Initial Commit

packages/security-stack/security/password-generator/src/charsets/charsets.md

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+# `charsets`
+
+<!-- begin:auto-docs -->
+_(no submodules)_
+<!-- end:auto-docs -->
+## Purpose
+
+Defines the canonical character-class constants used by every generator in the package — `LOWERCASE`, `UPPERCASE`, `DIGITS`, `SYMBOLS`, plus the curated `AMBIGUOUS` and `LOOKALIKES` sets that callers subtract to avoid characters confusable in fixed-width fonts. Exposing each class as a frozen `ReadonlySet<string>` lets callers compose custom unions (`new Set([...LOWERCASE, ...DIGITS])`) without depending on any private representation.
+
+The `buildEffectiveCharset(opts)` helper merges the enabled classes and subtracts `opts.exclude` to produce the deduplicated string array a generator can index into via `randomInt`. The four built-in classes are pairwise disjoint by construction, so insertion-order union is enough to deduplicate — adding a `Set`-tracked check would be dead code.
+
+## Features
+
+- Frozen `ReadonlySet<string>` for each class — safe to share across modules.
+- `AMBIGUOUS` (`0Ol1I`) and `LOOKALIKES` curated by frequency of human misreads.
+- `SYMBOLS` drawn from the OWASP-recommended printable range; excludes shell-quoting hazards (backtick, backslash, whitespace).
+- `buildEffectiveCharset(opts)` accepts string / array / `Set` exclusions.
+
+## Usage: Basic Example
+
+```ts
+import {
+ AMBIGUOUS,
+ buildEffectiveCharset,
+} from "@suaveplan/password-generator";
+
+const charset = buildEffectiveCharset({ exclude: AMBIGUOUS });
+```
+
+## Usage: Advanced Example
+
+```ts
+import {
+ DIGITS,
+ LOWERCASE,
+ UPPERCASE,
+ buildEffectiveCharset,
+} from "@suaveplan/password-generator";
+
+// Hex charset only (digits + a-f) via two passes
+const hexLower = [
+ ...buildEffectiveCharset({ uppercase: false, symbols: false }),
+].filter((c) => DIGITS.has(c) || "abcdef".includes(c));
+
+// "Vault-friendly" passwords: drop ambiguous + shell-hostile chars
+const safe = buildEffectiveCharset({ exclude: "0Ol1I`\\\"' " });
+const charset = safe.filter((c) => !UPPERCASE.has(c) || LOWERCASE.has(c.toLowerCase()));
+```
+
+## API Reference
+
+### Constants
+
+- `LOWERCASE: ReadonlySet<string>` — `a–z` (26 entries).
+- `UPPERCASE: ReadonlySet<string>` — `A–Z` (26 entries).
+- `DIGITS: ReadonlySet<string>` — `0–9` (10 entries).
+- `SYMBOLS: ReadonlySet<string>` — `!@#$%^&*()-_=+[]{};:,.<>/?` (25 entries).
+- `AMBIGUOUS: ReadonlySet<string>` — `0Ol1I`.
+- `LOOKALIKES: ReadonlySet<string>` — `0OQ1lI5S2Z8B`.
+
+### `buildEffectiveCharset(opts?: CharsetOptions): string[]`
+
+Builds the deduplicated union of enabled classes minus `opts.exclude`. Returns a fresh array on every call; insertion order is lowercase → uppercase → digits → symbols.
+
+- `lowercase` / `uppercase` / `digits` / `symbols` — each defaults to `true`.
+- `exclude` — `string` (per-character), `readonly string[]`, or `ReadonlySet<string>`; defaults to none.
+
+## Implementation Notes
+
+Every set is frozen at module load via `Object.freeze`, which only freezes the `Set` object itself (not the underlying internal storage). The intent is to surface accidental `.add` / `.delete` calls at call sites; consumers who need to add or remove characters must clone the set first.
+
+`SYMBOLS` intentionally omits whitespace, the backslash, double-quote, and backtick. Those characters routinely break shell interpolations and CSV exports; including them would force every caller to filter them out before interpolating the generated password into a deployment script. Callers who want them can compose `new Set([...SYMBOLS, "\\\""])` themselves — the omission is conservative-by-default but trivially reversible.

packages/security-stack/security/password-generator/src/charsets/charsets.test.ts

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+import { describe, expect, it } from "@suaveplan/testing/runner";
+import {
+    AMBIGUOUS,
+    buildEffectiveCharset,
+    DIGITS,
+    LOOKALIKES,
+    LOWERCASE,
+    SYMBOLS,
+    UPPERCASE,
+} from "./charsets.js";
+
+describe("character class constants", () => {
+    it("LOWERCASE contains 26 entries", { timeout: 5000 }, () => {
+        expect(LOWERCASE.size).toBe(26);
+        expect(LOWERCASE.has("a")).toBe(true);
+        expect(LOWERCASE.has("z")).toBe(true);
+        expect(LOWERCASE.has("A")).toBe(false);
+    });
+
+    it("UPPERCASE / DIGITS / SYMBOLS sizes match expectations", {
+        timeout: 5000,
+    }, () => {
+        expect(UPPERCASE.size).toBe(26);
+        expect(DIGITS.size).toBe(10);
+        expect(SYMBOLS.size).toBeGreaterThan(20);
+    });
+
+    it("AMBIGUOUS contains the canonical 0/O/l/1/I set", {
+        timeout: 5000,
+    }, () => {
+        for (const ch of "0Ol1I") expect(AMBIGUOUS.has(ch)).toBe(true);
+    });
+
+    it("LOOKALIKES is a superset of AMBIGUOUS-style digits", {
+        timeout: 5000,
+    }, () => {
+        expect(LOOKALIKES.has("0")).toBe(true);
+        expect(LOOKALIKES.has("O")).toBe(true);
+    });
+});
+
+describe("buildEffectiveCharset", () => {
+    it("defaults to the union of all four classes", { timeout: 5000 }, () => {
+        const cs = buildEffectiveCharset();
+        expect(cs.length).toBe(
+            LOWERCASE.size + UPPERCASE.size + DIGITS.size + SYMBOLS.size
+        );
+    });
+
+    it("omits a class when disabled", { timeout: 5000 }, () => {
+        const cs = buildEffectiveCharset({ symbols: false });
+        for (const ch of SYMBOLS) expect(cs.includes(ch)).toBe(false);
+    });
+
+    it("applies a string-form exclusion", { timeout: 5000 }, () => {
+        const cs = buildEffectiveCharset({ exclude: "abc" });
+        expect(cs.includes("a")).toBe(false);
+        expect(cs.includes("b")).toBe(false);
+        expect(cs.includes("c")).toBe(false);
+    });
+
+    it("applies an array-form exclusion", { timeout: 5000 }, () => {
+        const cs = buildEffectiveCharset({ exclude: ["x", "y"] });
+        expect(cs.includes("x")).toBe(false);
+        expect(cs.includes("y")).toBe(false);
+    });
+
+    it("applies a Set-form exclusion", { timeout: 5000 }, () => {
+        const cs = buildEffectiveCharset({ exclude: AMBIGUOUS });
+        for (const ch of AMBIGUOUS) expect(cs.includes(ch)).toBe(false);
+    });
+
+    it("deduplicates the output", { timeout: 5000 }, () => {
+        const cs = buildEffectiveCharset();
+        expect(cs.length).toBe(new Set(cs).size);
+    });
+
+    it("returns empty when every class is disabled", { timeout: 5000 }, () => {
+        const cs = buildEffectiveCharset({
+            lowercase: false,
+            uppercase: false,
+            digits: false,
+            symbols: false,
+        });
+        expect(cs).toEqual([]);
+    });
+
+    it("handles undefined exclude", { timeout: 5000 }, () => {
+        expect(
+            buildEffectiveCharset({ exclude: undefined }).length
+        ).toBeGreaterThan(0);
+    });
+});

packages/security-stack/security/password-generator/src/charsets/charsets.ts

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+/**
+ * Character-class constants exposed as `ReadonlySet<string>` so callers
+ * can author custom unions and intersections without pulling private
+ * implementation details.
+ *
+ * Sets are frozen at module load time. The strings inside are
+ * intentionally ASCII-only — Unicode case folding is out of scope here
+ * (see the package proposal "Out of scope" list).
+ */
+
+function freezeSet(chars: string): ReadonlySet<string> {
+    return Object.freeze(new Set(chars.split(""))) as ReadonlySet<string>;
+}
+
+export const LOWERCASE: ReadonlySet<string> = freezeSet(
+    "abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz"
+);
+
+export const UPPERCASE: ReadonlySet<string> = freezeSet(
+    "ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ"
+);
+
+export const DIGITS: ReadonlySet<string> = freezeSet("0123456789");
+
+/**
+ * Symbol set drawn from the OWASP-recommended printable-ASCII range.
+ * Excludes whitespace and the backtick / backslash pair to dodge shell
+ * quoting hazards on call sites that interpolate generated passwords
+ * into shell commands.
+ */
+export const SYMBOLS: ReadonlySet<string> = freezeSet(
+    "!@#$%^&*()-_=+[]{};:,.<>/?"
+);
+
+/** Characters frequently confused for one another in fixed-width fonts. */
+export const AMBIGUOUS: ReadonlySet<string> = freezeSet("0Ol1I");
+
+/** Characters often misread as digits or other letters in handwriting. */
+export const LOOKALIKES: ReadonlySet<string> = freezeSet("0OQ1lI5S2Z8B");
+
+export interface CharsetOptions {
+    readonly lowercase?: boolean | undefined;
+    readonly uppercase?: boolean | undefined;
+    readonly digits?: boolean | undefined;
+    readonly symbols?: boolean | undefined;
+    readonly exclude?:
+        | ReadonlySet<string>
+        | readonly string[]
+        | string
+        | undefined;
+}
+
+function expandExclusions(
+    exclude: CharsetOptions["exclude"]
+): ReadonlySet<string> {
+    if (!exclude) return new Set();
+    if (typeof exclude === "string") return new Set(exclude.split(""));
+    if (Array.isArray(exclude)) return new Set(exclude as readonly string[]);
+    return exclude as ReadonlySet<string>;
+}
+
+/**
+ * Build the effective charset for a generator call by unioning enabled
+ * classes and subtracting `exclude`. Returns a deduplicated string array
+ * (insertion order preserved) so callers can index into it via
+ * `randomInt`.
+ */
+export function buildEffectiveCharset(opts: CharsetOptions = {}): string[] {
+    const {
+        lowercase = true,
+        uppercase = true,
+        digits = true,
+        symbols = true,
+    } = opts;
+    const excluded = expandExclusions(opts.exclude);
+    const out: string[] = [];
+    // LOWERCASE / UPPERCASE / DIGITS / SYMBOLS are pairwise disjoint by
+    // construction so insertion order alone deduplicates the union.
+    const add = (set: ReadonlySet<string>): void => {
+        for (const ch of set) {
+            if (excluded.has(ch)) continue;
+            out.push(ch);
+        }
+    };
+    if (lowercase) add(LOWERCASE);
+    if (uppercase) add(UPPERCASE);
+    if (digits) add(DIGITS);
+    if (symbols) add(SYMBOLS);
+    return out;
+}

packages/security-stack/security/password-generator/src/charsets/index.ts

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+export type { CharsetOptions } from "./charsets.js";
+export {
+    AMBIGUOUS,
+    buildEffectiveCharset,
+    DIGITS,
+    LOOKALIKES,
+    LOWERCASE,
+    SYMBOLS,
+    UPPERCASE,
+} from "./charsets.js";

packages/security-stack/security/password-generator/src/entropy/entropy.md

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+# `entropy`
+
+<!-- begin:auto-docs -->
+_(no submodules)_
+<!-- end:auto-docs -->
+## Purpose
+
+`estimateEntropy(password, opts?)` returns the upper-bound entropy of a candidate password as `log2(charsetSize) * password.length`, where `charsetSize` is the cardinality of the union of every detected built-in class (lowercase / uppercase / digits / symbols) plus any caller-supplied `opts.extraClasses` whose characters appear in the password. `estimatePassphraseEntropy(words, wordlistSize)` returns `log2(wordlistSize) * words.length` for Diceware-style passphrases. `assertStrength(password, minBits, opts?)` consumes `estimateEntropy` and throws `PWGEN.STRENGTH_INSUFFICIENT` when the computed bits are below the floor.
+
+The entropy formulas assume uniform sampling and ignore patterns — `"AAAAAAAA"` is reported as the same entropy as `"hG83mP9k"` if both contain the same charset classes. Pattern-aware scoring (zxcvbn-style) is intentionally out of scope and lives in the separate `@suaveplan/password-strength` package.
+
+## Features
+
+- Detects class membership in a single pass over the password.
+- `extraClasses` opt-in lets callers report custom-charset passwords (emoji unions, hex-only PINs).
+- `assertStrength` throws on insufficient entropy with a structured error code.
+- Zod-validated `EntropyOptions`; mismatch → `PWGEN.INVALID_OPTIONS`.
+
+## Usage: Basic Example
+
+```ts
+import { estimateEntropy } from "@suaveplan/password-generator";
+
+const { bits, charsetSize } = estimateEntropy("Abc123Xy");
+// charsetSize === 62, bits === log2(62) * 8 ≈ 47.6
+```
+
+## Usage: Advanced Example
+
+```ts
+import {
+ assertStrength,
+ estimateEntropy,
+ estimatePassphraseEntropy,
+} from "@suaveplan/password-generator";
+
+// Server-side guard before persisting a vault item
+function persistVaultItem(pw: string): void {
+ assertStrength(pw, 80); // throws PWGEN.STRENGTH_INSUFFICIENT if < 80 bits
+ // ... persist
+}
+
+// Custom emoji-augmented class
+const e = estimateEntropy("emoji👍2025", { extraClasses: ["👍🎉🚀"] });
+
+// Diceware reporting
+const words = ["correct", "horse", "battery", "staple", "alpha", "beta"];
+const passEntropy = estimatePassphraseEntropy(words, 7776); // ≈ 77.55 bits
+```
+
+## API Reference
+
+### `estimateEntropy(password: string, opts?: EntropyOptions): EntropyEstimate`
+
+Returns `{ bits, charsetSize }`. `bits` is `0` when the password is empty.
+
+### `estimatePassphraseEntropy(words: readonly string[], wordlistSize: number): number`
+
+Returns `log2(wordlistSize) * words.length`. Throws `PWGEN.INVALID_OPTIONS` for non-positive integer `wordlistSize`.
+
+### `assertStrength(password: string, minBits: number, opts?: EntropyOptions): void`
+
+Returns `void` on success. Throws `PwgenError(PWGEN.STRENGTH_INSUFFICIENT)` when the computed bits are strictly less than `minBits`.
+
+### `EntropyOptions`
+
+- `extraClasses?: readonly string[]` — additional character classes the password may draw from.
+
+## Implementation Notes
+
+Class detection is a single forward pass over the password, tracking four boolean flags for the built-in classes plus a `Set<number>` of seen `extraClasses` indices. The `charsetSize` accumulator only adds a class's cardinality when the first matching character is seen, which keeps the cost `O(password.length * extraClasses.length)` worst-case.
+
+The formula deliberately reports an _upper bound_. A consumer comparing this number to a cracking-time chart should treat it as a ceiling: real-world passwords contain dictionary patterns, keyboard walks, and date stamps that reduce the effective entropy substantially. Use `@suaveplan/password-strength` for adversarial-aware estimates. `assertStrength` is a deliberately blunt instrument — it answers "does this password meet the floor on the most generous estimator?" — and is intended as a server-side guardrail against drastically weak inputs, not a substitute for proper strength scoring.

packages/security-stack/security/password-generator/src/entropy/entropy.test.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,101 @@
+import { describe, expect, it } from "@suaveplan/testing/runner";
+import {
+    assertStrength,
+    estimateEntropy,
+    estimatePassphraseEntropy,
+} from "./entropy.js";
+
+describe("estimateEntropy", () => {
+    it("reports 26-char charset for lowercase-only password", {
+        timeout: 5000,
+    }, () => {
+        const r = estimateEntropy("abcdefgh");
+        expect(r.charsetSize).toBe(26);
+        expect(r.bits).toBeCloseTo(Math.log2(26) * 8, 6);
+    });
+
+    it("reports 62-char charset for lowercase+uppercase+digits", {
+        timeout: 5000,
+    }, () => {
+        const r = estimateEntropy("Abc123Xy");
+        expect(r.charsetSize).toBe(62);
+        expect(r.bits).toBeCloseTo(Math.log2(62) * 8, 6);
+    });
+
+    it("adds symbol charset size when symbols present", {
+        timeout: 5000,
+    }, () => {
+        const r = estimateEntropy("Abc!23Xy");
+        expect(r.charsetSize).toBeGreaterThan(62);
+    });
+
+    it("returns zero charset / zero bits for empty input", {
+        timeout: 5000,
+    }, () => {
+        const r = estimateEntropy("");
+        expect(r.charsetSize).toBe(0);
+        expect(r.bits).toBe(0);
+    });
+
+    it("detects extraClasses when characters match", { timeout: 5000 }, () => {
+        const r = estimateEntropy("emoji👍ab", { extraClasses: ["👍"] });
+        expect(r.charsetSize).toBeGreaterThanOrEqual(27);
+    });
+
+    it("ignores extraClasses that do not appear", { timeout: 5000 }, () => {
+        const r = estimateEntropy("abc", { extraClasses: ["XYZ"] });
+        expect(r.charsetSize).toBe(26);
+    });
+
+    it("rejects malformed opts with PWGEN.INVALID_OPTIONS", {
+        timeout: 5000,
+    }, () => {
+        expect(() =>
+            estimateEntropy("abc", { extraClasses: 42 as never })
+        ).toThrow(/PWGEN\.INVALID_OPTIONS/);
+    });
+});
+
+describe("estimatePassphraseEntropy", () => {
+    it("6-word EFF Long passphrase reports ~77.5 bits", {
+        timeout: 5000,
+    }, () => {
+        const e = estimatePassphraseEntropy(
+            ["a", "b", "c", "d", "e", "f"],
+            7776
+        );
+        expect(e).toBeCloseTo(Math.log2(7776) * 6, 6);
+    });
+
+    it("5-word EFF Short passphrase reports ~51.7 bits", {
+        timeout: 5000,
+    }, () => {
+        const e = estimatePassphraseEntropy(["a", "b", "c", "d", "e"], 1296);
+        expect(e).toBeCloseTo(Math.log2(1296) * 5, 6);
+    });
+
+    it("rejects non-positive wordlistSize", { timeout: 5000 }, () => {
+        expect(() => estimatePassphraseEntropy(["a"], 0)).toThrow(
+            /PWGEN\.INVALID_OPTIONS/
+        );
+        expect(() => estimatePassphraseEntropy(["a"], 1.5)).toThrow(
+            /PWGEN\.INVALID_OPTIONS/
+        );
+    });
+});
+
+describe("assertStrength", () => {
+    it("assertStrength passes when entropy meets the floor", {
+        timeout: 5000,
+    }, () => {
+        expect(() => assertStrength("Abc123Xy", 40)).not.toThrow();
+    });
+
+    it("assertStrength throws when entropy is below the floor", {
+        timeout: 5000,
+    }, () => {
+        expect(() => assertStrength("aaaaaaaa", 80)).toThrow(
+            /PWGEN\.STRENGTH_INSUFFICIENT/
+        );
+    });
+});

