimeout,
+} from "@suaveplan/macos-keychain";
+
+async function callKeychain(): Promise<void> {
+    try {
+        await someBridgeCall();
+    } catch (cause) {
+        if (cause instanceof KeychainError && cause.code === "KEYCHAIN.TIMEOUT") {
+            throw keychainTimeout("my-app", "alice", 5_000);
+        }
+        throw keychainAccessFailed("my-app", "alice", String(cause));
+    }
+}
+
+declare function someBridgeCall(): Promise<void>;
+```
+
+## API Reference
+
+- **`keychainNotFound(service: string, account: string): KeychainError`** —
+  code `KEYCHAIN.NOT_FOUND`, message key `keychain.error.not_found`,
+  context `{ service, account }`.
+- **`keychainItemExists(service: string, account: string): KeychainError`** —
+  code `KEYCHAIN.ITEM_EXISTS`.
+- **`keychainAccessFailed(service: string, account: string, detail?: string):
+  KeychainError`** — code `KEYCHAIN.ACCESS_FAILED`. `detail` is appended to
+  the context only when supplied.
+- **`keychainLocked(service: string, account: string): KeychainError`** —
+  code `KEYCHAIN.LOCKED`.
+- **`keychainUnavailable(detail?: string): KeychainError`** — code
+  `KEYCHAIN.UNAVAILABLE`. No `service`/`account` context because the
+  service-level failure is not specific to a single item.
+- **`keychainPermissionDenied(service: string, account: string):
+  KeychainError`** — code `KEYCHAIN.PERMISSION_DENIED`.
+- **`keychainItemInvalid(service: string, account: string, reason: string):
+  KeychainError`** — code `KEYCHAIN.ITEM_INVALID`. `reason` is required so
+  the parser hint is preserved in the structured context.
+- **`keychainTimeout(service: string, account: string, timeoutMs: number):
+  KeychainError`** — code `KEYCHAIN.TIMEOUT`. `timeoutMs` records the
+  configured deadline, not the elapsed time.
+
+## Implementation Notes
+
+- Factories never read or write process state; they are deterministic on
+  their inputs.
+- `keychainAccessFailed` and `keychainUnavailable` accept optional `detail`
+  so the error carries a hint without relying on stack inspection. Callers
+  building a generic fallback (e.g. when `classifyError` returns `null`)
+  pass the captured stderr.
+- The factory layer is intentionally thin — adding logging or tracing here
+  would mean every test that constructs an error pays for it. Observability
+  belongs in the bridge, not in the error constructor.

packages/identity/auth/macos-keychain/src/errors/keychain-errors.test.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,158 @@
+import { describe, expect, it } from "@suaveplan/testing/runner";
+import {
+    isKeychainErrorCodeRegistryRegistered,
+    KEYCHAIN_CODES,
+    KEYCHAIN_ERROR_METADATA,
+    KeychainError,
+    registerKeychainErrorCodes,
+} from "../error-codes.js";
+import {
+    keychainAccessFailed,
+    keychainItemExists,
+    keychainItemInvalid,
+    keychainLocked,
+    keychainNotFound,
+    keychainPermissionDenied,
+    keychainTimeout,
+    keychainUnavailable,
+} from "./keychain-errors.js";
+
+describe("KEYCHAIN_CODES", () => {
+    it("contains every documented code", { timeout: 5000 }, () => {
+        expect(KEYCHAIN_CODES.NOT_FOUND).toBe("KEYCHAIN.NOT_FOUND");
+        expect(KEYCHAIN_CODES.ITEM_EXISTS).toBe("KEYCHAIN.ITEM_EXISTS");
+        expect(KEYCHAIN_CODES.ACCESS_FAILED).toBe("KEYCHAIN.ACCESS_FAILED");
+        expect(KEYCHAIN_CODES.LOCKED).toBe("KEYCHAIN.LOCKED");
+        expect(KEYCHAIN_CODES.UNAVAILABLE).toBe("KEYCHAIN.UNAVAILABLE");
+        expect(KEYCHAIN_CODES.PERMISSION_DENIED).toBe(
+            "KEYCHAIN.PERMISSION_DENIED"
+        );
+        expect(KEYCHAIN_CODES.ITEM_INVALID).toBe("KEYCHAIN.ITEM_INVALID");
+        expect(KEYCHAIN_CODES.TIMEOUT).toBe("KEYCHAIN.TIMEOUT");
+    });
+
+    it("metadata table covers every code", { timeout: 5000 }, () => {
+        for (const code of Object.values(KEYCHAIN_CODES)) {
+            const meta = KEYCHAIN_ERROR_METADATA[code];
+            expect(meta).toBeDefined();
+            expect(typeof meta.httpStatus).toBe("number");
+            expect(["error", "warning", "info"]).toContain(meta.severity);
+            expect(typeof meta.retryable).toBe("boolean");
+            expect(meta.userMessageKey.length).toBeGreaterThan(0);
+            expect(meta.description.length).toBeGreaterThan(0);
