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# sign/pkcs1v15
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## Purpose
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RSASSA-PKCS1-v1\_5 signature generation per RFC 8017 §8.2.1. Hashes
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the message with the configured algorithm, applies the EMSA-PKCS1-v1\_5
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encoding, and runs the RSA private operation through the CRT path. The
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output is a signature of length exactly `byteLength(n)`.
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## Features
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- RFC 8017 §8.2.1 conformant — uses the CRT private-key operation
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- Supports SHA-1, SHA-256, SHA-384, SHA-512
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- Modulus-length policy gates run on every call (`MODULUS_TOO_SHORT` / `MODULUS_TOO_LARGE`)
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- Re-uses the canonical `i2osp` / `os2ip` math primitives
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- Records `crypto_rsa.sign_duration_ms{scheme,hash,engine}` and `crypto_rsa.outcome_total{operation,outcome}` on every call
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- **RSA blinding (RFC 8017 §5.1.2 / Kocher 1996) wired by default** — opt-out via `{ blinding: false }` emits `crypto_rsa.blinding_disabled_total{operation="sign"}`
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- All thrown errors are `CryptoRsaError` instances; non-typed exceptions wrap as `CRYPTO_RSA.INVALID_SIGNATURE`
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## Usage: Basic Example
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```ts
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import { rsaSignPkcs1v15 } from "@suaveplan/crypto-rsa/sign/pkcs1v15";
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const message = new TextEncoder().encode("hello, signed world");
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const signature = rsaSignPkcs1v15(privateKey, message, { hash: "SHA-256" });
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console.log(signature.length); // === byteLength(n), e.g. 256 for 2048-bit
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```
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## Usage: Advanced Example
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The `allowLegacy` option lowers the modulus floor from 2048 to 1024 bits
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for legacy interop scenarios (e.g. WebAuthn TPM 1.2 endorsement keys).
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The `allowOversize` option lifts the ceiling beyond 16384 bits for
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offline tooling. Both default to `false`.
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```ts
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import { rsaSignPkcs1v15 } from "@suaveplan/crypto-rsa/sign/pkcs1v15";
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const sig = rsaSignPkcs1v15(legacy1024PrivateKey, message, {
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hash: "SHA-1",
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allowLegacy: true,
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});
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```
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## API Reference
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### `rsaSignPkcs1v15(privateKey, message, options): Uint8Array`
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- `privateKey: RsaPrivateKey` — canonical private key with mandatory CRT parameters
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- `message: Uint8Array` — bytes to be signed; will be hashed internally
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- `options.hash: RsaHashAlgorithm` — one of `"SHA-1"`, `"SHA-256"`, `"SHA-384"`, `"SHA-512"`
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- `options.allowLegacy?: boolean` — see policy doc
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- `options.allowOversize?: boolean` — see policy doc
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- `options.blinding?: boolean` — defaults to `true`; opting out emits `crypto_rsa.blinding_disabled_total{operation="sign"}`
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- `options.rng?: Rng` — randomness source for the blinding factor; defaults to `defaultRng()`
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- **returns** `Uint8Array` of length `byteLength(n)`
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- **throws** `CryptoRsaError(CRYPTO_RSA.MODULUS_TOO_SHORT)` / `MODULUS_TOO_LARGE` / `UNSUPPORTED_HASH` / `INVALID_KEY`
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## Implementation Notes
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- The output equals `i2osp(rsaPrivateOperationCrt(os2ip(em), privateKey), emLen)`
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where `em = emsaPkcs1v15Encode(message, emLen, hash)` and
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`emLen = byteLength(n)`. This is bit-for-bit identical to the naive
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`c = m^d mod n` reference, but uses the CRT decomposition for ~3-4×
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the throughput on a 2048-bit modulus.
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- Encoding is deterministic — every call with the same `(message, hash)`
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pair produces the same signature. This is RFC 8017 §8.2.1 behaviour:
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PKCS1-v1\_5 is a deterministic signature scheme, in contrast to PSS.
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- The function never short-circuits on early failure — even when an
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exception is raised, the duration histogram and outcome counter are
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recorded. The `outcome` attribute distinguishes `"ok"` from `"error"`.
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- The engine attribute is `"noble"` because the underlying modular
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exponentiation is `@noble/curves/abstract/modular.pow`. The
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`RsaCryptoEngine` adapter (`./engine`) selects `"subtle"` when
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`globalThis.crypto.subtle` exposes the matching algorithm.
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- **Blinding** — for every call `m' = m * r^e mod n` is computed with a
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freshly sampled `r ∈ Z*_n`, the CRT private operation runs against
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`m'`, and the result is unblinded via `s = s' * r^{-1} mod n`. This
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prevents the Kocher 1996 timing-attack class against the secret
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exponent. Output is bit-for-bit identical to the unblinded path; only
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the timing varies. The < 5% overhead is bench-verified.
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