packages/security-stack/security/password-generator/src/entropy/entropy.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,116 @@
+import { DIGITS, LOWERCASE, SYMBOLS, UPPERCASE } from "../charsets/charsets.js";
+import { pwgenError } from "../errors/codes.js";
+import { recordError } from "../observability/metrics.js";
+import { EntropyOptionsSchema } from "../schemas/schemas.js";
+
+export interface EntropyOptions {
+    /**
+     * Extra character classes (each a string of unique characters) that
+     * the password may draw from beyond the four built-in classes. Used
+     * when the caller authored a custom union via
+     * {@link buildEffectiveCharset}.
+     */
+    readonly extraClasses?: readonly string[];
+}
+
+export interface EntropyEstimate {
+    readonly bits: number;
+    readonly charsetSize: number;
+}
+
+/**
+ * Estimate the upper-bound entropy of `password` as
+ * `log2(charsetSize) * length`.
+ *
+ * `charsetSize` is the cardinality of the union of every detected
+ * built-in class (lowercase / uppercase / digits / symbols) plus any
+ * `opts.extraClasses` whose characters appear in the password.
+ *
+ * This is intentionally a loose upper bound — pattern-aware scoring
+ * lives in `@suaveplan/password-strength`.
+ */
+export function estimateEntropy(
+    password: string,
+    opts: EntropyOptions = {}
+): EntropyEstimate {
+    const parsed = EntropyOptionsSchema.safeParse(opts);
+    if (!parsed.success) {
+        recordError("PWGEN.INVALID_OPTIONS");
+        throw pwgenError("PWGEN.INVALID_OPTIONS", parsed.error.message, {
+            cause: parsed.error,
+        });
+    }
+    let charsetSize = 0;
+    let hasLower = false;
+    let hasUpper = false;
+    let hasDigit = false;
+    let hasSymbol = false;
+    const seenExtra = new Set<number>();
+    for (const ch of password) {
+        if (!hasLower && LOWERCASE.has(ch)) {
+            hasLower = true;
+            charsetSize += LOWERCASE.size;
+        } else if (!hasUpper && UPPERCASE.has(ch)) {
+            hasUpper = true;
+            charsetSize += UPPERCASE.size;
+        } else if (!hasDigit && DIGITS.has(ch)) {
+            hasDigit = true;
+            charsetSize += DIGITS.size;
+        } else if (!hasSymbol && SYMBOLS.has(ch)) {
+            hasSymbol = true;
+            charsetSize += SYMBOLS.size;
+        }
+        const extras = parsed.data.extraClasses;
+        if (extras) {
+            for (let i = 0; i < extras.length; i++) {
+                if (seenExtra.has(i)) continue;
+                const cls = extras[i] as string;
+                if (cls.includes(ch)) {
+                    seenExtra.add(i);
+                    charsetSize += new Set(cls).size;
+                }
+            }
+        }
+    }
+    const bits =
+        charsetSize === 0 ? 0 : Math.log2(charsetSize) * password.length;
+    return { bits, charsetSize };
+}
+
+/**
+ * Estimate passphrase entropy as `log2(wordlistSize) * words.length`.
+ * The caller is trusted to pass a `words` array whose members were
+ * drawn from a wordlist of size `wordlistSize`.
+ */
+export function estimatePassphraseEntropy(
+    words: readonly string[],
+    wordlistSize: number
+): number {
+    if (!Number.isInteger(wordlistSize) || wordlistSize < 1) {
+        throw pwgenError(
+            "PWGEN.INVALID_OPTIONS",
+            `wordlistSize must be a positive integer; received ${wordlistSize}`
+        );
+    }
+    return Math.log2(wordlistSize) * words.length;
+}
+
+/**
+ * Throw `PWGEN.STRENGTH_INSUFFICIENT` when `estimateEntropy(password).bits`
+ * is strictly less than `minBits`. Returns void on success — callers prove
+ * strength by absence of throw.
+ */
+export function assertStrength(
+    password: string,
+    minBits: number,
+    opts?: EntropyOptions
+): void {
+    const { bits } = estimateEntropy(password, opts);
+    if (bits < minBits) {
+        recordError("PWGEN.STRENGTH_INSUFFICIENT");
+        throw pwgenError(
+            "PWGEN.STRENGTH_INSUFFICIENT",
+            `password entropy ${bits.toFixed(2)} bits is below the floor of ${minBits} bits`
+        );
+    }
+}

packages/security-stack/security/password-generator/src/entropy/index.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,9 @@
+export type {
+    EntropyEstimate,
+    EntropyOptions,
+} from "./entropy.js";
+export {
+    assertStrength,
+    estimateEntropy,
+    estimatePassphraseEntropy,
+} from "./entropy.js";

packages/security-stack/security/password-generator/src/errors/codes.md

@@ -0,0 +1,81 @@
+# `errors/codes`
+
+<!-- begin:auto-docs -->
+_(no submodules)_
+<!-- end:auto-docs -->
+## Purpose
+
+Defines the stable error-code registry for `@suaveplan/password-generator` via `defineCodes("PWGEN", [...])` from `@suaveplan/error`. Every code names exactly one failure class so callers can branch on `error.code` rather than parsing message strings. The companion `PwgenError` class is the single concrete subtype thrown from this package, and `pwgenError(code, message, options)` is a convenience constructor that prefixes the message with the stable code for log scrapers.
+
+The registry is intentionally minimal — six codes, no overlap, every code thrown from at least one production call site (verified by `codes.test.ts`). Adding a code without a thrown call site is banned per `AGENTS.md` §2c.
+
+## Features
+
+- Six stable codes: `INVALID_OPTIONS`, `OPTIONS_INFEASIBLE`, `WORDLIST_TOO_SHORT`, `WORDLIST_NOT_REGISTERED`, `STRENGTH_INSUFFICIENT`, `RNG_FAILED`.
+- `PwgenError` extends `SuaveplanError<PwgenErrorCode>` for instanceof-friendly catching.
+- `pwgenError(code, message, { cause })` helper that auto-prefixes the message.
+- Frozen registry — direct property assignment throws in strict mode.
+
+## Usage: Basic Example
+
+```ts
+import { PwgenError, pwgenError } from "@suaveplan/password-generator/errors";
+
+try {
+ // ...
+} catch (e) {
+ if (e instanceof PwgenError && e.code === "PWGEN.INVALID_OPTIONS") {
+  // ...
+ }
+}
+```
+
+## Usage: Advanced Example
+
+```ts
+import {
+ PWGEN_CODES,
+ PwgenError,
+ pwgenError,
+} from "@suaveplan/password-generator/errors";
+
+// Catch and re-throw with structural context preserved
+try {
+ throw pwgenError("PWGEN.RNG_FAILED", "downstream RNG bug", {
+  cause: new Error("entropy source returned non-uint32"),
+ });
+} catch (e) {
+ if (e instanceof PwgenError) {
+  console.log(e.code, e.cause);
+ }
+}
+
+// Enumerate every code for an error-mapping table in i18n bundles
+for (const code of Object.values(PWGEN_CODES)) {
+ console.log(code);
+}
+```
+
+## API Reference
+
+### `PWGEN_CODES`
+
+Frozen record mapping each reason → fully-qualified code string. For example `PWGEN_CODES.RNG_FAILED === "PWGEN.RNG_FAILED"`.
+
+### `PwgenErrorCode`
+
+Literal-typed union of every registered code.
+
+### `class PwgenError extends SuaveplanError<PwgenErrorCode>`
+
+Construct with `(code, message, options?)`. Options may carry `cause: Error`.
+
+### `pwgenError(code, message, options?): PwgenError`
+
+Convenience constructor that prefixes the message with the code string. Non-`Error` `cause` values are silently dropped (per `SuaveplanError` contract).
+
+## Implementation Notes
+
+The registry shape is dictated by `defineCodes` from `@suaveplan/error` — the return type is `{ readonly [K in Reasons[number]]:`PWGEN.${K}`}`, so TypeScript narrows `PWGEN_CODES.INVALID_OPTIONS` to the literal string `"PWGEN.INVALID_OPTIONS"`. This is what makes `if (e.code === "PWGEN.INVALID_OPTIONS")` typecheck without a `string` widening.
+
+Three codes (`OPTIONS_INFEASIBLE`, `WORDLIST_TOO_SHORT`, `STRENGTH_INSUFFICIENT`) are sufficient to express every failure callers care about at first glance; the remaining three (`INVALID_OPTIONS`, `WORDLIST_NOT_REGISTERED`, `RNG_FAILED`) cover bug-shaped errors that should surface during development and never reach production. Catching `PwgenError` and branching on `code` lets call sites distinguish "user typed an invalid option" (recoverable, surface a form-validation message) from "RNG is broken" (panic, log, escalate).

packages/security-stack/security/password-generator/src/errors/codes.test.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,79 @@
+import { existsSync, readdirSync, readFileSync, statSync } from "node:fs";
+import { join } from "node:path";
+import { describe, expect, it } from "@suaveplan/testing/runner";
+import { PWGEN_CODES, PwgenError, pwgenError } from "./codes.js";
+
+const SRC_ROOT = join(__dirname, "..");
+
+function walk(dir: string, out: string[] = []): string[] {
+    for (const entry of readdirSync(dir, { withFileTypes: true })) {
+        const p = join(dir, entry.name);
+        if (entry.isDirectory()) {
+            if (entry.name === "node_modules" || entry.name === "dist")
+                continue;
+            walk(p, out);
+        } else if (
+            entry.name.endsWith(".ts") &&
+            !entry.name.endsWith(".test.ts") &&
+            !entry.name.endsWith(".bench.ts")
+        ) {
+            out.push(p);
+        }
+    }
+    return out;
+}
+
+describe("PWGEN_CODES registry", () => {
+    it("every registered code is thrown by at least one production call site", {
+        timeout: 5000,
+    }, () => {
+        const sources = walk(SRC_ROOT)
+            .filter((p) => !p.endsWith("/errors/codes.ts"))
+            .map((p) => readFileSync(p, "utf8"))
+            .join("\n");
+        for (const code of Object.values(PWGEN_CODES)) {
+            const short = code.replace(/^PWGEN\./, "");
+            const pattern = new RegExp(`["']PWGEN\\.${short}["']`);
+            expect(pattern.test(sources)).toBe(true);
+        }
+    });
+
+    it("PwgenError is a SuaveplanError subclass with the registered code", {
+        timeout: 5000,
+    }, () => {
+        const e = pwgenError("PWGEN.INVALID_OPTIONS", "test");
+        expect(e).toBeInstanceOf(PwgenError);
+        expect(e.code).toBe("PWGEN.INVALID_OPTIONS");
+        expect(e.message).toContain("PWGEN.INVALID_OPTIONS");
+    });
+
+    it("pwgenError attaches Error cause when supplied", {
+        timeout: 5000,
+    }, () => {
+        const cause = new Error("inner");
+        const e = pwgenError("PWGEN.RNG_FAILED", "outer", { cause });
+        expect(e.cause).toBe(cause);
+    });
+
+    it("pwgenError ignores non-Error cause", { timeout: 5000 }, () => {
+        const e = pwgenError("PWGEN.RNG_FAILED", "outer", { cause: "string" });
+        expect(e.cause).toBeUndefined();
+    });
+
+    it("PwgenError ctor accepts default options", { timeout: 5000 }, () => {
+        const e = new PwgenError("PWGEN.RNG_FAILED", "msg");
+        expect(e.code).toBe("PWGEN.RNG_FAILED");
+    });
+
+    it("pwgenError accepts default options", { timeout: 5000 }, () => {
+        const e = pwgenError("PWGEN.RNG_FAILED", "msg");
+        expect(e.code).toBe("PWGEN.RNG_FAILED");
+    });
+
+    it("src tree exists and contains the expected modules", {
+        timeout: 5000,
+    }, () => {
+        expect(existsSync(join(SRC_ROOT, "random"))).toBe(true);
+        expect(statSync(join(SRC_ROOT, "random")).isDirectory()).toBe(true);
+    });
+});

packages/security-stack/security/password-generator/src/errors/codes.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,47 @@
+import { defineCodes, SuaveplanError } from "@suaveplan/error";
+
+/**
+ * Stable, registered error codes for `@suaveplan/password-generator`.
+ *
+ * Each code names a single failure class so callers can branch on the root
+ * cause rather than parse message strings. Codes are namespaced `PWGEN.*`
+ * and every entry is exercised by at least one production call site (no
+ * orphan registry entries — see `openspec/AGENTS.md` §2c).
+ */
+export const PWGEN_CODES = defineCodes("PWGEN", [
+    "INVALID_OPTIONS",
+    "OPTIONS_INFEASIBLE",
+    "WORDLIST_TOO_SHORT",
+    "WORDLIST_NOT_REGISTERED",
+    "STRENGTH_INSUFFICIENT",
+    "RNG_FAILED",
+] as const);
+
+/** Literal-typed union of every registered code. */
+export type PwgenErrorCode = (typeof PWGEN_CODES)[keyof typeof PWGEN_CODES];
+
+/** Base class for every error thrown by `@suaveplan/password-generator`. */
+export class PwgenError extends SuaveplanError<PwgenErrorCode> {
+    constructor(
+        code: PwgenErrorCode,
+        message: string,
+        options: { cause?: Error } = {}
+    ) {
+        super(code, message, options);
+    }
+}
+
+/**
+ * Helper that constructs a `PwgenError` carrying a stable code and an
+ * optional underlying cause. Centralised so call sites stay terse and the
+ * code prefix appears in `.message` for log scrapers and toThrow matchers.
+ */
+export function pwgenError(
+    code: PwgenErrorCode,
+    message: string,
+    options: { cause?: unknown } = {}
+): PwgenError {
+    const opts: { cause?: Error } = {};
+    if (options.cause instanceof Error) opts.cause = options.cause;
+    return new PwgenError(code, `${code}: ${message}`, opts);
+}

packages/security-stack/security/password-generator/src/errors/index.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,6 @@
+export {
+    PWGEN_CODES,
+    PwgenError,
+    type PwgenErrorCode,
+    pwgenError,
+} from "./codes.js";

packages/security-stack/security/password-generator/src/index.test.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,24 @@
+import { describe, expect, it } from "@suaveplan/testing/runner";
+import * as root from "./index.js";
+
+describe("root barrel surface", () => {
+    it("exports the documented public API", { timeout: 5000 }, () => {
+        expect(typeof root.generatePassword).toBe("function");
+        expect(typeof root.generatePassphrase).toBe("function");
+        expect(typeof root.generatePronounceablePassword).toBe("function");
+        expect(typeof root.generatePin).toBe("function");
+        expect(typeof root.estimateEntropy).toBe("function");
+        expect(typeof root.estimatePassphraseEntropy).toBe("function");
+        expect(typeof root.assertStrength).toBe("function");
+        expect(typeof root.randomInt).toBe("function");
+        expect(typeof root.shuffleInPlace).toBe("function");
+        expect(typeof root.defaultRng).toBe("function");
+        expect(typeof root.registerWordlist).toBe("function");
+        expect(typeof root.getWordlist).toBe("function");
+        expect(typeof root.listWordlists).toBe("function");
+        expect(root.EFF_LONG_WORDLIST.length).toBe(7776);
+        expect(root.EFF_SHORT_WORDLIST.length).toBe(1296);
+        expect(root.PWGEN_CODES.RNG_FAILED).toBe("PWGEN.RNG_FAILED");
+        expect(typeof root.GeneratePasswordOptionsSchema).toBe("object");
+    });
+});

packages/security-stack/security/password-generator/src/index.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,68 @@
+// Public root barrel for `@suaveplan/password-generator`. Explicit named
+// re-exports per CLAUDE.md §10.
+
+export {
+    AMBIGUOUS,
+    buildEffectiveCharset,
+    type CharsetOptions,
+    DIGITS,
+    LOOKALIKES,
+    LOWERCASE,
+    SYMBOLS,
+    UPPERCASE,
+} from "./charsets/charsets.js";
+export {
+    assertStrength,
+    type EntropyEstimate,
+    type EntropyOptions,
+    estimateEntropy,
+    estimatePassphraseEntropy,
+} from "./entropy/entropy.js";
+export {
+    PWGEN_CODES,
+    PwgenError,
+    type PwgenErrorCode,
+    pwgenError,
+} from "./errors/codes.js";
+export {
+    entropyBits,
+    errorsTotal,
+    type GenerateMode,
+    generateDurationMs,
+    recordError,
+    recordGeneration,
+} from "./observability/metrics.js";
+export { generatePassphrase } from "./passphrase/passphrase.js";
+export type {
+    CapitalizationMode,
+    GeneratePassphraseOptions,
+    WordlistRef,
+} from "./passphrase/passphrase.types.js";
+export { generatePassword } from "./password/password.js";
+export type {
+    GeneratePasswordOptions,
+    PasswordMode,
+    RequiredClasses,
+} from "./password/password.types.js";
+export {
+    generatePronounceablePassword,
+    PRONOUNCEABLE_CONSONANTS,
+    PRONOUNCEABLE_VOWELS,
+} from "./password/pronounceable.js";
+export { generatePin } from "./pin/pin.js";
+export { defaultRng } from "./random/default-rng.js";
+export { shuffleInPlace } from "./random/fisher-yates.js";
+export { randomInt } from "./random/random-int.js";
+export {
+    EntropyOptionsSchema,
+    GeneratePassphraseOptionsSchema,
+    GeneratePasswordOptionsSchema,
+} from "./schemas/schemas.js";
+export { EFF_LONG_WORDLIST } from "./wordlists/eff-long.js";
+export { EFF_SHORT_WORDLIST } from "./wordlists/eff-short.js";
+export {
+    getWordlist,
+    listWordlists,
+    MIN_WORDLIST_SIZE,
+    registerWordlist,
+} from "./wordlists/registry.js";

packages/security-stack/security/password-generator/src/observability/index.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,9 @@
+export {
+    _resetInstruments,
+    entropyBits,
+    errorsTotal,
+    type GenerateMode,
+    generateDurationMs,
+    recordError,
+    recordGeneration,
+} from "./metrics.js";

packages/security-stack/security/password-generator/src/observability/metrics.md

@@ -0,0 +1,75 @@
+# `observability/metrics`
+
+<!-- begin:auto-docs -->
+_(no submodules)_
+<!-- end:auto-docs -->
+## Purpose
+
+Wires the package's OpenTelemetry instruments — `pwgen.generate_duration_ms{mode}` and `pwgen.entropy_bits{mode}` histograms, plus a `pwgen.errors_total{code}` counter — and exposes thin `recordGeneration` / `recordError` helpers every production call site uses. Instruments are obtained from `metrics.getMeter("@suaveplan/password-generator")` and lazy-initialised on first use so the active `MeterProvider` is always honoured (a global provider installed at startup overrides the package's no-op default).
+
+The `mode` attribute is bounded to four documented values — `"random"`, `"pronounceable"`, `"passphrase"`, `"pin"` — so cardinality on every dashboard stays flat regardless of call-site volume. The `code` attribute on the counter mirrors the stable `PWGEN.*` registry, so a single counter view shows the full failure-mode mix.
+
+## Features
+
+- Lazy-init pattern with `_resetInstruments()` test hook.
+- Three instruments: two histograms (`generate_duration_ms`, `entropy_bits`) + one counter (`errors_total`).
+- Low-cardinality `mode` and `code` attributes.
+- `recordGeneration(mode, durationMs, bits)` rolls duration + entropy into one call.
+- `recordError(code)` accepts the raw `PWGEN.*` code string.
+
+## Usage: Basic Example
+
+```ts
+import { recordError, recordGeneration } from "@suaveplan/password-generator";
+
+const start = performance.now();
+const pw = "abc...";
+recordGeneration("random", performance.now() - start, 95.2);
+```
+
+## Usage: Advanced Example
+
+```ts
+import { metrics } from "@opentelemetry/api";
+import { _resetInstruments } from "@suaveplan/password-generator";
+
+// Install an in-memory provider for tests, then exercise the package.
+const calls: { name: string; value: number; attrs: Record<string, string> }[] = [];
+metrics.setGlobalMeterProvider({
+ getMeter: () => ({
+  createCounter: (name: string) => ({
+   add: (v: number, attrs: Record<string, string> = {}) =>
+    calls.push({ name, value: v, attrs }),
+  }),
+  createHistogram: (name: string) => ({
+   record: (v: number, attrs: Record<string, string> = {}) =>
+    calls.push({ name, value: v, attrs }),
+  }),
+ }),
+} as never);
+_resetInstruments(); // Force lazy-init to use the fake provider next call
+```
+
+## API Reference
+
+### `recordGeneration(mode: GenerateMode, durationMs: number, bits: number): void`
+
+Records the per-call duration on `pwgen.generate_duration_ms` and the entropy on `pwgen.entropy_bits`, both tagged with `mode`.
+
+### `recordError(code: string): void`
+
+Increments `pwgen.errors_total` by 1 with `{ code }`.
+
+### `_resetInstruments(): void`
+
+Test-only hook that clears the lazy instrument cache. Call before installing a fake provider in tests.
+
+### `generateDurationMs` / `entropyBits` / `errorsTotal`
+
+Public facades on the underlying instruments — call `.record(value, { mode })` or `.add(value, { code })` for direct emission.
+
+## Implementation Notes
+
+Lazy initialisation is critical: if instruments were created at module load, they would bind to whatever `MeterProvider` was global at that moment (almost always the no-op default), and a test installing a real provider afterwards would see no data. The `??`-style lazy pattern means every call to `getInstruments` walks the active provider's `getMeter` lookup until the first non-no-op call is made; from that point the cached references are reused for the lifetime of the process (or until `_resetInstruments()` clears them).
+
+The four-value `mode` enum keeps per-mode cardinality bounded; adding a fifth mode would require a deliberate edit here and a refresh of dashboards. Resist the temptation to thread `password.length` or per-character `class` attributes into the histogram — those would explode cardinality and break the cost model OpenTelemetry backends assume.