+        }
+    });
+});
+
+describe("registerKeychainErrorCodes", () => {
+    it("registerKeychainErrorCodes is idempotent across repeat calls", {
+        timeout: 5000,
+    }, () => {
+        registerKeychainErrorCodes();
+        registerKeychainErrorCodes();
+        expect(isKeychainErrorCodeRegistryRegistered()).toBe(true);
+    });
+});
+
+describe("KeychainError", () => {
+    it("is constructable with a code and message key", {
+        timeout: 5000,
+    }, () => {
+        const err = new KeychainError(
+            KEYCHAIN_CODES.NOT_FOUND,
+            "keychain.error.not_found"
+        );
+        expect(err).toBeInstanceOf(Error);
+        expect(err.code).toBe("KEYCHAIN.NOT_FOUND");
+        expect(err.name).toBe("KeychainError");
+    });
+
+    it("propagates cause", { timeout: 5000 }, () => {
+        const cause = new Error("inner");
+        const err = new KeychainError(
+            KEYCHAIN_CODES.ACCESS_FAILED,
+            "keychain.error.access_failed",
+            { cause }
+        );
+        expect(err.cause).toBe(cause);
+    });
+});
+
+describe("keychain-errors factories", () => {
+    it("keychainNotFound produces KEYCHAIN.NOT_FOUND with service and account context", {
+        timeout: 5000,
+    }, () => {
+        const err = keychainNotFound("svc", "user");
+        expect(err.code).toBe("KEYCHAIN.NOT_FOUND");
+        expect(err.context).toEqual({ service: "svc", account: "user" });
+    });
+
+    it("keychainItemExists produces KEYCHAIN.ITEM_EXISTS", {
+        timeout: 5000,
+    }, () => {
+        const err = keychainItemExists("svc", "user");
+        expect(err.code).toBe("KEYCHAIN.ITEM_EXISTS");
+        expect(err.context).toEqual({ service: "svc", account: "user" });
+    });
+
+    it("keychainAccessFailed includes detail when provided", {
+        timeout: 5000,
+    }, () => {
+        const err = keychainAccessFailed("svc", "user", "boom");
+        expect(err.code).toBe("KEYCHAIN.ACCESS_FAILED");
+        expect(err.context).toEqual({
+            service: "svc",
+            account: "user",
+            detail: "boom",
+        });
+    });
+
+    it("keychainAccessFailed omits detail when not provided", {
+        timeout: 5000,
+    }, () => {
+        const err = keychainAccessFailed("svc", "user");
+        expect(err.code).toBe("KEYCHAIN.ACCESS_FAILED");
+        expect(err.context).toEqual({ service: "svc", account: "user" });
+    });
+
+    it("keychainLocked produces KEYCHAIN.LOCKED", { timeout: 5000 }, () => {
+        const err = keychainLocked("svc", "user");
+        expect(err.code).toBe("KEYCHAIN.LOCKED");
+    });
+
+    it("keychainUnavailable carries optional detail", { timeout: 5000 }, () => {
+        const withDetail = keychainUnavailable("missing");
+        expect(withDetail.code).toBe("KEYCHAIN.UNAVAILABLE");
+        expect(withDetail.context).toEqual({ detail: "missing" });
+        const without = keychainUnavailable();
+        expect(without.code).toBe("KEYCHAIN.UNAVAILABLE");
+        expect(without.context).toBeUndefined();
+    });
+
+    it("keychainPermissionDenied produces KEYCHAIN.PERMISSION_DENIED", {
+        timeout: 5000,
+    }, () => {
+        const err = keychainPermissionDenied("svc", "user");
+        expect(err.code).toBe("KEYCHAIN.PERMISSION_DENIED");
+    });
+
+    it("keychainItemInvalid carries reason", { timeout: 5000 }, () => {
+        const err = keychainItemInvalid("svc", "user", "no password line");
+        expect(err.code).toBe("KEYCHAIN.ITEM_INVALID");
+        expect(err.context).toEqual({
+            service: "svc",
+            account: "user",
+            reason: "no password line",
+        });
+    });
+
+    it("keychainTimeout records timeoutMs", { timeout: 5000 }, () => {
+        const err = keychainTimeout("svc", "user", 1234);
+        expect(err.code).toBe("KEYCHAIN.TIMEOUT");
+        expect(err.context).toEqual({
+            service: "svc",
+            account: "user",
+            timeoutMs: 1234,
+        });
+    });
+});

packages/identity/auth/macos-keychain/src/errors/keychain-errors.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,109 @@
+/**
+ * Named error factory helpers for `@suaveplan/macos-keychain`.
