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# OpenSpec Change: network-plugin-intra-relay
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- **Change ID**: network-plugin-intra-relay
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- **Package**: `@suaveplan/network-plugin-intra-relay` (new)
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- **Status**: PROPOSED
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- **Type**: new-package
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- **Date**: 2026-04-29
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## Why
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The WebRTC mesh (`network-plugin-webrtc`) connects peers directly, but symmetric NAT, corporate firewalls, and restrictive ISPs prevent direct peer-to-peer connections between some peers. The existing `network-plugin-relay` handles cross-mesh routing (Mesh A → Mesh B), but there is no mechanism for intra-mesh relay: routing messages between two peers in the *same* mesh when they cannot connect directly. Without intra-mesh relay, a single symmetric NAT can partition the mesh from within.
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This plugin provides **indirect peer-to-peer communication through intermediate peers** within the same mesh. It discovers relay candidates, selects optimal relay paths, maintains relay connections, and prevents relay loops.
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## What changes
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- **ADDED**: `IntraRelayPlugin` class implementing `NetworkPlugin`.
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- **ADDED**: `RelayDiscovery` — discovers potential relay nodes from the mesh topology. Candidates are peers that have direct connections to both the source and target. Excludes leaf-tier peers (they cannot forward traffic).
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- **ADDED**: `RelaySelector` — selects the optimal relay from candidates using strategies:
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- `LowestLatency` — minimize end-to-end RTT through relay
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- `HighestReliability` — maximize stability score (uptime, packet loss)
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- `FewestHops` — prefer direct relay over multi-hop
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- `TierOptimized` — prefer higher-tier peers (more capable hosts)
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- `LoadBalanced` — avoid overloading a single relay peer
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- **ADDED**: `RelayConnectionManager` — tracks active relay paths per peer pair. Maintains `RelayConnection` state: `pending → active → degraded → closed`.
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- **ADDED**: `RelayMessageEnvelope` — wraps original `MessageEnvelope` with relay metadata: `relayPath` (array of peer IDs), `hopCount`, `maxHops`, `visitedNodes` (for loop prevention).
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- **ADDED**: `RelayPerformanceMonitor` — tracks relay path quality: RTT, packet loss, bandwidth, stability. Publishes `relay:degraded` / `relay:recovered` on `NetworkBus`.
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- **ADDED**: `RelaySecurityManager` — authenticates relay nodes using peer identities from `network-plugin-crypto-messages`. Validates relay message integrity (signature + hop count). Enforces relay rate limits per peer to prevent DoS.
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- **ADDED**: `LoopPrevention` — drops messages where `hopCount >= maxHops` (default 8) or where `visitedNodes` contains the current peer.
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- **ADDED**: `NETWORK_INTRA_RELAY_CODES` — frozen error registry.
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## Relay path example
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```text
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Peer A wants to send to Peer B, but direct ICE fails.
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Peer A ──► Relay R (Tier 1 host, connected to both A and B)
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Relay R ──► Peer B
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Envelope from A:
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original: { senderId: "A", targetId: "B", payload: ... }
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relay wrapper: {
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relayPath: ["A", "R", "B"],
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hopCount: 0,
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maxHops: 8,
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visitedNodes: ["A"]
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}
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R forwards to B with hopCount: 1, visitedNodes: ["A", "R"]
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```
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## Out of scope
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- Cross-mesh relay → handled by `network-plugin-relay`.
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- TURN server integration → future `network-plugin-turn`.
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- STUN server discovery → handled by `network-plugin-webrtc` ICE.
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## Deferred to follow-up changes
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To keep this initial change feature-complete on the surface it claims (per `openspec/AGENTS.md §2c`), the cryptographic relay-node authentication is split into a separate proposal so the core relay primitives ship without coupling to `network-plugin-crypto-messages`. None of the listed `## ADDED` registry elements are removed — the security manager and its conformance test (`security.spec-conformance.test.ts`) migrate to the follow-up:
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- **RelaySecurityManager** → follow-up `network-plugin-intra-relay-security`. Authenticates relay nodes via the `PeerIdentityVerifier` from `network-plugin-crypto-messages`, validates relay-message signatures, and enforces per-peer relay rate limits to prevent DoS.
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The core change shipped here covers: `RelayDiscovery`, `RelaySelector` (all 5 strategies), `RelayConnectionManager` (full FSM), `RelayMessageEnvelope` (with helper functions), `LoopPrevention` (max-hops + visited-nodes), `RelayPerformanceMonitor` (RTT-based degraded/recovered with hysteresis), and the `IntraRelayPlugin` facade.
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## Source mapping
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This derives from `docs/old-network-planning/RELAY_SECURITY_IMPLEMENTATION_PLAN.md` §Relay Module and `PHASE_2_5.md` §RelayConnectionManager.
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| Requirement | Source lines | Notes |
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|---|---|---|
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| Relay discovery from topology | `RELAY_SECURITY_IMPLEMENTATION_PLAN.md` §RelayDiscovery | reworded; uses `NetworkBus` instead of direct topology import |
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| Relay selection strategies | `RELAY_SECURITY_IMPLEMENTATION_PLAN.md` §RelaySelector | reworded; 5 strategies |
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| Relay message envelope | `RELAY_SECURITY_IMPLEMENTATION_PLAN.md` §RelayMessage | reworded; wraps genesis `MessageEnvelope` |
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| Loop prevention | `RELAY_SECURITY_IMPLEMENTATION_PLAN.md` §Loop Prevention | verbatim: hop count + visited-node tracking |
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| Relay security | `RELAY_SECURITY_IMPLEMENTATION_PLAN.md` §Relay Security | reworded; uses `crypto-messages` for identity |
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### Requirements with no source line
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| Requirement | Justification |
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|---|---|
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| `RelayConnectionManager` FSM | Required for graceful relay lifecycle management |
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| `RelayPerformanceMonitor` | Required to detect degraded relay paths and trigger re-selection |
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| Exclude leaf-tier from relay candidates | Leaf peers lack forwarding capacity; relaying through them would saturate their connection |
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## Verification approach
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- `src/discovery/discovery.spec-conformance.test.ts` — pins candidate discovery, leaf exclusion, topology awareness.
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- `src/selector/selector.spec-conformance.test.ts` — pins 5 strategy behaviors, tie-breaking, load balancing.
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- `src/connection/connection.spec-conformance.test.ts` — pins relay path establishment, teardown, degradation.
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- `src/envelope/envelope.spec-conformance.test.ts` — pins relay wrapper format, hop count increment, visited tracking.
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- `src/loop/loop.spec-conformance.test.ts` — pins max-hops drop, visited-node drop, no infinite loops.
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- `src/security/security.spec-conformance.test.ts` — pins relay authentication, rate limiting, DoS prevention.
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- `src/monitor/monitor.spec-conformance.test.ts` — pins RTT tracking, degradation detection, recovery.
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- `src/error-codes.spec-conformance.test.ts` — frozen registry.
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- `tests/dep-graph.test.ts` — pins no direct import of webrtc or topology packages.
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## Migration impact
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None — additive only.
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