packages/security-stack/security/password-generator/src/observability/metrics.test.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,149 @@
+import { metrics } from "@opentelemetry/api";
+import {
+    afterEach,
+    beforeEach,
+    describe,
+    expect,
+    it,
+} from "@suaveplan/testing/runner";
+import { generatePassphrase } from "../passphrase/passphrase.js";
+import { generatePassword } from "../password/password.js";
+import { generatePronounceablePassword } from "../password/pronounceable.js";
+import { generatePin } from "../pin/pin.js";
+import {
+    _resetInstruments,
+    entropyBits,
+    errorsTotal,
+    generateDurationMs,
+    recordError,
+    recordGeneration,
+} from "./metrics.js";
+
+interface CounterCall {
+    name: string;
+    value: number;
+    attrs: Record<string, string>;
+}
+interface HistogramCall {
+    name: string;
+    value: number;
+    attrs: Record<string, string>;
+}
+
+let counterCalls: CounterCall[];
+let histogramCalls: HistogramCall[];
+
+function installFakeProvider(): void {
+    counterCalls = [];
+    histogramCalls = [];
+    const provider = {
+        getMeter: () => ({
+            createCounter: (name: string) => ({
+                add: (v: number, attrs: Record<string, string> = {}) => {
+                    counterCalls.push({ name, value: v, attrs });
+                },
+            }),
+            createHistogram: (name: string) => ({
+                record: (v: number, attrs: Record<string, string> = {}) => {
+                    histogramCalls.push({ name, value: v, attrs });
+                },
+            }),
+            createUpDownCounter: () => ({ add: () => {} }),
+            createObservableCounter: () => ({
+                addCallback: () => {},
+                removeCallback: () => {},
+            }),
+            createObservableGauge: () => ({
+                addCallback: () => {},
+                removeCallback: () => {},
+            }),
+            createObservableUpDownCounter: () => ({
+                addCallback: () => {},
+                removeCallback: () => {},
+            }),
+            createGauge: () => ({ record: () => {} }),
+        }),
+    };
+    metrics.setGlobalMeterProvider(
+        provider as unknown as Parameters<
+            typeof metrics.setGlobalMeterProvider
+        >[0]
+    );
+}
+
+describe("OpenTelemetry instrumentation", () => {
+    beforeEach(() => {
+        _resetInstruments();
+        installFakeProvider();
+    });
+
+    afterEach(() => {
+        metrics.disable();
+        _resetInstruments();
+    });
+
+    it("emits pwgen.generate_duration_ms histogram for random mode", {
+        timeout: 5000,
+    }, () => {
+        generatePassword({ length: 16 });
+        const hit = histogramCalls.find(
+            (h) =>
+                h.name === "pwgen.generate_duration_ms" &&
+                h.attrs.mode === "random"
+        );
+        expect(hit).toBeDefined();
+    });
+
+    it("emits pwgen.entropy_bits histogram for passphrase mode", {
+        timeout: 5000,
+    }, () => {
+        generatePassphrase({ length: 4 });
+        const hit = histogramCalls.find(
+            (h) =>
+                h.name === "pwgen.entropy_bits" && h.attrs.mode === "passphrase"
+        );
+        expect(hit).toBeDefined();
+    });
+
+    it("emits histogram for pronounceable mode", { timeout: 5000 }, () => {
+        generatePronounceablePassword({ length: 9, mode: "pronounceable" });
+        const hit = histogramCalls.find(
+            (h) =>
+                h.name === "pwgen.generate_duration_ms" &&
+                h.attrs.mode === "pronounceable"
+        );
+        expect(hit).toBeDefined();
+    });
+
+    it("emits histogram for pin mode", { timeout: 5000 }, () => {
+        generatePin(6);
+        const hit = histogramCalls.find(
+            (h) =>
+                h.name === "pwgen.generate_duration_ms" &&
+                h.attrs.mode === "pin"
+        );
+        expect(hit).toBeDefined();
+    });
+
+    it("increments pwgen.errors_total on PWGEN.OPTIONS_INFEASIBLE", {
+        timeout: 5000,
+    }, () => {
+        expect(() => generatePassword({ length: 0 })).toThrow();
+        const hit = counterCalls.find(
+            (c) => c.name === "pwgen.errors_total" && c.attrs.code !== undefined
+        );
+        expect(hit).toBeDefined();
+    });
+
+    it("recordGeneration / recordError / instrument facades route through the active provider", {
+        timeout: 5000,
+    }, () => {
+        recordGeneration("random", 1, 64);
+        recordError("PWGEN.RNG_FAILED");
+        generateDurationMs.record(2, { mode: "passphrase" });
+        entropyBits.record(50, { mode: "passphrase" });
+        errorsTotal.add(1, { code: "PWGEN.INVALID_OPTIONS" });
+        expect(histogramCalls.length).toBeGreaterThan(0);
+        expect(counterCalls.length).toBeGreaterThan(0);
+    });
+});

packages/security-stack/security/password-generator/src/observability/metrics.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,88 @@
+import { type Counter, type Histogram, metrics } from "@opentelemetry/api";
+
+/** Low-cardinality `mode` enum for the histograms below. */
+export type GenerateMode = "random" | "pronounceable" | "passphrase" | "pin";
+
+let _generateDurationMs: Histogram | undefined;
+let _entropyBits: Histogram | undefined;
+let _errorsTotal: Counter | undefined;
+
+function getInstruments(): {
+    generateDurationMs: Histogram;
+    entropyBits: Histogram;
+    errorsTotal: Counter;
+} {
+    const meter = metrics.getMeter("@suaveplan/password-generator");
+    _generateDurationMs ??= meter.createHistogram(
+        "pwgen.generate_duration_ms",
+        {
+            description:
+                "Wall-clock duration of a single successful password / passphrase / PIN generation",
+            unit: "ms",
+        }
+    );
+    _entropyBits ??= meter.createHistogram("pwgen.entropy_bits", {
+        description: "Estimated entropy of the generated secret",
+        unit: "bit",
+    });
+    _errorsTotal ??= meter.createCounter("pwgen.errors_total", {
+        description:
+            "Count of typed errors thrown from @suaveplan/password-generator",
+    });
+    return {
+        generateDurationMs: _generateDurationMs,
+        entropyBits: _entropyBits,
+        errorsTotal: _errorsTotal,
+    };
+}
+
+/**
+ * Record a successful generation. Threading every production path through
+ * a single helper keeps the attribute key set ("mode") consistent and the
+ * cardinality bounded.
+ */
+export function recordGeneration(
+    mode: GenerateMode,
+    durationMs: number,
+    bits: number
+): void {
+    const { generateDurationMs, entropyBits } = getInstruments();
+    generateDurationMs.record(durationMs, { mode });
+    entropyBits.record(bits, { mode });
+}
+
+/** Record a typed error by stable code. */
+export function recordError(code: string): void {
+    const { errorsTotal } = getInstruments();
+    errorsTotal.add(1, { code });
+}
+
+/** Reset the cached instruments (test-only). */
+export function _resetInstruments(): void {
+    _generateDurationMs = undefined;
+    _entropyBits = undefined;
+    _errorsTotal = undefined;
+}
+
+/**
+ * Public-facing accessors so callers (and tests) can inspect the
+ * underlying instruments. Lazy-evaluated so the active MeterProvider is
+ * always honoured.
+ */
+export const generateDurationMs = {
+    record(value: number, attrs: { mode: GenerateMode }): void {
+        getInstruments().generateDurationMs.record(value, attrs);
+    },
+};
+
+export const entropyBits = {
+    record(value: number, attrs: { mode: GenerateMode }): void {
+        getInstruments().entropyBits.record(value, attrs);
+    },
+};
+
+export const errorsTotal = {
+    add(value: number, attrs: { code: string }): void {
+        getInstruments().errorsTotal.add(value, attrs);
+    },
+};

packages/security-stack/security/password-generator/src/passphrase/index.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,6 @@
+export { generatePassphrase } from "./passphrase.js";
+export type {
+    CapitalizationMode,
+    GeneratePassphraseOptions,
+    WordlistRef,
+} from "./passphrase.types.js";

packages/security-stack/security/password-generator/src/passphrase/passphrase.md

@@ -0,0 +1,70 @@
+# `passphrase`
+
+<!-- begin:auto-docs -->
+_(no submodules)_
+<!-- end:auto-docs -->
+## Purpose
+
+`generatePassphrase(opts, rng?)` produces an EFF-style Diceware passphrase by drawing `length` words uniformly (via the bias-free `randomInt`) from the wordlist resolved via `opts.wordlist`. The default — 6 words from the EFF Long Wordlist joined with `-` — gives ≈ 77.55 bits of entropy, comfortably above the 75-bit floor recommended for symmetric-key-equivalent secrets. Diceware-style passphrases are dramatically more memorable than random char-class passwords at equivalent entropy, which is why the vault item editor in `@suaveplan/vault` defaults to this mode for the "Generate password" surface.
+
+The function honours configurable separator, three capitalisation modes (`none` / `firstChar` / `randomWord`), and optional `addDigits` / `addSymbols` injections at random positions in the joined output. The decoration knobs exist so the same generator can produce strings that satisfy downstream "must contain a digit" composition rules without abandoning the Diceware backbone.
+
+## Features
+
+- Bundled EFF Long (7776) and EFF Short 1 (1296) wordlists via tree-shakeable subpath imports.
+- Caller-supplied `string[]` wordlists allowed past the 256-entry min-size guard.
+- Configurable separator (`default "-"`).
+- `capitalize: "none" | "firstChar" | "randomWord"`.
+- `addDigits` / `addSymbols` injection at randomised positions.
+- Deterministic under seeded `Rng`.
+- Zod-validated; mismatch → `PWGEN.INVALID_OPTIONS`.
+- Emits `pwgen.generate_duration_ms{mode=passphrase}` and `pwgen.entropy_bits{mode=passphrase}` histograms.
+
+## Usage: Basic Example
+
+```ts
+import { generatePassphrase } from "@suaveplan/password-generator";
+
+const pp = generatePassphrase({}); // 6 words, EFF Long, joined with "-"
+```
+
+## Usage: Advanced Example
+
+```ts
+import { generatePassphrase } from "@suaveplan/password-generator";
+
+// 5 short words capitalised at random, two trailing digits, one symbol
+const pp = generatePassphrase({
+ length: 5,
+ wordlist: "short",
+ capitalize: "randomWord",
+ addDigits: 2,
+ addSymbols: 1,
+ separator: " ",
+});
+
+// Caller-supplied themed wordlist (must be ≥ 256 entries)
+const dnd = [/* ... 300 fantasy nouns ... */];
+const themed = generatePassphrase({ wordlist: dnd, length: 4 });
+```
+
+## API Reference
+
+### `generatePassphrase(opts?: GeneratePassphraseOptions, rng?: Rng): string`
+
+- `opts.length` (default `6`): number of words to draw.
+- `opts.wordlist` (default `"long"`): `"long"` / `"short"` / registry name / inline `string[]`.
+- `opts.separator` (default `"-"`): string inserted between words before decoration.
+- `opts.capitalize` (default `"none"`): `"none"` / `"firstChar"` / `"randomWord"`.
+- `opts.addDigits` / `opts.addSymbols` (default `0`): count of characters injected at randomised positions.
+- `rng`: defaults to `defaultRng()`.
+
+Throws `PwgenError(PWGEN.INVALID_OPTIONS)` on Zod mismatch, `PwgenError(PWGEN.WORDLIST_TOO_SHORT)` for inline arrays below 256 entries, and `PwgenError(PWGEN.WORDLIST_NOT_REGISTERED)` for unknown registry names.
+
+## Implementation Notes
+
+Wordlist resolution lazily routes through `getWordlist(name)` so the registry's min-size guard applies uniformly — there's no special-case for the bundled EFF lists. Inline `string[]` wordlists bypass the registry but go through the same 256-entry floor inline, so a caller passing a tiny array sees the same `PWGEN.WORDLIST_TOO_SHORT` they would see from `registerWordlist`.
+
+Decoration is applied _after_ joining: `addDigits` / `addSymbols` inserts characters at uniformly-random positions in the already-joined string. This means a digit can land mid-word (e.g. `hor5se-rifle`) — that's intentional because inserting only at word boundaries would create a small-cardinality position distribution that's easier to fingerprint. Per-class injection uses bias-free `randomInt` against the `DIGITS` / `SYMBOLS` sets defined in the `charsets` module.
+
+Entropy reporting uses `estimatePassphraseEntropy(words, wordlistSize)` against the _picked_ words (not the post-decoration string), so the reported figure reflects the Diceware contribution. Decoration adds a small amount of entropy on top of that, but the package does not currently roll that into the reported figure to keep the formula stable across runs.

packages/security-stack/security/password-generator/src/passphrase/passphrase.spec-conformance.test.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,80 @@
+import { describe, expect, it } from "@suaveplan/testing/runner";
+import type { Rng } from "@suaveplan/types";
+import fc from "fast-check";
+import { EFF_LONG_WORDLIST } from "../wordlists/eff-long.js";
+import { EFF_SHORT_WORDLIST } from "../wordlists/eff-short.js";
+import { generatePassphrase } from "./passphrase.js";
+
+function seededRng(seed: number): Rng {
+    let s = seed >>> 0;
+    return {
+        nextUint32(): number {
+            s = (s + 0x6d2b79f5) >>> 0;
+            let t = s;
+            t = Math.imul(t ^ (t >>> 15), t | 1);
+            t ^= t + Math.imul(t ^ (t >>> 7), t | 61);
+            return ((t ^ (t >>> 14)) >>> 0) >>> 0;
+        },
+        nextFloat(): number {
+            return this.nextUint32() / 0x1_0000_0000;
+        },
+    };
+}
+
+describe("generatePassphrase — spec conformance", () => {
+    it("every sampled passphrase respects the membership invariant", {
+        timeout: 30000,
+    }, () => {
+        const longSet = new Set(EFF_LONG_WORDLIST);
+        const shortSet = new Set(EFF_SHORT_WORDLIST);
+        fc.assert(
+            fc.property(
+                fc.record({
+                    ref: fc.constantFrom("long" as const, "short" as const),
+                    length: fc.integer({ min: 1, max: 12 }),
+                }),
+                ({ ref, length }) => {
+                    // Use space separator so hyphenated entries
+                    // (`yo-yo`, `t-shirt`, …) round-trip through split.
+                    const pp = generatePassphrase({
+                        wordlist: ref,
+                        length,
+                        separator: " ",
+                    });
+                    const words = pp.split(" ");
+                    expect(words.length).toBe(length);
+                    const lookup = ref === "long" ? longSet : shortSet;
+                    for (const w of words) expect(lookup.has(w)).toBe(true);
+                }
+            ),
+            { numRuns: 200 }
+        );
+    });
+
+    it("every output word is a member of the resolved wordlist", {
+        timeout: 5000,
+    }, () => {
+        const pp = generatePassphrase({
+            length: 8,
+            wordlist: "long",
+            separator: " ",
+        });
+        for (const w of pp.split(" ")) {
+            expect(EFF_LONG_WORDLIST.includes(w)).toBe(true);
+        }
+    });
+
+    it("generatePassphrase is deterministic under a seeded Rng", {
+        timeout: 5000,
+    }, () => {
+        const a = generatePassphrase(
+            { length: 6, capitalize: "firstChar" },
+            seededRng(99)
+        );
+        const b = generatePassphrase(
+            { length: 6, capitalize: "firstChar" },
+            seededRng(99)
+        );
+        expect(a).toBe(b);
+    });
+});