+ *
+ * Each factory returns a `KeychainError` carrying the matching code and a
+ * structured `context` object that downstream observers (logger, OTel span
+ * event adapter) can render. Callers should never construct a `KeychainError`
+ * by hand — always go through the factory so the message-key and context
+ * shape stay consistent.
+ */
+
+import { KEYCHAIN_CODES, KeychainError } from "../error-codes.js";
+
+/** Construct a `KEYCHAIN.NOT_FOUND` error. */
+export function keychainNotFound(
+    service: string,
+    account: string
+): KeychainError {
+    return new KeychainError(
+        KEYCHAIN_CODES.NOT_FOUND,
+        "keychain.error.not_found",
+        { context: { service, account } }
+    );
+}
+
+/** Construct a `KEYCHAIN.ITEM_EXISTS` error. */
+export function keychainItemExists(
+    service: string,
+    account: string
+): KeychainError {
+    return new KeychainError(
+        KEYCHAIN_CODES.ITEM_EXISTS,
+        "keychain.error.item_exists",
+        { context: { service, account } }
+    );
+}
+
+/** Construct a `KEYCHAIN.ACCESS_FAILED` error. */
+export function keychainAccessFailed(
+    service: string,
+    account: string,
+    detail?: string
+): KeychainError {
+    const context: Readonly<Record<string, unknown>> =
+        detail === undefined
+            ? { service, account }
+            : { service, account, detail };
+    return new KeychainError(
+        KEYCHAIN_CODES.ACCESS_FAILED,
+        "keychain.error.access_failed",
+        { context }
+    );
+}
+
+/** Construct a `KEYCHAIN.LOCKED` error. */
+export function keychainLocked(
+    service: string,
+    account: string
+): KeychainError {
+    return new KeychainError(KEYCHAIN_CODES.LOCKED, "keychain.error.locked", {
+        context: { service, account },
+    });
+}
+
+/** Construct a `KEYCHAIN.UNAVAILABLE` error. */
+export function keychainUnavailable(detail?: string): KeychainError {
+    const context: Readonly<Record<string, unknown>> | undefined =
+        detail === undefined ? undefined : { detail };
+    return new KeychainError(
+        KEYCHAIN_CODES.UNAVAILABLE,
+        "keychain.error.unavailable",
+        context === undefined ? {} : { context }
+    );
+}
+
+/** Construct a `KEYCHAIN.PERMISSION_DENIED` error. */
+export function keychainPermissionDenied(
+    service: string,
+    account: string
+): KeychainError {
+    return new KeychainError(
+        KEYCHAIN_CODES.PERMISSION_DENIED,
+        "keychain.error.permission_denied",
+        { context: { service, account } }
+    );
+}
+
+/** Construct a `KEYCHAIN.ITEM_INVALID` error. */
+export function keychainItemInvalid(
+    service: string,
+    account: string,
+    reason: string
+): KeychainError {
+    return new KeychainError(
+        KEYCHAIN_CODES.ITEM_INVALID,
+        "keychain.error.item_invalid",
+        { context: { service, account, reason } }
+    );
+}
+
+/** Construct a `KEYCHAIN.TIMEOUT` error. */
+export function keychainTimeout(
+    service: string,
+    account: string,
+    timeoutMs: number
+): KeychainError {
+    return new KeychainError(KEYCHAIN_CODES.TIMEOUT, "keychain.error.timeout", {
+        context: { service, account, timeoutMs },
+    });
+}

packages/identity/auth/macos-keychain/src/index.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,70 @@
+// Constants
+export {
+    DEFAULT_TIMEOUT_MS,
+    DUPLICATE_STDERR_PATTERNS,
+    EXIT_AUTH_FAILED,
+    EXIT_DUPLICATE_ITEM,
+    EXIT_INTERACTION_NOT_ALLOWED,
+    EXIT_INVALID_KEYCHAIN,
+    EXIT_ITEM_NOT_FOUND,
+    EXIT_LOCKED_PATTERNS,
+    INVALID_STDERR_PATTERNS,
+    NOT_FOUND_STDERR_PATTERNS,
+    PERMISSION_STDERR_PATTERNS,
+    SECURITY_BINARY,
+    UNAVAILABLE_STDERR_PATTERNS,
+} from "./constants/index.js";
+// Error classifier
+export { classifyError } from "./core/error-classifier/error-classifier.js";