packages/security-stack/security/password-generator/src/passphrase/passphrase.test.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,138 @@
+import { describe, expect, it } from "@suaveplan/testing/runner";
+import type { Rng } from "@suaveplan/types";
+import { DIGITS, SYMBOLS } from "../charsets/charsets.js";
+import { EFF_LONG_WORDLIST } from "../wordlists/eff-long.js";
+import { EFF_SHORT_WORDLIST } from "../wordlists/eff-short.js";
+import { generatePassphrase } from "./passphrase.js";
+
+function seededRng(seed: number): Rng {
+    let s = seed >>> 0;
+    return {
+        nextUint32(): number {
+            s = (s + 0x6d2b79f5) >>> 0;
+            let t = s;
+            t = Math.imul(t ^ (t >>> 15), t | 1);
+            t ^= t + Math.imul(t ^ (t >>> 7), t | 61);
+            return ((t ^ (t >>> 14)) >>> 0) >>> 0;
+        },
+        nextFloat(): number {
+            return this.nextUint32() / 0x1_0000_0000;
+        },
+    };
+}
+
+describe("generatePassphrase", () => {
+    it("defaults to EFF Long with length 6", { timeout: 5000 }, () => {
+        const pp = generatePassphrase({});
+        const words = pp.split("-");
+        expect(words.length).toBe(6);
+        for (const w of words) expect(EFF_LONG_WORDLIST.includes(w)).toBe(true);
+    });
+
+    it("draws from EFF Short when wordlist is short", { timeout: 5000 }, () => {
+        const pp = generatePassphrase({ wordlist: "short", length: 7 });
+        const words = pp.split("-");
+        expect(words.length).toBe(7);
+        for (const w of words)
+            expect(EFF_SHORT_WORDLIST.includes(w)).toBe(true);
+    });
+
+    it("accepts inline wordlist arrays meeting the min-size guard", {
+        timeout: 5000,
+    }, () => {
+        const inline = Array.from({ length: 256 }, (_, i) => `w${i}`);
+        const pp = generatePassphrase({ wordlist: inline, length: 4 });
+        const words = pp.split("-");
+        expect(words.length).toBe(4);
+        for (const w of words) expect(inline.includes(w)).toBe(true);
+    });
+
+    it("rejects inline wordlist arrays below 256 entries", {
+        timeout: 5000,
+    }, () => {
+        expect(() =>
+            generatePassphrase({ wordlist: ["one", "two"], length: 2 })
+        ).toThrow(/PWGEN\.WORDLIST_TOO_SHORT/);
+    });
+
+    it("capitalize firstChar applies to every word", { timeout: 5000 }, () => {
+        const pp = generatePassphrase({ length: 4, capitalize: "firstChar" });
+        const words = pp.split("-");
+        for (const w of words) {
+            expect(w.charAt(0)).toBe(w.charAt(0).toUpperCase());
+            expect(/^[A-Z]/.test(w)).toBe(true);
+        }
+    });
+
+    it("capitalize randomWord applies to exactly one word", {
+        timeout: 5000,
+    }, () => {
+        const pp = generatePassphrase(
+            { length: 4, capitalize: "randomWord" },
+            seededRng(11)
+        );
+        const words = pp.split("-");
+        const upperCount = words.filter((w) => /^[A-Z]/.test(w)).length;
+        expect(upperCount).toBe(1);
+    });
+
+    it("addDigits and addSymbols inject the requested counts", {
+        timeout: 5000,
+    }, () => {
+        // Use a separator outside both DIGITS and SYMBOLS so the injected
+        // counts are not confounded by the separator characters.
+        const pp = generatePassphrase({
+            length: 3,
+            addDigits: 2,
+            addSymbols: 1,
+            separator: " ",
+        });
+        const digitCount = [...pp].filter((c) => DIGITS.has(c)).length;
+        const symbolCount = [...pp].filter((c) => SYMBOLS.has(c)).length;
+        expect(digitCount).toBe(2);
+        expect(symbolCount).toBe(1);
+    });
+
+    it("uses a custom separator", { timeout: 5000 }, () => {
+        const pp = generatePassphrase({ length: 4, separator: "." });
+        expect(pp.split(".").length).toBe(4);
+    });
+
+    it("is deterministic under seeded Rng", { timeout: 5000 }, () => {
+        const a = generatePassphrase(
+            { length: 6, capitalize: "firstChar" },
+            seededRng(42)
+        );
+        const b = generatePassphrase(
+            { length: 6, capitalize: "firstChar" },
+            seededRng(42)
+        );
+        expect(a).toBe(b);
+    });
+
+    it("rejects invalid input with PWGEN.INVALID_OPTIONS", {
+        timeout: 5000,
+    }, () => {
+        expect(() => generatePassphrase({ length: 0 })).toThrow(
+            /PWGEN\.INVALID_OPTIONS/
+        );
+    });
+
+    it("resolves wordlist via registry name", { timeout: 5000 }, () => {
+        const pp = generatePassphrase({ wordlist: "eff-short", length: 4 });
+        const words = pp.split("-");
+        for (const w of words)
+            expect(EFF_SHORT_WORDLIST.includes(w)).toBe(true);
+    });
+
+    it("works with no opts argument", { timeout: 5000 }, () => {
+        const pp = generatePassphrase();
+        expect(pp.split("-").length).toBe(6);
+    });
+
+    it("applies capitalize none by default", { timeout: 5000 }, () => {
+        const pp = generatePassphrase({ length: 4 });
+        const words = pp.split("-");
+        for (const w of words) expect(/^[a-z]/.test(w)).toBe(true);
+    });
+});

packages/security-stack/security/password-generator/src/passphrase/passphrase.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,107 @@
+import type { Rng } from "@suaveplan/types";
+import { DIGITS, SYMBOLS } from "../charsets/charsets.js";
+import { estimatePassphraseEntropy } from "../entropy/entropy.js";
+import { pwgenError } from "../errors/codes.js";
+import { recordError, recordGeneration } from "../observability/metrics.js";
+import { defaultRng } from "../random/default-rng.js";
+import { randomInt } from "../random/random-int.js";
+import { GeneratePassphraseOptionsSchema } from "../schemas/schemas.js";
+import { getWordlist, MIN_WORDLIST_SIZE } from "../wordlists/registry.js";
+import type {
+    GeneratePassphraseOptions,
+    WordlistRef,
+} from "./passphrase.types.js";
+
+const DEFAULT_LENGTH = 6;
+const DEFAULT_SEPARATOR = "-";
+
+function resolveWordlist(ref: WordlistRef | undefined): readonly string[] {
+    if (ref === undefined || ref === "long") return getWordlist("eff-long");
+    if (ref === "short") return getWordlist("eff-short");
+    if (typeof ref === "string") return getWordlist(ref);
+    if (ref.length < MIN_WORDLIST_SIZE) {
+        throw pwgenError(
+            "PWGEN.WORDLIST_TOO_SHORT",
+            `inline wordlist has ${ref.length} entries; minimum is ${MIN_WORDLIST_SIZE}`
+        );
+    }
+    return ref;
+}
+
+function capitalizeFirst(word: string): string {
+    return word.charAt(0).toUpperCase() + word.slice(1);
+}
+
+function applyCapitalization(
+    words: string[],
+    mode: "none" | "firstChar" | "randomWord",
+    rng: Rng
+): string[] {
+    if (mode === "none") return words;
+    if (mode === "firstChar") return words.map(capitalizeFirst);
+    const pickIdx = randomInt(rng, words.length);
+    return words.map((w, i) => (i === pickIdx ? capitalizeFirst(w) : w));
+}
+
+function injectChars(
+    base: string,
+    count: number,
+    source: ReadonlySet<string>,
+    rng: Rng
+): string {
+    if (count === 0) return base;
+    const chars = [...source];
+    let acc = base;
+    for (let n = 0; n < count; n++) {
+        const insertAt = randomInt(rng, acc.length + 1);
+        const ch = chars[randomInt(rng, chars.length)] as string;
+        acc = acc.slice(0, insertAt) + ch + acc.slice(insertAt);
+    }
+    return acc;
+}
+
+/**
+ * Generate an EFF-style Diceware passphrase. Default is 6 words drawn
+ * uniformly from the EFF Long Wordlist (~77.5 bits of entropy) joined
+ * with `-`.
+ *
+ * @throws PwgenError(PWGEN.INVALID_OPTIONS) on schema mismatch.
+ * @throws PwgenError(PWGEN.WORDLIST_TOO_SHORT) on inline wordlists with
+ *   < 256 entries.
+ * @throws PwgenError(PWGEN.WORDLIST_NOT_REGISTERED) for unknown registry
+ *   names.
+ */
+export function generatePassphrase(
+    opts: GeneratePassphraseOptions = {},
+    rng?: Rng
+): string {
+    const parsed = GeneratePassphraseOptionsSchema.safeParse(opts);
+    if (!parsed.success) {
+        recordError("PWGEN.INVALID_OPTIONS");
+        throw pwgenError("PWGEN.INVALID_OPTIONS", parsed.error.message, {
+            cause: parsed.error,
+        });
+    }
+    const o = parsed.data;
+    const length = o.length ?? DEFAULT_LENGTH;
+    const separator = o.separator ?? DEFAULT_SEPARATOR;
+    const capitalize = o.capitalize ?? "none";
+    const addDigits = o.addDigits ?? 0;
+    const addSymbols = o.addSymbols ?? 0;
+    const effectiveRng = rng ?? defaultRng();
+    const wordlist = resolveWordlist(o.wordlist);
+    const start = performance.now();
+    const picked: string[] = [];
+    for (let i = 0; i < length; i++) {
+        picked.push(
+            wordlist[randomInt(effectiveRng, wordlist.length)] as string
+        );
+    }
+    const cased = applyCapitalization(picked, capitalize, effectiveRng);
+    let joined = cased.join(separator);
+    joined = injectChars(joined, addDigits, DIGITS, effectiveRng);
+    joined = injectChars(joined, addSymbols, SYMBOLS, effectiveRng);
+    const bits = estimatePassphraseEntropy(picked, wordlist.length);
+    recordGeneration("passphrase", performance.now() - start, bits);
+    return joined;
+}

packages/security-stack/security/password-generator/src/passphrase/passphrase.types.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,18 @@
+export type CapitalizationMode = "none" | "firstChar" | "randomWord";
+
+/**
+ * Wordlist reference: `"long"` resolves to the bundled EFF Long Wordlist,
+ * `"short"` resolves to the bundled EFF Short Wordlist 1, any other
+ * non-empty string resolves to a name in the registry, and a `string[]`
+ * is passed through the registry's min-size guard inline.
+ */
+export type WordlistRef = "long" | "short" | string | readonly string[];
+
+export interface GeneratePassphraseOptions {
+    readonly length?: number;
+    readonly wordlist?: WordlistRef;
+    readonly separator?: string;
+    readonly capitalize?: CapitalizationMode;
+    readonly addDigits?: number;
+    readonly addSymbols?: number;
+}

packages/security-stack/security/password-generator/src/password/index.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,11 @@
+export { generatePassword } from "./password.js";
+export type {
+    GeneratePasswordOptions,
+    PasswordMode,
+    RequiredClasses,
+} from "./password.types.js";
+export {
+    generatePronounceablePassword,
+    PRONOUNCEABLE_CONSONANTS,
+    PRONOUNCEABLE_VOWELS,
+} from "./pronounceable.js";

packages/security-stack/security/password-generator/src/password/password.md

@@ -0,0 +1,97 @@
+# `password`
+
+<!-- begin:auto-docs -->
+_(no submodules)_
+<!-- end:auto-docs --> - pronounceable — `generatePronounceablePassword(opts…
+- [pronounceable](./pronounceable.md) — `generatePronounceablePassword(opts, rng?)` emits CVC-pattern (consonant–vowel–consonant) syllables suitable for should…
+- pronounceable — `generatePronounceablePassword(opts…
+
+- [pronounceable](./pronounceable.md) — `generatePronounceablePassword(opts, rng?)` emits CVC-pattern (consonant–vowel–consonant) syllables suitable for should…
+
+- pronounceable — `generatePronounceablePassword(opts…
+
+- [pronounceable](./pronounceable.md) — `generatePronounceablePassword(opts, rng?)` emits CVC-pattern (consonant–vowel–consonant) syllables suitable for should…
+
+- pronounceable — `generatePronounceablePassword(opts…
+
+- [pronounceable](./pronounceable.md) — `generatePronounceablePassword(opts, rng?)` emits CVC-pattern (consonant–vowel–consonant) syllables suitable for should…
+- [pronounceable](./pronounceable.md) — `generatePronounceablePassword(opts, rng?)` emits CVC-pattern (consonant–vowel–consonant) syllables suitable for should…
+
+## Purpose
+
+`generatePassword(opts, rng?)` produces a `length`-character password drawn uniformly from the union of enabled character classes minus any caller-supplied exclusions. Required-class quotas (`requireLowercase`, `requireUppercase`, `requireDigits`, `requireSymbols`) are satisfied without leaking position information: one randomly-chosen character from each required class is placed first, the remainder filled from the union, and the entire buffer Fisher-Yates-shuffled so the required-class characters are not biased to the head of the string. NIST SP 800-63B §5.1.1.2 deprecates required-class composition rules — they reduce effective entropy and trade resistance to cracking for a stronger memorability constraint — but downstream sites still mandate them, so the generator supports per-class quotas while documenting the cost.
+
+## Features
+
+- Bias-free draws via `randomInt` (Lemire 2018 rejection sampling).
+- Per-class enablement (`lowercase`/`uppercase`/`digits`/`symbols`) and per-class required quotas.
+- Arbitrary `exclude` set (string / `string[]` / `Set<string>`).
+- Deterministic under a seeded `Rng` for replay tests.
+- Zod-validated `opts`; mismatch → `PWGEN.INVALID_OPTIONS`.
+- Rejects infeasible options (`length < requiredCount` or empty effective charset) with `PWGEN.OPTIONS_INFEASIBLE`.
+- Emits `pwgen.generate_duration_ms{mode=random}` and `pwgen.entropy_bits{mode=random}` on success.
+
+## Usage: Basic Example
+
+```ts
+import { generatePassword } from "@suaveplan/password-generator";
+
+const pw = generatePassword({ length: 16 });
+```
+
+## Usage: Advanced Example
+
+```ts
+import {
+ AMBIGUOUS,
+ generatePassword,
+} from "@suaveplan/password-generator";
+
+// 32-char password that satisfies every class and avoids confusable chars
+const pw = generatePassword({
+ length: 32,
+ requireLowercase: true,
+ requireUppercase: true,
+ requireDigits: true,
+ requireSymbols: true,
+ exclude: AMBIGUOUS,
+});
+
+// Deterministic replay under a seeded Rng
+import type { Rng } from "@suaveplan/types";
+function seeded(seed: number): Rng {
+ let s = seed >>> 0;
+ return {
+  nextUint32(): number {
+   s = (s + 0x6d2b79f5) >>> 0;
+   let t = s;
+   t = Math.imul(t ^ (t >>> 15), t | 1);
+   t ^= t + Math.imul(t ^ (t >>> 7), t | 61);
+   return (t ^ (t >>> 14)) >>> 0;
+  },
+  nextFloat(): number {
+   return this.nextUint32() / 0x1_0000_0000;
+  },
+ };
+}
+const replayed = generatePassword({ length: 24 }, seeded(42));
+```
+
+## API Reference
+
+### `generatePassword(opts: GeneratePasswordOptions, rng?: Rng): string`
+
+- `opts.length`: positive integer total length.
+- `opts.lowercase` / `opts.uppercase` / `opts.digits` / `opts.symbols`: defaults to `true`; pass `false` to omit the class from the union.
+- `opts.requireLowercase` / `opts.requireUppercase` / `opts.requireDigits` / `opts.requireSymbols`: defaults to `false`; when `true`, at least one character from the class is guaranteed in the output.
+- `opts.exclude`: characters to subtract from the union after class merge.
+- `opts.mode`: ignored by `generatePassword`; see `pronounceable.ts` for the `pronounceable` mode.
+- `rng`: defaults to `defaultRng()`.
+
+Throws `PwgenError(PWGEN.INVALID_OPTIONS)` on Zod mismatch, `PwgenError(PWGEN.OPTIONS_INFEASIBLE)` when `length < requiredCount` or when the effective charset is empty after exclusions.
+
+## Implementation Notes
+
+The required-class placement is a two-phase fill: phase 1 pushes one randomly-chosen character per enabled required class into the buffer; phase 2 fills the remainder from the full effective charset. The buffer is then shuffled in-place via `shuffleInPlace` so the required-class characters end up at uniformly-distributed positions across `[0, length)`. Without the shuffle, the leading `requiredCount` characters would be deterministic-by-position, which is observable to an attacker and weakens the resistance of the generated password.
+
+Effective-charset construction goes through `buildEffectiveCharset`, which performs class-merge + exclusion arithmetic. If any required class becomes empty after exclusions (e.g. `requireDigits: true` with `exclude: "0123456789"`) the generator throws `PWGEN.OPTIONS_INFEASIBLE` instead of producing an output that silently violates the contract. Entropy is reported via `estimateEntropy` immediately before recording — this is an upper-bound `log2(charset) * length` estimate; pattern-aware scoring lives in `@suaveplan/password-strength`.

packages/security-stack/security/password-generator/src/password/password.spec-conformance.test.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,141 @@
+import { describe, expect, it } from "@suaveplan/testing/runner";
+import type { Rng } from "@suaveplan/types";
+import fc from "fast-check";
+import { DIGITS, LOWERCASE, SYMBOLS, UPPERCASE } from "../charsets/charsets.js";
+import { generatePassword } from "./password.js";
+
+function seededRng(seed: number): Rng {
+    let s = seed >>> 0;
+    return {
+        nextUint32(): number {
+            s = (s + 0x6d2b79f5) >>> 0;
+            let t = s;
+            t = Math.imul(t ^ (t >>> 15), t | 1);
+            t ^= t + Math.imul(t ^ (t >>> 7), t | 61);
+            return ((t ^ (t >>> 14)) >>> 0) >>> 0;
+        },
+        nextFloat(): number {
+            return this.nextUint32() / 0x1_0000_0000;
+        },
+    };
+}
+
+describe("generatePassword — spec conformance", () => {
+    it("every sampled options bundle yields a quota-respecting password", {
+        timeout: 30000,
+    }, () => {
+        fc.assert(
+            fc.property(
+                fc.record({
+                    length: fc.integer({ min: 4, max: 32 }),
+                    rl: fc.boolean(),
+                    ru: fc.boolean(),
+                    rd: fc.boolean(),
+                    rs: fc.boolean(),
+                }),
+                ({ length, rl, ru, rd, rs }) => {
+                    const required =
+                        (rl ? 1 : 0) +
+                        (ru ? 1 : 0) +
+                        (rd ? 1 : 0) +
+                        (rs ? 1 : 0);
+                    if (length < required) return;
+                    const pw = generatePassword({
+                        length,
+                        requireLowercase: rl,
+                        requireUppercase: ru,
+                        requireDigits: rd,
+                        requireSymbols: rs,
+                    });
+                    if (rl)
+                        expect([...pw].some((c) => LOWERCASE.has(c))).toBe(
+                            true
+                        );
+                    if (ru)
+                        expect([...pw].some((c) => UPPERCASE.has(c))).toBe(
+                            true
+                        );
+                    if (rd)
+                        expect([...pw].some((c) => DIGITS.has(c))).toBe(true);
+                    if (rs)
+                        expect([...pw].some((c) => SYMBOLS.has(c))).toBe(true);
+                }
+            ),
+            { numRuns: 200 }
+        );
+    });
+
+    it("required-class character position is uniform after shuffle", {
+        timeout: 30000,
+    }, () => {
+        const trials = 2000;
+        const length = 10;
+        const positionCounts = new Array<number>(length).fill(0);
+        for (let i = 0; i < trials; i++) {
+            const pw = generatePassword({
+                length,
+                requireDigits: true,
+                lowercase: true,
+                uppercase: false,
+                digits: false,
+                symbols: false,
+            });
+            for (let j = 0; j < pw.length; j++) {
+                if (DIGITS.has(pw[j] as string)) {
+                    positionCounts[j] = (positionCounts[j] as number) + 1;
+                    break;
+                }
+            }
+        }
+        // With one required digit shuffled across `length` positions, the
+        // first-digit position is uniform. Expected per bucket: trials/length.
+        // Allow ±35% slack to keep this test stable on CI variance.
+        const expected = trials / length;
+        for (const count of positionCounts) {
+            expect(count).toBeGreaterThan(expected * 0.65);
+            expect(count).toBeLessThan(expected * 1.35);
+        }
+    });
+
+    it("every required class is present in the output", {
+        timeout: 30000,
+    }, () => {
+        for (let trial = 0; trial < 100; trial++) {
+            const pw = generatePassword({
+                length: 16,
+                requireLowercase: true,
+                requireUppercase: true,
+                requireDigits: true,
+                requireSymbols: true,
+            });
+            expect([...pw].some((c) => LOWERCASE.has(c))).toBe(true);
+            expect([...pw].some((c) => UPPERCASE.has(c))).toBe(true);
+            expect([...pw].some((c) => DIGITS.has(c))).toBe(true);
+            expect([...pw].some((c) => SYMBOLS.has(c))).toBe(true);
+        }
+    });
+
+    it("generatePassword is deterministic under a seeded Rng", {
+        timeout: 5000,
+    }, () => {
+        const a = generatePassword(
+            { length: 32, requireDigits: true },
+            seededRng(123)
+        );
+        const b = generatePassword(
+            { length: 32, requireDigits: true },
+            seededRng(123)
+        );
+        expect(a).toBe(b);
+    });
+
+    it("default Rng draws from crypto-utils.randomBytes", {
+        timeout: 5000,
+    }, async () => {
+        const module = await import("@suaveplan/crypto-utils");
+        expect(typeof module.randomBytes).toBe("function");
+        // Sanity: the generated output is a 16-char string.
+        const pw = generatePassword({ length: 16 });
+        expect(pw.length).toBe(16);
+    });
+});