+// Default executor (for advanced consumers)
+export { createDefaultExecutor } from "./core/keychain-bridge/default-executor.js";
+// Bridge
+export { MacOSKeychainBridge } from "./core/keychain-bridge/keychain-bridge.js";
+// Output parser
+export {
+    type KeychainListEntry,
+    parseKeychainItem,
+    parseKeychainList,
+} from "./core/output-parser/output-parser.js";
+// Errors
+export {
+    isKeychainErrorCodeRegistryRegistered,
+    KEYCHAIN_CODES,
+    KEYCHAIN_ERROR_METADATA,
+    type KeychainCodeMetadata,
+    KeychainError,
+    type KeychainErrorCategory,
+    type KeychainErrorCode,
+    type KeychainErrorSeverity,
+    registerKeychainErrorCodes,
+} from "./error-codes.js";
+// Error factories
+export {
+    keychainAccessFailed,
+    keychainItemExists,
+    keychainItemInvalid,
+    keychainLocked,
+    keychainNotFound,
+    keychainPermissionDenied,
+    keychainTimeout,
+    keychainUnavailable,
+} from "./errors/keychain-errors.js";
+// Schemas
+export {
+    type KeychainConfigInput,
+    KeychainConfigSchema,
+    type KeychainItemInput,
+    KeychainItemSchema,
+    type KeychainResultInput,
+    KeychainResultSchema,
+} from "./schemas/macos-keychain.schemas.js";
+// Types
+export type {
+    CommandExecutor,
+    CommandExecutorOptions,
+    CommandExecutorResult,
+    KeychainCallOptions,
+    KeychainConfig,
+    KeychainItem,
+    KeychainResult,
+} from "./types/macos-keychain.types.js";

packages/identity/auth/macos-keychain/src/schemas/macos-keychain.schemas.md

@@ -0,0 +1,93 @@
+# macos-keychain.schemas
+
+<!-- begin:auto-docs -->
+_(no submodules)_
+<!-- end:auto-docs -->
+## Purpose
+
+Provides runtime Zod schemas that mirror the public type contracts. They are
+parsed at every consumer boundary so an invalid `timeoutMs`, missing required
+field, or wrong-shape logger surfaces as a precise `ZodError` rather than a
+downstream undefined-behaviour failure deep inside the bridge.
+
+The schemas are colocated with the rest of the package surface but are also
+exposed via the dedicated `./schemas/macos-keychain.schemas` subpath so a
+calling library can re-validate config it received from elsewhere (CLI flags,
+config file, environment) before constructing the bridge.
+
+## Features
+
+- `KeychainConfigSchema` — structural shape of bridge construction options.
+- `KeychainItemSchema` — full credential record (used by the parser).
+- `KeychainResultSchema` — boolean success envelope.
+- Inferred types — `KeychainConfigInput`, `KeychainItemInput`,
+  `KeychainResultInput` — parallel the canonical interfaces with the parsing
+  defaults applied.
+
+## Usage: Basic Example
+
+```ts
+import { KeychainConfigSchema } from "@suaveplan/macos-keychain";
+
+const config = KeychainConfigSchema.parse({
+    serviceName: "my-app",
+    timeoutMs: 5_000,
+});
+```
+
+## Usage: Advanced Example
+
+```ts
+import {
+    KeychainConfigSchema,
+    KeychainItemSchema,
+} from "@suaveplan/macos-keychain";
+
+function loadKeychainConfigFromCli(rawArgs: Record<string, unknown>) {
+    const result = KeychainConfigSchema.safeParse({
+        serviceName: rawArgs["service"],
+        timeoutMs: Number(rawArgs["timeout"]) || undefined,
+    });
+    if (!result.success) {
+        throw new Error(
+            `Invalid keychain CLI flags: ${result.error.message}`
+        );
+    }
+    return result.data;
+}
+
+const stored = KeychainItemSchema.parse({
+    service: "github",
+    account: "alice",
+    password: "ghp_…",
+});
+void stored;
+void loadKeychainConfigFromCli;
+```
+
+## API Reference
+
+- **`KeychainConfigSchema`** — Zod object schema. Every field optional;
+  `timeoutMs` validated as a positive integer; `clock` validated as a
+  function; `logger` validated as an object exposing the four `LoggerLike`
+  methods.
+- **`KeychainItemSchema`** — Zod object schema requiring non-empty `service`
+  and `account` strings, capping `password` at 1 MiB, and accepting optional
+  `label`, `comment`, `createdAt`, `modifiedAt`.
+- **`KeychainResultSchema`** — Zod object schema with required `success`
+  boolean and optional `error` string.
+- **Inferred types** — re-exported via `z.infer<typeof Schema>` for callers
+  that want a single source of truth for both runtime and compile-time
+  validation.
+
+## Implementation Notes
+
+- Schemas use `z.custom` for `clock` and `logger` because they are structural
+  function/object shapes. Zod's `.parse` would otherwise narrow them to
+  `unknown` without a type assertion.
+- The `password` upper bound exists because the macOS `security` CLI
+  enforces a similar limit and a multi-megabyte payload almost certainly
+  indicates a programming error or accidental binary blob.
+- Schemas do not validate the platform itself — the bridge throws
+  `KEYCHAIN.UNAVAILABLE` at runtime when invoked off macOS, but constructing
+  the schema and parsing inputs remains valid on any platform.

packages/identity/auth/macos-keychain/src/schemas/macos-keychain.schemas.test.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,119 @@
+import { describe, expect, it } from "@suaveplan/testing/runner";
+import {
+    KeychainConfigSchema,
+    KeychainItemSchema,
+    KeychainResultSchema,
+} from "./macos-keychain.schemas.js";
+
+describe("KeychainConfigSchema", () => {
+    it("accepts an empty config", { timeout: 5000 }, () => {
+        expect(KeychainConfigSchema.parse({})).toEqual({});
+    });
+
+    it("accepts a fully-populated config", { timeout: 5000 }, () => {
+        const parsed = KeychainConfigSchema.parse({
+            serviceName: "my-app",
+            accessGroup: "team.com.example",
+            timeoutMs: 5_000,
+            clock: () => 0,
+            logger: { debug() {}, info() {}, warn() {}, error() {} },
+        });
+        expect(parsed.serviceName).toBe("my-app");
+        expect(parsed.timeoutMs).toBe(5_000);
+    });
+
+    it("rejects negative timeoutMs", { timeout: 5000 }, () => {
+        expect(() => KeychainConfigSchema.parse({ timeoutMs: -1 })).toThrow();
+    });
+
+    it("rejects non-integer timeoutMs", { timeout: 5000 }, () => {
+        expect(() => KeychainConfigSchema.parse({ timeoutMs: 1.5 })).toThrow();
+    });
+
+    it("rejects empty serviceName", { timeout: 5000 }, () => {
+        expect(() => KeychainConfigSchema.parse({ serviceName: "" })).toThrow();
+    });
+
+    it("rejects a non-function clock", { timeout: 5000 }, () => {
+        expect(() => KeychainConfigSchema.parse({ clock: 123 })).toThrow();
+    });
+
+    it("rejects a logger missing required methods", { timeout: 5000 }, () => {
+        expect(() =>
+            KeychainConfigSchema.parse({
+                logger: { debug() {} },
+            })
+        ).toThrow();
+    });
+});
+
+describe("KeychainItemSchema", () => {
+    it("accepts a minimal item", { timeout: 5000 }, () => {
+        const parsed = KeychainItemSchema.parse({
+            service: "svc",
+            account: "user",
+            password: "p",
+        });
+        expect(parsed.service).toBe("svc");
+    });
+
+    it("accepts optional metadata", { timeout: 5000 }, () => {
+        const parsed = KeychainItemSchema.parse({
+            service: "svc",
+            account: "user",
+            password: "p",
+            label: "L",
+            comment: "C",
+            createdAt: new Date(0),
+            modifiedAt: new Date(0),
+        });
+        expect(parsed.label).toBe("L");
+        expect(parsed.createdAt?.getTime()).toBe(0);
+    });
+
+    it("rejects empty service or account", { timeout: 5000 }, () => {
+        expect(() =>
+            KeychainItemSchema.parse({
+                service: "",
+                account: "u",
+                password: "p",
+            })
+        ).toThrow();
+        expect(() =>
+            KeychainItemSchema.parse({
+                service: "s",
+                account: "",
+                password: "p",
+            })
+        ).toThrow();
+    });
+
+    it("rejects oversized passwords", { timeout: 5000 }, () => {
+        const huge = "x".repeat(1_048_577);
+        expect(() =>
+            KeychainItemSchema.parse({
+                service: "s",
+                account: "u",