packages/security-stack/security/password-generator/src/password/password.test.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,170 @@
+import { describe, expect, it } from "@suaveplan/testing/runner";
+import type { Rng } from "@suaveplan/types";
+import {
+    AMBIGUOUS,
+    DIGITS,
+    LOWERCASE,
+    SYMBOLS,
+    UPPERCASE,
+} from "../charsets/charsets.js";
+import { generatePassword } from "./password.js";
+
+function seededRng(seed: number): Rng {
+    let s = seed >>> 0;
+    return {
+        nextUint32(): number {
+            s = (s + 0x6d2b79f5) >>> 0;
+            let t = s;
+            t = Math.imul(t ^ (t >>> 15), t | 1);
+            t ^= t + Math.imul(t ^ (t >>> 7), t | 61);
+            return ((t ^ (t >>> 14)) >>> 0) >>> 0;
+        },
+        nextFloat(): number {
+            return this.nextUint32() / 0x1_0000_0000;
+        },
+    };
+}
+
+describe("generatePassword", () => {
+    it("generates a length-16 password from the default union", {
+        timeout: 5000,
+    }, () => {
+        const pw = generatePassword({ length: 16 });
+        expect(pw.length).toBe(16);
+        for (const ch of pw) {
+            const inUnion =
+                LOWERCASE.has(ch) ||
+                UPPERCASE.has(ch) ||
+                DIGITS.has(ch) ||
+                SYMBOLS.has(ch);
+            expect(inUnion).toBe(true);
+        }
+    });
+
+    it("respects exclusion sets", { timeout: 5000 }, () => {
+        const pw = generatePassword({ length: 32, exclude: AMBIGUOUS });
+        for (const ch of pw) expect(AMBIGUOUS.has(ch)).toBe(false);
+    });
+
+    it("satisfies all required-class quotas simultaneously", {
+        timeout: 5000,
+    }, () => {
+        for (let trial = 0; trial < 50; trial++) {
+            const pw = generatePassword({
+                length: 12,
+                requireLowercase: true,
+                requireUppercase: true,
+                requireDigits: true,
+                requireSymbols: true,
+            });
+            expect([...pw].some((c) => LOWERCASE.has(c))).toBe(true);
+            expect([...pw].some((c) => UPPERCASE.has(c))).toBe(true);
+            expect([...pw].some((c) => DIGITS.has(c))).toBe(true);
+            expect([...pw].some((c) => SYMBOLS.has(c))).toBe(true);
+        }
+    });
+
+    it("throws PWGEN.OPTIONS_INFEASIBLE when length below required count", {
+        timeout: 5000,
+    }, () => {
+        expect(() =>
+            generatePassword({
+                length: 2,
+                requireLowercase: true,
+                requireUppercase: true,
+                requireDigits: true,
+                requireSymbols: true,
+            })
+        ).toThrow(/PWGEN\.OPTIONS_INFEASIBLE/);
+    });
+
+    it("throws PWGEN.OPTIONS_INFEASIBLE when effective charset is empty", {
+        timeout: 5000,
+    }, () => {
+        expect(() =>
+            generatePassword({
+                length: 8,
+                lowercase: false,
+                uppercase: false,
+                digits: false,
+                symbols: false,
+            })
+        ).toThrow(/PWGEN\.OPTIONS_INFEASIBLE/);
+    });
+
+    it("throws PWGEN.OPTIONS_INFEASIBLE when a required class is excluded out", {
+        timeout: 5000,
+    }, () => {
+        expect(() =>
+            generatePassword({
+                length: 8,
+                requireDigits: true,
+                exclude: "0123456789",
+            })
+        ).toThrow(/PWGEN\.OPTIONS_INFEASIBLE/);
+    });
+
+    it("is deterministic under a seeded Rng", { timeout: 5000 }, () => {
+        const a = generatePassword(
+            { length: 32, requireDigits: true },
+            seededRng(7)
+        );
+        const b = generatePassword(
+            { length: 32, requireDigits: true },
+            seededRng(7)
+        );
+        expect(a).toBe(b);
+    });
+
+    it("only requires lowercase when only lowercase requested", {
+        timeout: 5000,
+    }, () => {
+        const pw = generatePassword({ length: 8, requireLowercase: true });
+        expect([...pw].some((c) => LOWERCASE.has(c))).toBe(true);
+    });
+
+    it("only requires uppercase when only uppercase requested", {
+        timeout: 5000,
+    }, () => {
+        const pw = generatePassword({ length: 8, requireUppercase: true });
+        expect([...pw].some((c) => UPPERCASE.has(c))).toBe(true);
+    });
+
+    it("only requires symbols when only symbols requested", {
+        timeout: 5000,
+    }, () => {
+        const pw = generatePassword({ length: 8, requireSymbols: true });
+        expect([...pw].some((c) => SYMBOLS.has(c))).toBe(true);
+    });
+
+    it("rejects invalid schema input with PWGEN.INVALID_OPTIONS", {
+        timeout: 5000,
+    }, () => {
+        expect(() => generatePassword({ length: -1 })).toThrow(
+            /PWGEN\.INVALID_OPTIONS/
+        );
+    });
+
+    it("accepts array-form exclude in generatePassword", {
+        timeout: 5000,
+    }, () => {
+        const pw = generatePassword({
+            length: 16,
+            requireDigits: true,
+            exclude: ["a", "b", "c"],
+        });
+        for (const ch of pw) {
+            expect(ch === "a" || ch === "b" || ch === "c").toBe(false);
+        }
+    });
+
+    it("accepts Set-form exclude in generatePassword", {
+        timeout: 5000,
+    }, () => {
+        const setEx = new Set(["a", "b"]);
+        const pw = generatePassword({ length: 16, exclude: setEx });
+        for (const ch of pw) {
+            expect(setEx.has(ch)).toBe(false);
+        }
+    });
+});

packages/security-stack/security/password-generator/src/password/password.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,109 @@
+import type { Rng } from "@suaveplan/types";
+import {
+    buildEffectiveCharset,
+    DIGITS,
+    LOWERCASE,
+    SYMBOLS,
+    UPPERCASE,
+} from "../charsets/charsets.js";
+import { estimateEntropy } from "../entropy/entropy.js";
+import { pwgenError } from "../errors/codes.js";
+import { recordError, recordGeneration } from "../observability/metrics.js";
+import { defaultRng } from "../random/default-rng.js";
+import { shuffleInPlace } from "../random/fisher-yates.js";
+import { randomInt } from "../random/random-int.js";
+import { GeneratePasswordOptionsSchema } from "../schemas/schemas.js";
+import type { GeneratePasswordOptions } from "./password.types.js";
+
+function requiredCharFor(
+    klass: "lower" | "upper" | "digit" | "symbol",
+    exclude: ReadonlySet<string>,
+    rng: Rng
+): string {
+    const map: Record<typeof klass, ReadonlySet<string>> = {
+        lower: LOWERCASE,
+        upper: UPPERCASE,
+        digit: DIGITS,
+        symbol: SYMBOLS,
+    };
+    const filtered = [...map[klass]].filter((c) => !exclude.has(c));
+    if (filtered.length === 0) {
+        throw pwgenError(
+            "PWGEN.OPTIONS_INFEASIBLE",
+            `required class "${klass}" became empty after applying exclusions`
+        );
+    }
+    return filtered[randomInt(rng, filtered.length)] as string;
+}
+
+function expandExclusion(
+    exclude: GeneratePasswordOptions["exclude"]
+): ReadonlySet<string> {
+    if (!exclude) return new Set<string>();
+    if (typeof exclude === "string") return new Set(exclude.split(""));
+    if (Array.isArray(exclude)) return new Set(exclude as readonly string[]);
+    return exclude as ReadonlySet<string>;
+}
+
+/**
+ * Generate a `length`-character password drawn uniformly from the union of
+ * enabled character classes minus any caller-supplied exclusions.
+ *
+ * Required-class quotas (`requireLowercase`/`requireUppercase`/
+ * `requireDigits`/`requireSymbols`) are satisfied by placing one randomly-
+ * chosen character from each required class first, filling the remainder
+ * from the union, and Fisher-Yates-shuffling the buffer so the required-
+ * class characters are not biased to the head of the string.
+ *
+ * @throws PwgenError(PWGEN.INVALID_OPTIONS) on schema mismatch.
+ * @throws PwgenError(PWGEN.OPTIONS_INFEASIBLE) if `length < requiredCount`
+ *   or if the effective charset is empty after exclusions.
+ */
+export function generatePassword(
+    opts: GeneratePasswordOptions,
+    rng?: Rng
+): string {
+    const parsed = GeneratePasswordOptionsSchema.safeParse(opts);
+    if (!parsed.success) {
+        recordError("PWGEN.INVALID_OPTIONS");
+        throw pwgenError("PWGEN.INVALID_OPTIONS", parsed.error.message, {
+            cause: parsed.error,
+        });
+    }
+    const o = parsed.data;
+    const required: ("lower" | "upper" | "digit" | "symbol")[] = [];
+    if (o.requireLowercase) required.push("lower");
+    if (o.requireUppercase) required.push("upper");
+    if (o.requireDigits) required.push("digit");
+    if (o.requireSymbols) required.push("symbol");
+    if (o.length < required.length) {
+        recordError("PWGEN.OPTIONS_INFEASIBLE");
+        throw pwgenError(
+            "PWGEN.OPTIONS_INFEASIBLE",
+            `length ${o.length} is below required-class count ${required.length}`
+        );
+    }
+    const effectiveRng = rng ?? defaultRng();
+    const charset = buildEffectiveCharset(o);
+    if (charset.length === 0) {
+        recordError("PWGEN.OPTIONS_INFEASIBLE");
+        throw pwgenError(
+            "PWGEN.OPTIONS_INFEASIBLE",
+            "effective charset is empty — at least one class must be enabled and not fully excluded"
+        );
+    }
+    const exclude = expandExclusion(o.exclude);
+    const buffer: string[] = [];
+    for (const klass of required) {
+        buffer.push(requiredCharFor(klass, exclude, effectiveRng));
+    }
+    while (buffer.length < o.length) {
+        buffer.push(charset[randomInt(effectiveRng, charset.length)] as string);
+    }
+    shuffleInPlace(buffer, effectiveRng);
+    const out = buffer.join("");
+    const start = performance.now();
+    const { bits } = estimateEntropy(out);
+    recordGeneration("random", performance.now() - start, bits);
+    return out;
+}

packages/security-stack/security/password-generator/src/password/password.types.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,25 @@
+import type { CharsetOptions } from "../charsets/charsets.js";
+
+/** Generation mode discriminator. */
+export type PasswordMode = "random" | "pronounceable";
+
+/** Required-class quotas — caller asserts the result must contain ≥ 1 char from each enabled class. */
+export interface RequiredClasses {
+    readonly requireLowercase?: boolean;
+    readonly requireUppercase?: boolean;
+    readonly requireDigits?: boolean;
+    readonly requireSymbols?: boolean;
+}
+
+/**
+ * Options accepted by `generatePassword` and `generatePronounceablePassword`.
+ * The character-class flags (`lowercase`/`uppercase`/`digits`/`symbols`) all
+ * default to `true`; pass `false` to omit a class from the effective union.
+ * `exclude` subtracts characters from the union after classes are merged.
+ */
+export interface GeneratePasswordOptions
+    extends CharsetOptions,
+        RequiredClasses {
+    readonly length: number;
+    readonly mode?: PasswordMode;
+}

packages/security-stack/security/password-generator/src/password/pronounceable.md

@@ -0,0 +1,72 @@
+# `pronounceable`
+
+## Purpose
+
+`generatePronounceablePassword(opts, rng?)` emits CVC-pattern (consonant–vowel–consonant) syllables suitable for shoulder-surf-friendly UX contexts where the user must read the password aloud or type it from memory in a short window. The output alternates consonant-frequency-weighted picks from a 21-character consonant set and 5-character vowel set, drawn via the bias-free `randomInt` primitive. Pronounceable passwords trade entropy for memorability: per-character entropy is ≈ log2(21·5)/2 ≈ 4.7 bits versus ≈ 6.55 bits for a full 94-character symbol set, so callers SHOULD pair this mode with a longer `length` or reserve it strictly for UX contexts where the user re-types the password by hand.
+
+The consonant ordering is derived from Norvig's 2013 English-corpus letter frequencies. Picks are uniform over the 21-character consonant set (not frequency-biased), but the choice of which consonants appear at all reflects common English digrams — `q` and `x` are present but produce visibly less "English-shaped" syllables than `t` and `n`.
+
+## Features
+
+- 3-character CVC syllables (`[bcdfghjklmnpqrstvwxyz][aeiou][bcdfghjklmnpqrstvwxyz]`).
+- Truncates the final syllable when `length % 3 !== 0`.
+- Deterministic under a seeded `Rng`.
+- Throws `PWGEN.INVALID_OPTIONS` for `length < 1` or non-integer `length`.
+- Emits `pwgen.generate_duration_ms{mode=pronounceable}` and `pwgen.entropy_bits{mode=pronounceable}` on success.
+
+## Usage: Basic Example
+
+```ts
+import { generatePronounceablePassword } from "@suaveplan/password-generator";
+
+const pw = generatePronounceablePassword({ length: 12, mode: "pronounceable" });
+```
+
+## Usage: Advanced Example
+
+```ts
+import type { Rng } from "@suaveplan/types";
+import { generatePronounceablePassword } from "@suaveplan/password-generator";
+
+function seeded(seed: number): Rng {
+ let s = seed >>> 0;
+ return {
+  nextUint32(): number {
+   s = (s + 0x6d2b79f5) >>> 0;
+   let t = s;
+   t = Math.imul(t ^ (t >>> 15), t | 1);
+   t ^= t + Math.imul(t ^ (t >>> 7), t | 61);
+   return (t ^ (t >>> 14)) >>> 0;
+  },
+  nextFloat(): number {
+   return this.nextUint32() / 0x1_0000_0000;
+  },
+ };
+}
+
+// Pair with longer length to recover entropy lost to the CVC constraint.
+// 18 chars ≈ 18 * 4.7 ≈ 85 bits.
+const pw = generatePronounceablePassword(
+ { length: 18, mode: "pronounceable" },
+ seeded(1234),
+);
+```
+
+## API Reference
+
+### `generatePronounceablePassword(opts: GeneratePasswordOptions & { mode: "pronounceable" }, rng?: Rng): string`
+
+- `opts.length`: positive integer total length. The last syllable is truncated to fit.
+- `opts.mode`: must be `"pronounceable"`; type discriminator only.
+- `rng`: defaults to `defaultRng()`.
+
+### Constants
+
+- `PRONOUNCEABLE_CONSONANTS: string` — the 21-character consonant set ordered by English frequency.
+- `PRONOUNCEABLE_VOWELS: string` — `aeiou`.
+
+## Implementation Notes
+
+The generator never reaches Markov-state complexity — instead the CVC pattern is encoded directly in the position index. At output index `i`, `idx = i % 3` selects between the consonant set (`idx === 0` or `idx === 2`) and the vowel set (`idx === 1`). This sidesteps the digram-table lookups Markov-style generators perform and produces strictly uniform draws within each class.
+
+Frequency-weighted picks (where common consonants like `t` and `n` would appear more often than rare ones like `q` and `x`) would make output more English-shaped at the cost of further entropy reduction. The trade-off was decided in favour of uniform per-class picks because the package's `assertStrength` measurement assumes the entropy formula `log2(charset) * length`, which only holds under uniform sampling. Switching to frequency-weighted picks would require carrying a separate empirical entropy estimate per locale.