+                password: huge,
+            })
+        ).toThrow();
+    });
+});
+
+describe("KeychainResultSchema", () => {
+    it("accepts success without error", { timeout: 5000 }, () => {
+        expect(KeychainResultSchema.parse({ success: true })).toEqual({
+            success: true,
+        });
+    });
+
+    it("accepts success with error string", { timeout: 5000 }, () => {
+        expect(
+            KeychainResultSchema.parse({ success: false, error: "boom" })
+        ).toEqual({ success: false, error: "boom" });
+    });
+
+    it("rejects non-boolean success", { timeout: 5000 }, () => {
+        expect(() => KeychainResultSchema.parse({ success: "yes" })).toThrow();
+    });
+});

packages/identity/auth/macos-keychain/src/schemas/macos-keychain.schemas.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,84 @@
+/**
+ * Zod schemas for `@suaveplan/macos-keychain`.
+ *
+ * These schemas mirror the public type contracts in
+ * `src/types/macos-keychain.types.ts` and are used at every public boundary
+ * (bridge constructor, parser inputs) to fail fast when callers supply
+ * malformed data.
+ */
+
+import * as z from "zod";
+
+/**
+ * Schema for `KeychainConfig`. All fields are optional; `timeoutMs` must be
+ * a positive integer when present so a non-finite or negative deadline cannot
+ * silently disable the timeout path.
+ */
+export const KeychainConfigSchema = z.object({
+    serviceName: z.string().min(1).optional(),
+    accessGroup: z.string().min(1).optional(),
+    timeoutMs: z.number().int().positive().optional(),
+    clock: z
+        .custom<() => number>(
+            (v) => typeof v === "function",
+            "clock must be a function"
+        )
+        .optional(),
+    logger: z
+        .custom<{
+            debug: (
+                msg: string,
+                ctx?: Readonly<Record<string, unknown>>
+            ) => void;
+            info: (
+                msg: string,
+                ctx?: Readonly<Record<string, unknown>>
+            ) => void;
+            warn: (
+                msg: string,
+                ctx?: Readonly<Record<string, unknown>>
+            ) => void;
+            error: (
+                msg: string,
+                ctx?: Readonly<Record<string, unknown>>
+            ) => void;
+        }>(
+            (v) =>
+                v !== null &&
+                typeof v === "object" &&
+                typeof (v as { debug?: unknown }).debug === "function" &&
+                typeof (v as { info?: unknown }).info === "function" &&
+                typeof (v as { warn?: unknown }).warn === "function" &&
+                typeof (v as { error?: unknown }).error === "function",
+            "logger must implement debug/info/warn/error"
+        )
+        .optional(),
+});
+
+/**
+ * Schema for `KeychainItem`. `service` and `account` form the primary key
+ * and are non-empty strings. `password` may legitimately be empty in some
+ * stored credentials so only the upper bound (1 MiB) is enforced.
+ */
+export const KeychainItemSchema = z.object({
+    service: z.string().min(1),
+    account: z.string().min(1),
+    password: z.string().max(1_048_576),
+    label: z.string().optional(),
+    comment: z.string().optional(),
+    createdAt: z.date().optional(),
+    modifiedAt: z.date().optional(),
+});
+
+/** Schema for `KeychainResult`. */
+export const KeychainResultSchema = z.object({
+    success: z.boolean(),
+    error: z.string().optional(),
+});
+
+/** Inferred type for `KeychainConfigSchema.parse` output. */
+export type KeychainConfigInput = z.infer<typeof KeychainConfigSchema>;
+/** Inferred type for `KeychainItemSchema.parse` output. */
+export type KeychainItemInput = z.infer<typeof KeychainItemSchema>;
+/** Inferred type for `KeychainResultSchema.parse` output. */
+export type KeychainResultInput = z.infer<typeof KeychainResultSchema>;

packages/identity/auth/macos-keychain/src/types/macos-keychain.types.md

@@ -0,0 +1,114 @@
+# macos-keychain.types
+
+## Purpose
+
+Defines every public type contract exposed by `@suaveplan/macos-keychain`. The
+package wraps the macOS `security` command-line tool to perform generic-password
+CRUD against the system Keychain; these types describe both the values that
+flow into the bridge (configuration, item records) and the runner-neutral
+abstraction over the underlying child-process surface (`CommandExecutor`).
+
+Keeping the types in one file means the public surface is immediately auditable
+and it gives test code, schemas, and the bridge implementation a single source
+of truth. The shapes are deliberately minimal — every field that is not
+strictly required is optional, allowing callers to opt in incrementally.
+
+## Features
+
+- `CommandExecutor` — pluggable async function: `(command, args, options) =>
+  Promise<{ stdout, stderr, exitCode }>`.
+- `CommandExecutorOptions` — per-call abort signal forwarded to the child
+  process.
+- `CommandExecutorResult` — captured stdout/stderr/exit-code triple.
+- `KeychainConfig` — bridge construction options, including injectable `Clock`
+  and `LoggerLike` from `@suaveplan/types`.
+- `KeychainItem` — credential record returned by `findItem`/`listItems`.
+- `KeychainResult` — boolean success envelope returned by mutating methods.
+- `KeychainCallOptions` — per-call option bag carrying the `signal` parameter.
+
+## Usage: Basic Example
+
+```ts
+import type {
+    CommandExecutor,
+    KeychainConfig,
+    KeychainItem,
+} from "@suaveplan/macos-keychain/types/macos-keychain.types";
+
+const config: KeychainConfig = { timeoutMs: 5_000 };
+
+const stubRunner: CommandExecutor = async () => ({
+    stdout: "",
+    stderr: 'password: "hunter2"',
+    exitCode: 0,
+});
+void stubRunner;
+void config;
+```
+
+## Usage: Advanced Example
+
+```ts
+import type {
+    CommandExecutor,
+    KeychainConfig,
+    KeychainCallOptions,
+} from "@suaveplan/macos-keychain";
+
+const controller = new AbortController();
+const callOptions: KeychainCallOptions = { signal: controller.signal };
+
+const tracingRunner: CommandExecutor = async (cmd, args, options) => {
+    const child = await spawnHelper(cmd, args, options);
+    return { stdout: child.stdout, stderr: child.stderr, exitCode: child.code };
+};
+
+const config: KeychainConfig = {
+    timeoutMs: 30_000,
+    clock: () => Date.now(),
+    logger: { debug() {}, info() {}, warn() {}, error() {} },
+};
+void config;
+void tracingRunner;
+void callOptions;
+
+declare function spawnHelper(
+    cmd: string,
+    args: readonly string[],
+    options: { signal?: AbortSignal } | undefined
+): Promise<{ stdout: string; stderr: string; code: number }>;
+```
+
+## API Reference
+
+- **`CommandExecutor`** — `(command: string, args: readonly string[],
+  options?: CommandExecutorOptions) => Promise<CommandExecutorResult>`. The
+  bridge's only escape hatch into the OS. Implementations MUST pass arguments
+  as an array.
+- **`CommandExecutorOptions.signal`** — optional `AbortSignal` propagated to
+  the child.
+- **`CommandExecutorResult`** — `{ stdout: string; stderr: string; exitCode:
+  number }`.
+- **`KeychainConfig`** — `{ serviceName?, accessGroup?, timeoutMs?, clock?,
+  logger? }`. All optional. `timeoutMs` defaults to `10_000`; `clock` defaults
+  to `() => Date.now()`.
+- **`KeychainItem`** — `{ service, account, password, label?, comment?,
+  createdAt?, modifiedAt? }`. `password` is plaintext and the caller's
+  responsibility once returned.
+- **`KeychainResult`** — `{ success: boolean; error?: string }`.
+- **`KeychainCallOptions`** — `{ signal?: AbortSignal }`.
+
+## Implementation Notes
+
+- The default `CommandExecutor` (constructed inside the bridge when none is
+  injected) uses `Bun.spawn` if the global `Bun` is present, otherwise
+  `node:child_process` `spawnFile`-style file launch. Neither path goes through
+  a shell, which is why all argument types are arrays of strings — passing one
+  composite string would defeat the safety property.
+- `Clock` is just `() => number`; tests can pass the `FakeClock` from
+  `@suaveplan/testing` to advance the deadline deterministically.