packages/security-stack/security/password-generator/src/password/pronounceable.test.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,78 @@
+import { describe, expect, it } from "@suaveplan/testing/runner";
+import type { Rng } from "@suaveplan/types";
+import {
+    generatePronounceablePassword,
+    PRONOUNCEABLE_CONSONANTS,
+    PRONOUNCEABLE_VOWELS,
+} from "./pronounceable.js";
+
+function seededRng(seed: number): Rng {
+    let s = seed >>> 0;
+    return {
+        nextUint32(): number {
+            s = (s + 0x6d2b79f5) >>> 0;
+            let t = s;
+            t = Math.imul(t ^ (t >>> 15), t | 1);
+            t ^= t + Math.imul(t ^ (t >>> 7), t | 61);
+            return ((t ^ (t >>> 14)) >>> 0) >>> 0;
+        },
+        nextFloat(): number {
+            return this.nextUint32() / 0x1_0000_0000;
+        },
+    };
+}
+
+describe("generatePronounceablePassword", () => {
+    it("emits CVC syllables of total length N", { timeout: 5000 }, () => {
+        const pw = generatePronounceablePassword({
+            length: 12,
+            mode: "pronounceable",
+        });
+        expect(pw.length).toBe(12);
+        for (let i = 0; i < pw.length; i++) {
+            const ch = pw[i] as string;
+            const idx = i % 3;
+            if (idx === 1) {
+                expect(PRONOUNCEABLE_VOWELS.includes(ch)).toBe(true);
+            } else {
+                expect(PRONOUNCEABLE_CONSONANTS.includes(ch)).toBe(true);
+            }
+        }
+    });
+
+    it("deterministic under seeded Rng", { timeout: 5000 }, () => {
+        const a = generatePronounceablePassword(
+            { length: 12, mode: "pronounceable" },
+            seededRng(5)
+        );
+        const b = generatePronounceablePassword(
+            { length: 12, mode: "pronounceable" },
+            seededRng(5)
+        );
+        expect(a).toBe(b);
+    });
+
+    it("truncates last syllable for non-multiple-of-3 length", {
+        timeout: 5000,
+    }, () => {
+        const pw = generatePronounceablePassword({
+            length: 7,
+            mode: "pronounceable",
+        });
+        expect(pw.length).toBe(7);
+    });
+
+    it("rejects invalid length with PWGEN.INVALID_OPTIONS", {
+        timeout: 5000,
+    }, () => {
+        expect(() =>
+            generatePronounceablePassword({ length: 0, mode: "pronounceable" })
+        ).toThrow(/PWGEN\.INVALID_OPTIONS/);
+        expect(() =>
+            generatePronounceablePassword({
+                length: 1.5,
+                mode: "pronounceable",
+            })
+        ).toThrow(/PWGEN\.INVALID_OPTIONS/);
+    });
+});

packages/security-stack/security/password-generator/src/password/pronounceable.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,57 @@
+import type { Rng } from "@suaveplan/types";
+import { estimateEntropy } from "../entropy/entropy.js";
+import { pwgenError } from "../errors/codes.js";
+import { recordError, recordGeneration } from "../observability/metrics.js";
+import { defaultRng } from "../random/default-rng.js";
+import { randomInt } from "../random/random-int.js";
+import type { GeneratePasswordOptions } from "./password.types.js";
+
+/**
+ * Consonants ordered by English letter frequency (Norvig 2013 corpus
+ * analysis). Bias toward common consonants improves pronounceability
+ * without harming uniform-letter entropy by more than ≈ 0.5 bits/char.
+ */
+const CONSONANTS = "tnsrhdlcmpfgwybvkxjqz";
+const VOWELS = "aeiou";
+
+/**
+ * Generate a CVC-pattern pronounceable password of `length` characters by
+ * concatenating consonant–vowel–consonant syllables. The last syllable is
+ * truncated to fit `length` exactly when `length % 3 !== 0`.
+ *
+ * Pronounceable output has materially lower entropy than the char-class
+ * generator (per-char ≈ log2(21·5) ≈ 6.7 bits vs. log2(94) ≈ 6.55 for full
+ * symbols, but the constraint on alternating C-V-C reduces the effective
+ * search space). Callers SHOULD pair this mode with a longer `length` or
+ * reserve it for shoulder-surf-friendly UX contexts.
+ *
+ * @throws PwgenError(PWGEN.INVALID_OPTIONS) when `length` is not a positive integer.
+ */
+export function generatePronounceablePassword(
+    opts: GeneratePasswordOptions & { mode: "pronounceable" },
+    rng?: Rng
+): string {
+    if (!Number.isInteger(opts.length) || opts.length < 1) {
+        recordError("PWGEN.INVALID_OPTIONS");
+        throw pwgenError(
+            "PWGEN.INVALID_OPTIONS",
+            `length must be a positive integer; received ${opts.length}`
+        );
+    }
+    const effectiveRng = rng ?? defaultRng();
+    const out: string[] = [];
+    while (out.length < opts.length) {
+        const idx = out.length % 3;
+        const source = idx === 1 ? VOWELS : CONSONANTS;
+        out.push(source[randomInt(effectiveRng, source.length)] as string);
+    }
+    const start = performance.now();
+    const joined = out.join("");
+    const { bits } = estimateEntropy(joined);
+    recordGeneration("pronounceable", performance.now() - start, bits);
+    return joined;
+}
+
+/** Exposed for tests so the CVC pattern can be asserted deterministically. */
+export const PRONOUNCEABLE_CONSONANTS = CONSONANTS;
+export const PRONOUNCEABLE_VOWELS = VOWELS;

packages/security-stack/security/password-generator/src/pin/index.ts

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+export { generatePin } from "./pin.js";

packages/security-stack/security/password-generator/src/pin/pin.md

@@ -0,0 +1,66 @@
+# `pin`
+
+<!-- begin:auto-docs -->
+_(no submodules)_
+<!-- end:auto-docs -->
+## Purpose
+
+`generatePin(length, rng?)` returns a `length`-character PIN drawn uniformly from `[0-9]` via the bias-free `randomInt(rng, 10)` primitive. PINs are intentionally a separate surface from `generatePassword` because the constraint set is narrower (only digits, no class quotas, no exclusion arithmetic) and call-site UX is different — banking apps, SIM lock screens, and confirmation flows want a tight `generatePin(6)` rather than a `generatePassword({ length: 6, lowercase: false, uppercase: false, symbols: false })` configuration cliff.
+
+The per-digit entropy is `log2(10) ≈ 3.32` bits, so a 6-digit PIN carries ≈ 19.9 bits and a 12-digit PIN ≈ 39.9 bits. PINs SHOULD be paired with rate-limiting or lockout policies at the call site; this generator is responsible only for producing the digits, not for protecting the channel that submits them.
+
+## Features
+
+- Bias-free uniform draws over `[0, 10)`.
+- Throws `PWGEN.OPTIONS_INFEASIBLE` for `length < 1` or non-integer `length`.
+- Deterministic under a seeded `Rng`.
+- Emits `pwgen.generate_duration_ms{mode=pin}` and `pwgen.entropy_bits{mode=pin}` on success.
+
+## Usage: Basic Example
+
+```ts
+import { generatePin } from "@suaveplan/password-generator";
+
+const pin = generatePin(6); // "049213"
+```
+
+## Usage: Advanced Example
+
+```ts
+import type { Rng } from "@suaveplan/types";
+import { generatePin } from "@suaveplan/password-generator";
+
+function seeded(seed: number): Rng {
+ let s = seed >>> 0;
+ return {
+  nextUint32(): number {
+   s = (s + 0x6d2b79f5) >>> 0;
+   let t = s;
+   t = Math.imul(t ^ (t >>> 15), t | 1);
+   t ^= t + Math.imul(t ^ (t >>> 7), t | 61);
+   return (t ^ (t >>> 14)) >>> 0;
+  },
+  nextFloat(): number {
+   return this.nextUint32() / 0x1_0000_0000;
+  },
+ };
+}
+
+// Replay a known PIN for tests
+const replayed = generatePin(12, seeded(42));
+```
+
+## API Reference
+
+### `generatePin(length: number, rng?: Rng): string`
+
+- `length`: positive integer total digit count.
+- `rng`: defaults to `defaultRng()`.
+
+Throws `PwgenError(PWGEN.OPTIONS_INFEASIBLE)` when `length < 1` or `length` is non-integer.
+
+## Implementation Notes
+
+The function loops `length` times calling `randomInt(rng, 10).toString()` and concatenates the result. Building the output via `String#concat` rather than `Array.join` keeps the hot path allocation-light — for the typical 4-to-12-digit range the JIT keeps the buffer in registers without intermediate array creation.
+
+Distribution conformance is tested by drawing 100 000 digits and asserting each of the 10 buckets falls within ±10% of the expected `total / 10`. The χ² statistical test owned by `randomInt` is what guarantees uniform per-bucket distribution; the PIN-specific test exists only to catch a regression where `generatePin` introduces its own bias on top of `randomInt`.

packages/security-stack/security/password-generator/src/pin/pin.spec-conformance.test.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,21 @@
+import { describe, expect, it } from "@suaveplan/testing/runner";
+import { generatePin } from "./pin.js";
+
+describe("generatePin — distribution conformance", () => {
+    it("distributes evenly across [0,9] over 100k digits", {
+        timeout: 30000,
+    }, () => {
+        const total = 100_000;
+        const pin = generatePin(total);
+        const counts = new Int32Array(10);
+        for (const ch of pin) {
+            counts[ch.charCodeAt(0) - 48] =
+                (counts[ch.charCodeAt(0) - 48] as number) + 1;
+        }
+        const expected = total / 10;
+        for (const c of counts) {
+            expect(c).toBeGreaterThan(expected * 0.9);
+            expect(c).toBeLessThan(expected * 1.1);
+        }
+    });
+});

packages/security-stack/security/password-generator/src/pin/pin.test.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,45 @@
+import { describe, expect, it } from "@suaveplan/testing/runner";
+import type { Rng } from "@suaveplan/types";
+import { generatePin } from "./pin.js";
+
+function seededRng(seed: number): Rng {
+    let s = seed >>> 0;
+    return {
+        nextUint32(): number {
+            s = (s + 0x6d2b79f5) >>> 0;
+            let t = s;
+            t = Math.imul(t ^ (t >>> 15), t | 1);
+            t ^= t + Math.imul(t ^ (t >>> 7), t | 61);
+            return ((t ^ (t >>> 14)) >>> 0) >>> 0;
+        },
+        nextFloat(): number {
+            return this.nextUint32() / 0x1_0000_0000;
+        },
+    };
+}
+
+describe("generatePin", () => {
+    it("generates a length-6 PIN", { timeout: 5000 }, () => {
+        const pin = generatePin(6);
+        expect(pin.length).toBe(6);
+        expect(/^[0-9]{6}$/.test(pin)).toBe(true);
+    });
+
+    it("rejects zero length", { timeout: 5000 }, () => {
+        expect(() => generatePin(0)).toThrow(/PWGEN\.OPTIONS_INFEASIBLE/);
+    });
+
+    it("rejects negative length", { timeout: 5000 }, () => {
+        expect(() => generatePin(-1)).toThrow(/PWGEN\.OPTIONS_INFEASIBLE/);
+    });
+
+    it("rejects non-integer length", { timeout: 5000 }, () => {
+        expect(() => generatePin(2.5)).toThrow(/PWGEN\.OPTIONS_INFEASIBLE/);
+    });
+
+    it("is deterministic under seeded Rng", { timeout: 5000 }, () => {
+        const a = generatePin(8, seededRng(123));
+        const b = generatePin(8, seededRng(123));
+        expect(a).toBe(b);
+    });
+});

packages/security-stack/security/password-generator/src/pin/pin.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,35 @@
+import type { Rng } from "@suaveplan/types";
+import { pwgenError } from "../errors/codes.js";
+import { recordError, recordGeneration } from "../observability/metrics.js";
+import { defaultRng } from "../random/default-rng.js";
+import { randomInt } from "../random/random-int.js";
+
+const ENTROPY_BITS_PER_DIGIT = Math.log2(10);
+
+/**
+ * Generate a `length`-character PIN drawn uniformly from `[0-9]` via the
+ * bias-free `randomInt(rng, 10)`.
+ *
+ * @throws PwgenError(PWGEN.OPTIONS_INFEASIBLE) when `length < 1`.
+ */
+export function generatePin(length: number, rng?: Rng): string {
+    if (!Number.isInteger(length) || length < 1) {
+        recordError("PWGEN.OPTIONS_INFEASIBLE");
+        throw pwgenError(
+            "PWGEN.OPTIONS_INFEASIBLE",
+            `PIN length must be a positive integer; received ${length}`
+        );
+    }
+    const effectiveRng = rng ?? defaultRng();
+    const start = performance.now();
+    let out = "";
+    for (let i = 0; i < length; i++) {
+        out += randomInt(effectiveRng, 10).toString();
+    }
+    recordGeneration(
+        "pin",
+        performance.now() - start,
+        ENTROPY_BITS_PER_DIGIT * length
+    );
+    return out;
+}

packages/security-stack/security/password-generator/src/random/default-rng.md

@@ -0,0 +1,54 @@
+# `default-rng`
+
+## Purpose
+
+`defaultRng()` builds the default `Rng` backed by `@suaveplan/crypto-utils.randomBytes`, which delegates to `crypto.getRandomValues` and is therefore cryptographically strong on every supported runtime (Bun, Node ≥ 20, Deno, the browser). The function is invoked lazily by each generator when the caller does not supply their own `Rng`, which means consumers that always pass a deterministic seeded `Rng` (tests, replay logs) never reach `crypto.getRandomValues` at all and tree-shakers can drop this module.
+
+Keeping the default in a separate file (rather than inline at every generator's call site) gives a single canonical place to swap entropy sources — for example to wire a hardware RNG adapter — without touching the generators themselves.
+
+## Features
+
+- Wraps `randomBytes(4)` to produce a uint32 per `nextUint32` call.
+- Optional `nextBytes(n)` exposed for the rare consumer that wants raw entropy.
+- Optional `nextFloat()` computed from `nextUint32() / 2^32`.
+- Zero module-scope state — every call to `defaultRng()` returns a fresh `Rng`.
+
+## Usage: Basic Example
+
+```ts
+import { defaultRng } from "@suaveplan/password-generator/random";
+
+const rng = defaultRng();
+const u = rng.nextUint32(); // ∈ [0, 2^32)
+```
+
+## Usage: Advanced Example
+
+```ts
+import { randomInt, defaultRng } from "@suaveplan/password-generator/random";
+import { generatePassword } from "@suaveplan/password-generator/password";
+
+// The two snippets below are equivalent — generatePassword falls back to
+// defaultRng() when no rng is supplied.
+generatePassword({ length: 16 });
+generatePassword({ length: 16 }, defaultRng());
+
+// Explicit rng is preferable inside loops so the same instance is reused
+// across many calls without re-importing crypto each time.
+const rng = defaultRng();
+for (let i = 0; i < 100; i++) {
+ randomInt(rng, 7776);
+}
+```
+
+## API Reference
+
+### `defaultRng(): Rng`
+
+Builds a fresh `Rng` whose `nextUint32` reads four bytes from `@suaveplan/crypto-utils.randomBytes` and assembles them into a big-endian uint32. The returned object also implements the optional `nextFloat` (uint32 normalised into `[0, 1)`) and `nextBytes` (direct passthrough to `randomBytes(n)`) members of the `Rng` contract.
+
+## Implementation Notes
+
+The bit layout for `nextUint32` is `(b0 << 24) | (b1 << 16) | (b2 << 8) | b3`, with the final `>>> 0` to coerce JavaScript's 32-bit signed arithmetic back into an unsigned integer. The same big-endian ordering is consistent across runtimes — `crypto.getRandomValues` makes no endianness promises, but since every byte is independent and uniform the assembly order does not affect the distribution.
+
+`nextFloat` is intentionally implemented as `nextUint32() / 2^32` rather than `Math.random()` so the package contains _zero_ references to `Math.random` (rule 8 of the source-tree hygiene gate). The float resolution is 32-bit; consumers that need 53-bit precision should derive it from two `nextUint32` draws themselves.

packages/security-stack/security/password-generator/src/random/default-rng.test.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,30 @@
+import { describe, expect, it } from "@suaveplan/testing/runner";
+import { defaultRng } from "./default-rng.js";
+
+describe("defaultRng", () => {
+    it("nextUint32 returns an integer in [0, 2^32)", { timeout: 5000 }, () => {
+        const rng = defaultRng();
+        for (let i = 0; i < 100; i++) {
+            const v = rng.nextUint32();
+            expect(Number.isInteger(v)).toBe(true);
+            expect(v).toBeGreaterThanOrEqual(0);
+            expect(v).toBeLessThan(0x1_0000_0000);
+        }
+    });
+
+    it("nextFloat returns values in [0, 1)", { timeout: 5000 }, () => {
+        const rng = defaultRng();
+        for (let i = 0; i < 100; i++) {
+            const v = rng.nextFloat();
+            expect(v).toBeGreaterThanOrEqual(0);
+            expect(v).toBeLessThan(1);
+        }
+    });
+
+    it("nextBytes returns an n-byte buffer", { timeout: 5000 }, () => {
+        const rng = defaultRng();
+        const bytes = rng.nextBytes?.(16);
+        expect(bytes).toBeInstanceOf(Uint8Array);
+        expect(bytes?.length).toBe(16);
+    });
+});

packages/security-stack/security/password-generator/src/random/default-rng.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,29 @@
+import { randomBytes } from "@suaveplan/crypto-utils";
+import type { Rng } from "@suaveplan/types";
+
+/**
+ * Build the default `Rng` backed by `@suaveplan/crypto-utils.randomBytes`
+ * (which delegates to `crypto.getRandomValues`). Constructed lazily so
+ * importers that pass their own `Rng` never reach `crypto` at all and
+ * tree-shakers can drop this module.
+ */
+export function defaultRng(): Rng {
+    return {
+        nextUint32(): number {
+            const bytes = randomBytes(4);
+            return (
+                (((bytes[0] as number) << 24) |
+                    ((bytes[1] as number) << 16) |
+                    ((bytes[2] as number) << 8) |
+                    (bytes[3] as number)) >>>
+                0
+            );
+        },
+        nextFloat(): number {
+            return this.nextUint32() / 0x1_0000_0000;
+        },
+        nextBytes(n: number): Uint8Array {
+            return randomBytes(n);
+        },
+    };
+}

packages/security-stack/security/password-generator/src/random/fisher-yates.md

@@ -0,0 +1,64 @@
+# `fisher-yates`
+
+## Purpose
+
+`shuffleInPlace(array, rng)` performs an in-place Fisher–Yates / Knuth shuffle parameterised over the bias-free `randomInt` primitive. The shuffle is the load-bearing step that prevents required-class characters from being biased to the head of `generatePassword`'s output buffer — without it, the first N characters of every generated password would always be the required-class quotas in declaration order, leaking information about the generator's option set to anyone who inspects the produced string.
+
+The standard Knuth analysis guarantees that every permutation of `array` appears with equal probability, _provided_ the underlying integer draws are uniform. Pairing the algorithm with the bias-free `randomInt` rather than `Math.floor(Math.random() * n)` is what makes that guarantee hold for arbitrary `array.length`.
+
+## Features
+
+- Cryptographically-unbiased permutations via Lemire-style rejection sampling.
+- In-place mutation; returns the same array reference for fluent chaining.
+- No-op for arrays of length 0 or 1.
+- Pure given `rng`; deterministic under a seeded `Rng`.
+
+## Usage: Basic Example
+
+```ts
+import { defaultRng, shuffleInPlace } from "@suaveplan/password-generator/random";
+
+const arr = [1, 2, 3, 4, 5];
+shuffleInPlace(arr, defaultRng());
+```
+
+## Usage: Advanced Example
+
+```ts
+import type { Rng } from "@suaveplan/types";
+import { shuffleInPlace } from "@suaveplan/password-generator/random";
+
+function seededRng(seed: number): Rng {
+ let s = seed >>> 0;
+ return {
+  nextUint32(): number {
+   s = (s + 0x6d2b79f5) >>> 0;
+   let t = s;
+   t = Math.imul(t ^ (t >>> 15), t | 1);
+   t ^= t + Math.imul(t ^ (t >>> 7), t | 61);
+   return (t ^ (t >>> 14)) >>> 0;
+  },
+  nextFloat(): number {
+   return this.nextUint32() / 0x1_0000_0000;
+  },
+ };
+}
+
+// Reproducible card-deck shuffle for replay logs
+const deck = [...Array(52).keys()];
+shuffleInPlace(deck, seededRng(123));
+```
+
+## API Reference
+
+### `shuffleInPlace<T>(array: T[], rng: Rng): T[]`
+
+- `array`: mutated in-place. The reference is returned so consumers can chain.
+- `rng`: any `Rng`; only `nextUint32` is used (via `randomInt`).
+- Returns: the same `array` reference.
+
+## Implementation Notes
+
+The implementation walks `i` from `array.length - 1` down to `1`. At each step it draws `j = randomInt(rng, i + 1)` and swaps positions `i` and `j`. Bias-free uniform draws are critical: a biased `randomInt` would skew certain permutations and the standard distributional argument would fail.
+
+The shuffle complexity is `O(array.length)` with one `randomInt` call per element except the last. Memory complexity is `O(1)` beyond the input array. Returning the same array reference lets callers compose `shuffleInPlace(...).map(...)` without an explicit local variable; consumers who need an immutable shuffle should clone the input first.

packages/security-stack/security/password-generator/src/random/fisher-yates.test.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,55 @@
+import { describe, expect, it } from "@suaveplan/testing/runner";
+import type { Rng } from "@suaveplan/types";
+import { defaultRng } from "./default-rng.js";
+import { shuffleInPlace } from "./fisher-yates.js";
+
+function seededRng(seed: number): Rng {
+    // Mulberry32 — well-distributed for 32-bit seeds.
+    let s = seed >>> 0;
+    return {
+        nextUint32(): number {
+            s = (s + 0x6d2b79f5) >>> 0;
+            let t = s;
+            t = Math.imul(t ^ (t >>> 15), t | 1);
+            t ^= t + Math.imul(t ^ (t >>> 7), t | 61);
+            return ((t ^ (t >>> 14)) >>> 0) >>> 0;
+        },
+        nextFloat(): number {
+            return this.nextUint32() / 0x1_0000_0000;
+        },
+    };
+}
+
+describe("shuffleInPlace", () => {
+    it("preserves length", { timeout: 5000 }, () => {
+        const arr = [1, 2, 3, 4, 5];
+        shuffleInPlace(arr, defaultRng());
+        expect(arr.length).toBe(5);
+    });
+
+    it("preserves multiset of elements", { timeout: 5000 }, () => {
+        const arr = [1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10];
+        const original = [...arr];
+        shuffleInPlace(arr, defaultRng());
+        expect([...arr].sort((a, b) => a - b)).toEqual(original);
+    });
+
+    it("is deterministic under seeded Rng", { timeout: 5000 }, () => {
+        const a = [1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10];
+        const b = [1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10];
+        shuffleInPlace(a, seededRng(42));
+        shuffleInPlace(b, seededRng(42));
+        expect(a).toEqual(b);
+    });
+
+    it("is no-op for arrays of length 0 or 1", { timeout: 5000 }, () => {
+        expect(shuffleInPlace([], defaultRng())).toEqual([]);
+        expect(shuffleInPlace(["x"], defaultRng())).toEqual(["x"]);
+    });
+
+    it("returns the same array reference", { timeout: 5000 }, () => {
+        const arr = [1, 2, 3];
+        const result = shuffleInPlace(arr, defaultRng());
+        expect(result).toBe(arr);
+    });
+});

packages/security-stack/security/password-generator/src/random/fisher-yates.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,24 @@
+import type { Rng } from "@suaveplan/types";
+import { randomInt } from "./random-int.js";
+
+/**
+ * Fisher–Yates in-place shuffle. Uses the bias-free
+ * {@link randomInt} so the resulting permutation distribution is
+ * uniform regardless of `array.length`.
+ *
+ * The shuffle iterates from the end of the array down to index 1; at each
+ * step it swaps the current element with a uniformly-chosen element from
+ * the prefix `[0, i]`. This guarantees every permutation appears with
+ * equal probability (the standard Knuth analysis).
+ *
+ * Returns the same array reference for fluent chaining.
+ */
+export function shuffleInPlace<T>(array: T[], rng: Rng): T[] {
+    for (let i = array.length - 1; i > 0; i--) {
+        const j = randomInt(rng, i + 1);
+        const tmp = array[i] as T;
+        array[i] = array[j] as T;
+        array[j] = tmp;
+    }
+    return array;
+}

packages/security-stack/security/password-generator/src/random/index.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+export { defaultRng } from "./default-rng.js";
+export { shuffleInPlace } from "./fisher-yates.js";
+export { randomInt } from "./random-int.js";

packages/security-stack/security/password-generator/src/random/random-int.md

@@ -0,0 +1,68 @@
+# `random-int`
+
+## Purpose
+
+`randomInt(rng, max)` returns a uniformly-distributed integer in the half-open interval `[0, max)` for any `max ∈ [1, 2^32)` by drawing uint32 values from the supplied `Rng` and rejecting draws above the threshold `2^32 - (2^32 mod max)`. This is the load-bearing primitive every generator in the package relies on for unbiased sampling — replacing it with the naïve `Math.floor(rng() * max)` shortcut would silently bias output for non-power-of-two `max`, the very common case for 7776-entry word lists and 10-entry digit picks.
+
+The implementation follows Daniel Lemire's 2018 _Fast Random Integer Generation in an Interval_ (https://arxiv.org/abs/1805.10941) §3 ("Nearly Divisionless"). Expected per-call draws are below 2 in the worst case; for the EFF Long list (`max = 7776`) the rejection probability is < 0.0000019 per draw, so the bounded retry budget (1024 attempts) acts purely as a guard against a pathologically broken `Rng`.
+
+## Features
+
+- Strictly uniform output across `[0, max)`.
+- Rejection-sampling loop with a 1024-attempt safety bound.
+- Throws `PWGEN.RNG_FAILED` for invalid `max` or pathological RNGs.
+- Pure function; no I/O, no module-scope state.
+
+## Usage: Basic Example
+
+```ts
+import { defaultRng } from "@suaveplan/password-generator/random";
+import { randomInt } from "@suaveplan/password-generator/random";
+
+const rng = defaultRng();
+const v = randomInt(rng, 7776); // ∈ [0, 7776)
+```
+
+## Usage: Advanced Example
+
+```ts
+import type { Rng } from "@suaveplan/types";
+import { randomInt } from "@suaveplan/password-generator/random";
+
+function seededRng(seed: number): Rng {
+ let s = seed >>> 0;
+ return {
+  nextUint32(): number {
+   s = (s + 0x6d2b79f5) >>> 0;
+   let t = s;
+   t = Math.imul(t ^ (t >>> 15), t | 1);
+   t ^= t + Math.imul(t ^ (t >>> 7), t | 61);
+   return (t ^ (t >>> 14)) >>> 0;
+  },
+  nextFloat(): number {
+   return this.nextUint32() / 0x1_0000_0000;
+  },
+ };
+}
+
+// Deterministic replay for tests
+const rng = seededRng(42);
+const a = randomInt(rng, 256);
+const b = randomInt(rng, 256);
+```
+
+## API Reference
+
+### `randomInt(rng: Rng, max: number): number`
+
+Returns a uniform integer in `[0, max)`.
+
+- `rng`: any `Rng` from `@suaveplan/types`. Only `nextUint32` is used.
+- `max`: must satisfy `Number.isInteger(max) && 1 <= max < 2^32`.
+- Throws `PwgenError(PWGEN.RNG_FAILED)` when `max` is out of range or when the rejection loop exhausts its 1024-attempt budget.
+
+## Implementation Notes
+
+The threshold `T = 2^32 - (2^32 mod max)` is the largest multiple of `max` below `2^32`. Any uint32 in `[0, T)` is uniformly distributed across the `T / max` complete copies of `[0, max)` it covers; values in `[T, 2^32)` are rejected and the next draw is taken. This makes the output strictly uniform at the cost of an expected `< 2` calls to `rng.nextUint32` for typical `max`.
+
+The retry budget guards against an `Rng` that always returns values above the threshold — without the bound, a broken RNG would loop forever. 1024 attempts is far beyond any non-pathological RNG: even with `max = 7776` the probability of 1024 consecutive rejections is below `(7776 / 2^32)^1024`, indistinguishable from zero. Reaching the bound therefore proves the supplied `Rng` is broken and the function throws `PWGEN.RNG_FAILED` instead of hanging.

packages/security-stack/security/password-generator/src/random/random-int.spec-conformance.test.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,64 @@
+import { describe, expect, it } from "@suaveplan/testing/runner";
+import { defaultRng } from "./default-rng.js";
+import { randomInt } from "./random-int.js";
+
+/**
+ * Wilson-Hilferty transform: a chi-squared distribution with `df` degrees
+ * of freedom can be approximated as a Normal((1 - 2/(9 df)), √(2/(9 df))³)
+ * after the cube-root transform `(X/df)^(1/3)`. We then convert to
+ * a standard normal Z-score and return the two-sided p-value from a
+ * Hastings (1955) rational approximation. Avoids pulling a stats lib.
+ */
+function chiSquaredPValue(chi2: number, df: number): number {
+    const cubeRoot = Math.cbrt(chi2 / df);
+    const mean = 1 - 2 / (9 * df);
+    const sd = Math.sqrt(2 / (9 * df));
+    const z = (cubeRoot - mean) / sd;
+    // One-sided survival of standard normal — chi-squared p-value is the
+    // upper-tail probability, so a small `chi2` gives a large p.
+    return survivalNormal(z);
+}
+
+function survivalNormal(z: number): number {
+    // Abramowitz & Stegun 26.2.17 — accurate to ~7.5e-8.
+    const cdf = (x: number): number => {
+        const sign = x < 0 ? -1 : 1;
+        const ax = Math.abs(x) / Math.SQRT2;
+        const t = 1 / (1 + 0.3275911 * ax);
+        const a1 = 0.254829592;
+        const a2 = -0.284496736;
+        const a3 = 1.421413741;
+        const a4 = -1.453152027;
+        const a5 = 1.061405429;
+        const erf =
+            1 -
+            ((((a5 * t + a4) * t + a3) * t + a2) * t + a1) *
+                t *
+                Math.exp(-ax * ax);
+        return 0.5 * (1 + sign * erf);
+    };
+    return 1 - cdf(z);
+}
+
+describe("randomInt — statistical conformance", () => {
+    it("1M-sample chi-squared p > 0.01 over n=7776 buckets", {
+        timeout: 30000,
+    }, () => {
+        const n = 7776;
+        const samples = 1_000_000;
+        const counts = new Int32Array(n);
+        const rng = defaultRng();
+        for (let i = 0; i < samples; i++) {
+            const v = randomInt(rng, n);
+            counts[v] = (counts[v] as number) + 1;
+        }
+        const expected = samples / n;
+        let chi2 = 0;
+        for (let i = 0; i < n; i++) {
+            const diff = (counts[i] as number) - expected;
+            chi2 += (diff * diff) / expected;
+        }
+        const p = chiSquaredPValue(chi2, n - 1);
+        expect(p).toBeGreaterThan(0.01);
+    });
+});

packages/security-stack/security/password-generator/src/random/random-int.test.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,69 @@
+import { describe, expect, it } from "@suaveplan/testing/runner";
+import type { Rng } from "@suaveplan/types";
+import { defaultRng } from "./default-rng.js";
+import { randomInt } from "./random-int.js";
+
+function fixedRng(values: number[]): Rng {
+    let i = 0;
+    return {
+        nextUint32(): number {
+            const v = values[i++] ?? values[values.length - 1] ?? 0;
+            return v >>> 0;
+        },
+        nextFloat(): number {
+            return this.nextUint32() / 0x1_0000_0000;
+        },
+    };
+}
+
+describe("randomInt", () => {
+    it("returns value in [0, max)", { timeout: 5000 }, () => {
+        const rng = defaultRng();
+        for (let i = 0; i < 10_000; i++) {
+            const v = randomInt(rng, 7776);
+            expect(v).toBeGreaterThanOrEqual(0);
+            expect(v).toBeLessThan(7776);
+            expect(Number.isInteger(v)).toBe(true);
+        }
+    });
+
+    it("triggers rejection branch above threshold", { timeout: 5000 }, () => {
+        const max = 7776;
+        const threshold = 0x1_0000_0000 - (0x1_0000_0000 % max);
+        let calls = 0;
+        const rng: Rng = {
+            nextUint32(): number {
+                calls++;
+                return calls === 1 ? threshold + 5 : 42;
+            },
+            nextFloat(): number {
+                return this.nextUint32() / 0x1_0000_0000;
+            },
+        };
+        const v = randomInt(rng, max);
+        expect(calls).toBe(2);
+        expect(v).toBe(42 % max);
+    });
+
+    it("throws PWGEN.RNG_FAILED on pathological RNG", { timeout: 5000 }, () => {
+        const max = 7776;
+        const threshold = 0x1_0000_0000 - (0x1_0000_0000 % max);
+        const rng = fixedRng([threshold + 1]);
+        expect(() => randomInt(rng, max)).toThrow(/PWGEN\.RNG_FAILED/);
+    });
+
+    it("throws PWGEN.RNG_FAILED for invalid max", { timeout: 5000 }, () => {
+        const rng = defaultRng();
+        expect(() => randomInt(rng, 0)).toThrow(/PWGEN\.RNG_FAILED/);
+        expect(() => randomInt(rng, -1)).toThrow(/PWGEN\.RNG_FAILED/);
+        expect(() => randomInt(rng, 1.5)).toThrow(/PWGEN\.RNG_FAILED/);
+        expect(() => randomInt(rng, 0x1_0000_0000)).toThrow(
+            /PWGEN\.RNG_FAILED/
+        );
+    });
+
+    it("reduces uint32 modulo max for in-range draw", { timeout: 5000 }, () => {
+        const rng = fixedRng([100]);
+        expect(randomInt(rng, 50)).toBe(0);
+    });
+});

packages/security-stack/security/password-generator/src/random/random-int.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,50 @@
+import type { Rng } from "@suaveplan/types";
+import { pwgenError } from "../errors/codes.js";
+
+/**
+ * Bounded retry budget for the rejection loop. A correctly-implemented
+ * `Rng.nextUint32` produces a uniformly-distributed uint32 every call; the
+ * worst-case rejection probability is `(2^32 mod max) / 2^32 < max/2^32`,
+ * which is < 0.0000019 for `max = 7776`. 1024 attempts give a worst-case
+ * success probability of `1 - (max/2^32)^1024`, indistinguishable from 1.
+ * Hitting this cap therefore proves the supplied `Rng` is broken.
+ */
+const REJECTION_RETRY_BUDGET = 1024;
+
+/** Exclusive upper bound of the uint32 space. */
+const TWO_POW_32 = 0x1_0000_0000;
+
+/**
+ * Return a uniformly-distributed integer in the half-open interval
+ * `[0, max)` using Lemire-style rejection sampling.
+ *
+ * Reference: Daniel Lemire, _Fast Random Integer Generation in an
+ * Interval_, ACM Trans. Model. Comput. Simul. 2019,
+ * https://arxiv.org/abs/1805.10941 §3 ("Nearly Divisionless").
+ *
+ * The naïve `Math.floor(rng() * max)` is biased for non-power-of-two
+ * `max`. This implementation draws a uint32 and rejects values above the
+ * threshold `2^32 - (2^32 mod max)`, re-drawing on rejection. The bias
+ * disappears at the cost of an expected `< 2` draws per call.
+ *
+ * @throws PwgenError(PWGEN.RNG_FAILED) if `rng.nextUint32` returns
+ *   non-uint32 values for {@link REJECTION_RETRY_BUDGET} consecutive
+ *   attempts.
+ */
+export function randomInt(rng: Rng, max: number): number {
+    if (!Number.isInteger(max) || max < 1 || max >= TWO_POW_32) {
+        throw pwgenError(
+            "PWGEN.RNG_FAILED",
+            `randomInt requires max in [1, 2^32); received ${max}`
+        );
+    }
+    const threshold = TWO_POW_32 - (TWO_POW_32 % max);
+    for (let attempt = 0; attempt < REJECTION_RETRY_BUDGET; attempt++) {
+        const draw = rng.nextUint32() >>> 0;
+        if (draw < threshold) return draw % max;
+    }
+    throw pwgenError(
+        "PWGEN.RNG_FAILED",
+        `Rng failed to produce an in-range uint32 after ${REJECTION_RETRY_BUDGET} attempts`
+    );
+}

packages/security-stack/security/password-generator/src/schemas/index.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,5 @@
+export {
+    EntropyOptionsSchema,
+    GeneratePassphraseOptionsSchema,
+    GeneratePasswordOptionsSchema,
+} from "./schemas.js";

packages/security-stack/security/password-generator/src/schemas/schemas.md

@@ -0,0 +1,60 @@
+# `schemas`
+
+<!-- begin:auto-docs -->
+_(no submodules)_
+<!-- end:auto-docs -->
+## Purpose
+
+Owns the Zod boundary schemas that every public generator function uses to validate its `opts` argument. Schema mismatch throws `PwgenError(PWGEN.INVALID_OPTIONS)` with the original `ZodError` attached as `cause`, so callers can introspect the failing field path while keeping the typed error code stable for logging.
+
+Strict-mode schemas reject unknown fields rather than silently dropping them — typos like `requrieDigits` (with a transposed `i`) surface immediately instead of being ignored at runtime. Three schemas are exported: `GeneratePasswordOptionsSchema`, `GeneratePassphraseOptionsSchema`, and `EntropyOptionsSchema`.
+
+## Features
+
+- Strict-object schemas reject unknown fields.
+- Positive-integer guards on `length`-shaped fields.
+- Discriminated `wordlist` accepts `"long"`, `"short"`, an inline `string[]`, or any registry name.
+- All three schemas are invoked from at least one production call site (the conformance script verifies this).
+
+## Usage: Basic Example
+
+```ts
+import { GeneratePasswordOptionsSchema } from "@suaveplan/password-generator/schemas";
+
+const result = GeneratePasswordOptionsSchema.safeParse({ length: 16 });
+if (!result.success) throw result.error;
+```
+
+## Usage: Advanced Example
+
+```ts
+import {
+ EntropyOptionsSchema,
+ GeneratePassphraseOptionsSchema,
+} from "@suaveplan/password-generator/schemas";
+
+// Pre-validate user-supplied JSON before forwarding to the generator
+function fromJson(raw: unknown) {
+ const parsed = GeneratePassphraseOptionsSchema.parse(raw);
+ return parsed;
+}
+
+// Compose with downstream schemas
+import z from "zod";
+const apiBody = z.object({
+ mode: z.literal("passphrase"),
+ opts: GeneratePassphraseOptionsSchema,
+});
+```
+
+## API Reference
+
+- `GeneratePasswordOptionsSchema` — strict object mirroring `GeneratePasswordOptions`.
+- `GeneratePassphraseOptionsSchema` — strict object mirroring `GeneratePassphraseOptions`. `length` is optional in the schema (the generator applies the default `6`).
+- `EntropyOptionsSchema` — strict object mirroring `EntropyOptions`.
+
+## Implementation Notes
+
+The schemas live in a single feature module to keep the conformance script's `src/schemas/` discovery simple — the script walks that directory and verifies every exported `*Schema` is invoked via `.parse(` or `.safeParse(` somewhere outside the directory. This pattern also matches the layout the `cbor`, `validation`, and `vault` packages already use, so reviewers don't need to context-switch.
+
+Strict-object semantics are non-negotiable for boundary surfaces — Zod's default `passthrough` would let typos silently pass through to the generator and corrupt observability (a `requireDigit` typo with a missing `s` would not enable required-digit quotas but `recordError` would never fire). The trade-off — slightly more verbose error messages when adding new options forces a schema update in the same commit — is the entire point of the gate.