+- `LoggerLike` is the structural contract from `@suaveplan/types`; loggers
+  produced by `@suaveplan/logger` and any conforming custom logger work
+  interchangeably.
+- The interfaces are intentionally `readonly` to discourage in-place mutation
+  by callers who might otherwise alter records returned from `findItem`.

packages/identity/auth/macos-keychain/src/types/macos-keychain.types.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,107 @@
+/**
+ * Public type contracts for `@suaveplan/macos-keychain`.
+ *
+ * Every type is runtime-agnostic and carries no DOM or Node.js dependencies.
+ * Optional `clock` and `logger` fields on `KeychainConfig` accept the canonical
+ * `Clock` and `LoggerLike` shapes from `@suaveplan/types` so the bridge can be
+ * driven deterministically in tests.
+ */
+
+import type { Clock, LoggerLike } from "@suaveplan/types";
+
+/**
+ * Result of a `CommandExecutor` invocation. The default executor implementation
+ * uses `Bun.spawn` (Bun runtime) or `node:child_process.execFile` (Node runtime)
+ * — never any shell wrapper.
+ */
+export interface CommandExecutorResult {
+    /** Captured standard-output from the child process. */
+    readonly stdout: string;
+    /** Captured standard-error from the child process. */
+    readonly stderr: string;
+    /** Numeric exit code; `0` indicates success. */
+    readonly exitCode: number;
+}
+
+/**
+ * Options accepted by a `CommandExecutor` invocation. The optional `signal`
+ * is propagated by the bridge so abort and timeout handling cancel the
+ * underlying child process.
+ */
+export interface CommandExecutorOptions {
+    /** Caller-provided AbortSignal. Aborts the child process when fired. */
+    readonly signal?: AbortSignal | undefined;
+}
+
+/**
+ * Pluggable command runner. Tests pass a deterministic stub literal that
+ * returns preset results — no `vi.mock` required.
+ *
+ * The default implementation MUST pass arguments as an array (no shell
+ * interpolation) and SHOULD honour `options.signal` for cancellation.
+ */
+export type CommandExecutor = (
+    command: string,
+    args: readonly string[],
+    options?: CommandExecutorOptions
+) => Promise<CommandExecutorResult>;
+
+/**
+ * Construction options for `MacOSKeychainBridge`. Every field is optional;
+ * defaults match a typical macOS user account (no access group, 10 second
+ * CLI timeout, real wall clock, no logger).
+ */
+export interface KeychainConfig {
+    /** Default service label; can be overridden per-call. */
+    readonly serviceName?: string;
+    /** Optional access-group string passed via `-T` to the security CLI. */
+    readonly accessGroup?: string;
+    /** Per-CLI-call timeout in milliseconds. Default `10_000`. */
+    readonly timeoutMs?: number;
+    /** Injected wall clock for deadline computation. Default `() => Date.now()`. */
+    readonly clock?: Clock;
+    /** Optional structured logger. Bridge logs at `debug` level when present. */
+    readonly logger?: LoggerLike;
+}
+
+/**
+ * A keychain credential record. `password` is plaintext; the caller is
+ * responsible for narrow scoping and disposal once the value is no longer
+ * needed.
+ */
+export interface KeychainItem {
+    /** Service identifier, equivalent to the `-s` flag. */
+    readonly service: string;
+    /** Account / username, equivalent to the `-a` flag. */
+    readonly account: string;
+    /** Decrypted password as a JS string. */
+    readonly password: string;
+    /** Optional human-readable label. */
+    readonly label?: string;
+    /** Optional comment field. */
+    readonly comment?: string;
+    /** Creation timestamp parsed from the `security` CLI output. */
+    readonly createdAt?: Date;
+    /** Last-modified timestamp parsed from the `security` CLI output. */
+    readonly modifiedAt?: Date;
+}
+
+/**
+ * Result of a state-changing CRUD operation. `success` is `true` when the
+ * underlying CLI call returned exit code `0`. The optional `error` string
+ * carries a human-readable hint when callers prefer not to throw.
+ */
+export interface KeychainResult {
+    readonly success: boolean;
+    readonly error?: string;
+}
+
+/**
+ * Common option bag accepted by every bridge method that performs a CLI call.
+ * Used to thread per-call cancellation through the OTel-instrumented bridge
+ * methods without overloading every signature.
+ */
+export interface KeychainCallOptions {
+    /** Per-call AbortSignal. Combined with the configured `timeoutMs` deadline. */
+    readonly signal?: AbortSignal | undefined;
+}