packages/security-stack/security/password-generator/src/schemas/schemas.test.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,67 @@
+import { describe, expect, it } from "@suaveplan/testing/runner";
+import { estimateEntropy } from "../entropy/entropy.js";
+import { generatePassphrase } from "../passphrase/passphrase.js";
+import { generatePassword } from "../password/password.js";
+import {
+    EntropyOptionsSchema,
+    GeneratePassphraseOptionsSchema,
+    GeneratePasswordOptionsSchema,
+} from "./schemas.js";
+
+describe("Zod boundary schemas", () => {
+    it("GeneratePasswordOptionsSchema rejects negative length", {
+        timeout: 5000,
+    }, () => {
+        expect(() => generatePassword({ length: -1 })).toThrow(
+            /PWGEN\.INVALID_OPTIONS/
+        );
+    });
+
+    it("GeneratePasswordOptionsSchema accepts the documented option shape", {
+        timeout: 5000,
+    }, () => {
+        const r = GeneratePasswordOptionsSchema.safeParse({
+            length: 16,
+            lowercase: true,
+            uppercase: false,
+            digits: true,
+            symbols: false,
+            requireDigits: true,
+            exclude: "abc",
+        });
+        expect(r.success).toBe(true);
+    });
+
+    it("GeneratePassphraseOptionsSchema rejects zero length", {
+        timeout: 5000,
+    }, () => {
+        expect(() => generatePassphrase({ length: 0 })).toThrow(
+            /PWGEN\.INVALID_OPTIONS/
+        );
+    });
+
+    it("GeneratePassphraseOptionsSchema rejects unknown fields", {
+        timeout: 5000,
+    }, () => {
+        const r = GeneratePassphraseOptionsSchema.safeParse({
+            length: 4,
+            bogus: true,
+        });
+        expect(r.success).toBe(false);
+    });
+
+    it("EntropyOptionsSchema rejects malformed extraClasses", {
+        timeout: 5000,
+    }, () => {
+        expect(() =>
+            estimateEntropy("abc", { extraClasses: 42 as never })
+        ).toThrow(/PWGEN\.INVALID_OPTIONS/);
+    });
+
+    it("EntropyOptionsSchema accepts a string[] extraClasses", {
+        timeout: 5000,
+    }, () => {
+        const r = EntropyOptionsSchema.safeParse({ extraClasses: ["xyz"] });
+        expect(r.success).toBe(true);
+    });
+});

packages/security-stack/security/password-generator/src/schemas/schemas.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,62 @@
+import z from "zod";
+
+/** Reusable count schema — `length` arguments must be positive integers. */
+const PositiveLength = z.number().int().positive();
+
+/**
+ * Zod schema mirroring `GeneratePasswordOptions`. The shape stays strict so
+ * unknown fields propagate as `PWGEN.INVALID_OPTIONS` and callers see typos
+ * at the boundary instead of silently-ignored options.
+ */
+export const GeneratePasswordOptionsSchema = z
+    .object({
+        length: PositiveLength,
+        lowercase: z.boolean().optional(),
+        uppercase: z.boolean().optional(),
+        digits: z.boolean().optional(),
+        symbols: z.boolean().optional(),
+        requireLowercase: z.boolean().optional(),
+        requireUppercase: z.boolean().optional(),
+        requireDigits: z.boolean().optional(),
+        requireSymbols: z.boolean().optional(),
+        exclude: z
+            .union([
+                z.string(),
+                z.array(z.string()),
+                z.instanceof(Set as unknown as { new (): Set<string> }),
+            ])
+            .optional(),
+        mode: z.enum(["random", "pronounceable"]).optional(),
+    })
+    .strict();
+
+const CapitalizationMode = z.enum(["none", "firstChar", "randomWord"]);
+const WordlistRef = z.union([
+    z.literal("long"),
+    z.literal("short"),
+    z.string().min(1),
+    z.array(z.string()),
+]);
+
+/**
+ * Zod schema mirroring `GeneratePassphraseOptions`. `length` defaults to 6
+ * in the call site, not in the schema, so the schema rejects `0` rather
+ * than silently coercing it into the default.
+ */
+export const GeneratePassphraseOptionsSchema = z
+    .object({
+        length: PositiveLength.optional(),
+        wordlist: WordlistRef.optional(),
+        separator: z.string().optional(),
+        capitalize: CapitalizationMode.optional(),
+        addDigits: z.number().int().nonnegative().optional(),
+        addSymbols: z.number().int().nonnegative().optional(),
+    })
+    .strict();
+
+/** Zod schema for `EntropyOptions`. */
+export const EntropyOptionsSchema = z
+    .object({
+        extraClasses: z.array(z.string().min(1)).optional(),
+    })
+    .strict();

packages/security-stack/security/password-generator/src/wordlists/eff-long.md

@@ -0,0 +1,48 @@
+# `eff-long` — EFF Long Wordlist
+
+## Purpose
+
+Bundles the EFF Long Wordlist as a frozen `readonly string[]` so callers who only want passphrase generation pull this 85 KB asset and nothing else. The list contains exactly 7776 entries (5-dice / 6⁵), giving ≈ 12.92 bits of entropy per word and 77.55 bits for a 6-word passphrase. Source: https://www.eff.org/files/2016/07/18/eff_large_wordlist.txt (Electronic Frontier Foundation, released under CC BY 3.0 US).
+
+The wordlist is exposed via two surfaces: the registry name `"eff-long"` (via `getWordlist`) and the dedicated subpath import `@suaveplan/password-generator/wordlists/eff-long`. The subpath import lets a tree-shaker drop the array entirely from a bundle that only generates char-class passwords or PINs.
+
+## Features
+
+- Exactly 7776 ASCII entries.
+- Deduplicated and prefix-disambiguated within the first three characters (per EFF's selection criteria).
+- Each word is 3–9 characters and contains only `[a-z-]`.
+- Frozen array — safe to share across modules.
+
+## Usage: Basic Example
+
+```ts
+import { EFF_LONG_WORDLIST } from "@suaveplan/password-generator/wordlists/eff-long";
+
+console.log(EFF_LONG_WORDLIST[0]); // "abacus"
+```
+
+## Usage: Advanced Example
+
+```ts
+import { generatePassphrase } from "@suaveplan/password-generator";
+import { EFF_LONG_WORDLIST } from "@suaveplan/password-generator/wordlists/eff-long";
+
+// Verify a passphrase came from the EFF Long list
+const pp = generatePassphrase({});
+const longSet = new Set(EFF_LONG_WORDLIST);
+for (const w of pp.split("-")) {
+ if (!longSet.has(w) && !w.includes("-")) throw new Error("not from EFF Long");
+}
+```
+
+## API Reference
+
+### `EFF_LONG_WORDLIST: readonly string[]`
+
+Frozen array of 7776 lowercase ASCII strings. Mutation attempts throw at runtime in strict mode.
+
+## Implementation Notes
+
+The wordlist is embedded verbatim from the EFF source file. Re-generating it (for example to localise to a non-English language) requires verifying the prefix-disambiguation property: every pair of entries differs within the first three characters, which makes typed passphrases auto-completable without ambiguity in EFF's documented dice-rolling protocol. The package does not re-verify this property at runtime because the array is constant — it's the responsibility of any caller who re-bundles a translated list to maintain the property.
+
+Bundle cost: roughly 85 KB minified UTF-8 (the array literal expansion). The `sideEffects: false` flag on the package plus the `preserveModules: true` Vite output ensure that an import of `@suaveplan/password-generator/password` does not transitively pull in this module — verified by the rollup tree-shaker against the build output.

packages/security-stack/security/password-generator/src/wordlists/eff-long.test.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,26 @@
+import { describe, expect, it } from "@suaveplan/testing/runner";
+import { EFF_LONG_WORDLIST } from "./eff-long.js";
+
+describe("EFF_LONG_WORDLIST", () => {
+    it("contains exactly 7776 entries", { timeout: 5000 }, () => {
+        expect(EFF_LONG_WORDLIST.length).toBe(7776);
+    });
+
+    it("contains no duplicates", { timeout: 5000 }, () => {
+        expect(new Set(EFF_LONG_WORDLIST).size).toBe(EFF_LONG_WORDLIST.length);
+    });
+
+    it("contains only ASCII letters", { timeout: 30000 }, () => {
+        for (const word of EFF_LONG_WORDLIST) {
+            expect(/^[a-z-]+$/.test(word)).toBe(true);
+            // ASCII-only — no characters above 0x7f
+            for (let i = 0; i < word.length; i++) {
+                expect(word.charCodeAt(i)).toBeLessThan(128);
+            }
+        }
+    });
+
+    it("starts with 'abacus' (sentinel)", { timeout: 5000 }, () => {
+        expect(EFF_LONG_WORDLIST[0]).toBe("abacus");
+    });
+});

packages/security-stack/security/password-generator/src/wordlists/eff-short.md

@@ -0,0 +1,43 @@
+# `eff-short` — EFF Short Wordlist 1
+
+## Purpose
+
+Bundles EFF's Short Wordlist #1 — 1296 entries (4-dice / 6⁴), ≈ 10.34 bits/word, every entry ≤ 5 ASCII characters. Source: https://www.eff.org/files/2016/09/08/eff_short_wordlist_1.txt (Electronic Frontier Foundation, released under CC BY 3.0 US). The short list is optimised for memorability and typing speed at the cost of fewer bits per word; an 8-word short-list passphrase (~82.7 bits) is comparable in entropy to a 6.4-word long-list passphrase but markedly faster to type.
+
+Exposed via the registry name `"eff-short"` and the dedicated subpath `@suaveplan/password-generator/wordlists/eff-short` so a consumer who only wants the short list does not pull the ~85 KB long list.
+
+## Features
+
+- Exactly 1296 ASCII entries.
+- Every entry is ≤ 5 characters; words are easy to spell.
+- Deduplicated; only `[a-z-]` characters.
+- Frozen array.
+
+## Usage: Basic Example
+
+```ts
+import { EFF_SHORT_WORDLIST } from "@suaveplan/password-generator/wordlists/eff-short";
+
+console.log(EFF_SHORT_WORDLIST.length); // 1296
+```
+
+## Usage: Advanced Example
+
+```ts
+import { generatePassphrase } from "@suaveplan/password-generator";
+
+// 8 short words for ≈ 82.7 bits — comparable to a 6-word EFF Long passphrase
+const pp = generatePassphrase({ wordlist: "short", length: 8 });
+```
+
+## API Reference
+
+### `EFF_SHORT_WORDLIST: readonly string[]`
+
+Frozen array of 1296 lowercase ASCII strings.
+
+## Implementation Notes
+
+The short list was constructed by EFF specifically for "shorter words that are easier to type". Per-word entropy is `log2(1296) ≈ 10.34` bits versus `log2(7776) ≈ 12.92` for the long list — to match a 6-word long-list passphrase's 77.55 bits, callers need 7.5 (round up to 8) short-list words. The trade-off favours short-list passphrases when the user must type the phrase on a constrained surface like a mobile virtual keyboard, where the per-word typing-time penalty dominates the per-word entropy gain.
+
+EFF also publishes a Short Wordlist 2 with autocompleting prefixes; this package intentionally bundles only Wordlist 1 to keep the runtime surface minimal. Wordlist 2 is available as a caller-registered list via `registerWordlist`; future versions of this package may add a dedicated subpath if there is demand.

packages/security-stack/security/password-generator/src/wordlists/eff-short.test.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,27 @@
+import { describe, expect, it } from "@suaveplan/testing/runner";
+import { EFF_SHORT_WORDLIST } from "./eff-short.js";
+
+describe("EFF_SHORT_WORDLIST", () => {
+    it("contains exactly 1296 entries", { timeout: 5000 }, () => {
+        expect(EFF_SHORT_WORDLIST.length).toBe(1296);
+    });
+
+    it("contains no duplicates", { timeout: 5000 }, () => {
+        expect(new Set(EFF_SHORT_WORDLIST).size).toBe(
+            EFF_SHORT_WORDLIST.length
+        );
+    });
+
+    it("contains only ASCII letters", { timeout: 5000 }, () => {
+        for (const word of EFF_SHORT_WORDLIST) {
+            expect(/^[a-z-]+$/.test(word)).toBe(true);
+            for (let i = 0; i < word.length; i++) {
+                expect(word.charCodeAt(i)).toBeLessThan(128);
+            }
+        }
+    });
+
+    it("starts with 'acid' (sentinel)", { timeout: 5000 }, () => {
+        expect(EFF_SHORT_WORDLIST[0]).toBe("acid");
+    });
+});

packages/security-stack/security/password-generator/src/wordlists/index.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,8 @@
+export { EFF_LONG_WORDLIST } from "./eff-long.js";
+export { EFF_SHORT_WORDLIST } from "./eff-short.js";
+export {
+    getWordlist,
+    listWordlists,
+    MIN_WORDLIST_SIZE,
+    registerWordlist,
+} from "./registry.js";

packages/security-stack/security/password-generator/src/wordlists/registry.md

@@ -0,0 +1,66 @@
+# `wordlists/registry`
+
+## Purpose
+
+The wordlist registry exposes a small plugin API — `registerWordlist`, `getWordlist`, `listWordlists` — that lets callers add localised or themed wordlists to the same name-space the bundled EFF lists use. `generatePassphrase` resolves `opts.wordlist` through this registry, so any caller-registered list gets the same treatment as the built-in lists with zero changes to the passphrase generator. The registry enforces a 256-entry minimum (8 bits per word) so a 16-word passphrase built from any registered list crosses the 128-bit symmetric-key floor.
+
+The registry is pre-populated with `"eff-long"` and `"eff-short"`. Calling `registerWordlist("eff-long", customList)` overwrites the bundled list — useful for caller-supplied localised variants of the EFF lists.
+
+## Features
+
+- Pre-populated with `"eff-long"` and `"eff-short"`.
+- 256-entry minimum enforced at registration.
+- Unknown names throw a typed `PWGEN.WORDLIST_NOT_REGISTERED` error.
+- Re-registration overwrites the previous entry (deliberate, for localisation).
+- `listWordlists()` for UI surfaces that need to render available options.
+
+## Usage: Basic Example
+
+```ts
+import {
+ getWordlist,
+ listWordlists,
+ registerWordlist,
+} from "@suaveplan/password-generator/wordlists/registry";
+
+const dnd = [/* ... 300 fantasy nouns ... */];
+registerWordlist("dnd-spells", dnd);
+console.log(listWordlists()); // ["eff-long", "eff-short", "dnd-spells"]
+```
+
+## Usage: Advanced Example
+
+```ts
+import { generatePassphrase } from "@suaveplan/password-generator";
+import { registerWordlist } from "@suaveplan/password-generator/wordlists/registry";
+
+// Localise the long list to Italian (must still be ≥ 256 entries; EFF
+// publishes localised lists at https://www.eff.org/dice).
+const italianLong = await loadItalianEffLong();
+registerWordlist("eff-long-it", italianLong);
+const pp = generatePassphrase({ wordlist: "eff-long-it", length: 6 });
+```
+
+## API Reference
+
+### `registerWordlist(name: string, words: readonly string[]): void`
+
+Throws `PwgenError(PWGEN.WORDLIST_TOO_SHORT)` when `words.length < 256` (the `MIN_WORDLIST_SIZE` constant).
+
+### `getWordlist(name: string): readonly string[]`
+
+Throws `PwgenError(PWGEN.WORDLIST_NOT_REGISTERED)` for unknown names.
+
+### `listWordlists(): string[]`
+
+Returns every registered name, in insertion order.
+
+### `MIN_WORDLIST_SIZE: 256`
+
+Exported so callers can show "needs at least 256 entries" in upload UIs.
+
+## Implementation Notes
+
+The registry is a single module-level `Map<string, readonly string[]>` keyed by name. There is intentionally no per-realm or per-call-site isolation — registration is global because the use case (localising the bundled lists, adding a themed list) is fundamentally a deployment-time decision, not per-request state. Callers that need stricter isolation should pass an inline `string[]` to `generatePassphrase` instead, which bypasses the registry entirely.
+
+The 256-entry floor (`log2(256) = 8` bits/word) is set so that 10-word passphrases against the smallest acceptable list still reach 80 bits, which is above NIST SP 800-63B's symmetric-key-equivalent floor for moderate-strength contexts. EFF's Short Wordlist 1 (1296 entries) comfortably exceeds this — the floor is enforced primarily to protect against caller-supplied "wordlists" that are actually tiny themed lists too short to provide meaningful entropy.

packages/security-stack/security/password-generator/src/wordlists/registry.test.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,43 @@
+import { describe, expect, it } from "@suaveplan/testing/runner";
+import {
+    getWordlist,
+    listWordlists,
+    MIN_WORDLIST_SIZE,
+    registerWordlist,
+} from "./registry.js";
+
+describe("wordlist registry", () => {
+    it("pre-populates eff-long and eff-short", { timeout: 5000 }, () => {
+        const names = listWordlists();
+        expect(names.includes("eff-long")).toBe(true);
+        expect(names.includes("eff-short")).toBe(true);
+    });
+
+    it("registers a wordlist and retrieves it", { timeout: 5000 }, () => {
+        const words = Array.from({ length: 256 }, (_, i) => `w${i}`);
+        registerWordlist("dnd-spells", words);
+        expect(getWordlist("dnd-spells")).toEqual(words);
+    });
+
+    it("rejects wordlist below 256 entries", { timeout: 5000 }, () => {
+        expect(() => registerWordlist("tiny", ["one", "two"])).toThrow(
+            /PWGEN\.WORDLIST_TOO_SHORT/
+        );
+    });
+
+    it("throws PWGEN.WORDLIST_NOT_REGISTERED for unknown names", {
+        timeout: 5000,
+    }, () => {
+        expect(() => getWordlist("never-registered")).toThrow(
+            /PWGEN\.WORDLIST_NOT_REGISTERED/
+        );
+    });
+
+    it("MIN_WORDLIST_SIZE is 256", { timeout: 5000 }, () => {
+        expect(MIN_WORDLIST_SIZE).toBe(256);
+    });
+
+    it("listWordlists returns an array", { timeout: 5000 }, () => {
+        expect(Array.isArray(listWordlists())).toBe(true);
+    });
+});

packages/security-stack/security/password-generator/src/wordlists/registry.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,55 @@
+import { pwgenError } from "../errors/codes.js";
+import { EFF_LONG_WORDLIST } from "./eff-long.js";
+import { EFF_SHORT_WORDLIST } from "./eff-short.js";
+
+/**
+ * Floor below which a registered wordlist is rejected. 256 entries
+ * (8 bits per word) is the minimum that makes a 16-word passphrase
+ * cross the 128-bit symmetric-key floor.
+ */
+export const MIN_WORDLIST_SIZE = 256;
+
+const registry = new Map<string, readonly string[]>([
+    ["eff-long", EFF_LONG_WORDLIST],
+    ["eff-short", EFF_SHORT_WORDLIST],
+]);
+
+/**
+ * Register a caller-supplied wordlist under `name`. Subsequent calls
+ * with the same name overwrite. Re-registering `"eff-long"` or
+ * `"eff-short"` is permitted — callers occasionally want to override
+ * the bundled lists with a localised variant.
+ *
+ * @throws PwgenError(PWGEN.WORDLIST_TOO_SHORT) if `words.length <
+ *   MIN_WORDLIST_SIZE` (256).
+ */
+export function registerWordlist(name: string, words: readonly string[]): void {
+    if (words.length < MIN_WORDLIST_SIZE) {
+        throw pwgenError(
+            "PWGEN.WORDLIST_TOO_SHORT",
+            `wordlist "${name}" has ${words.length} entries; minimum is ${MIN_WORDLIST_SIZE}`
+        );
+    }
+    registry.set(name, words);
+}
+
+/**
+ * Return the registered wordlist for `name`.
+ *
+ * @throws PwgenError(PWGEN.WORDLIST_NOT_REGISTERED) for unknown names.
+ */
+export function getWordlist(name: string): readonly string[] {
+    const list = registry.get(name);
+    if (!list) {
+        throw pwgenError(
+            "PWGEN.WORDLIST_NOT_REGISTERED",
+            `no wordlist registered under name "${name}"`
+        );
+    }
+    return list;
+}
+
+/** Return every registered wordlist name. */
+export function listWordlists(): string[] {
+    return [...registry.keys()];
+}