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# `@suaveplan/api-secrets-worker-proxy` — worker-side proxy to main-process secrets adapter
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**Package**: `@suaveplan/api-secrets-worker-proxy`
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**Status**: PROPOSED
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**Type**: new-package
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**Stage**: 3 (Worker isolation infrastructure)
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## Why
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Per design doc §5.2a, every capability ships a proxy surface. Secrets are unusually sensitive: a worker reading a value it didn't manifest is a security incident. So the main-side adapter does the allow-check before the value crosses the wire (design doc §5.2b sandboxed gating), and this proxy is the worker-side transport. The proxy MUST NEVER cache a secret value in the worker heap beyond the immediate caller's scope — that's the proxy's job to enforce by not exposing any internal storage.
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## What changes
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Net-new package.
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**ADDED exports:**
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- `./client` — `createSecretsProxyClient(port): WorkerProxyOf<SecretsLike>`. Worker-side `ctx.secrets.get(name)` → main-side allow-check + read → marshalled value.
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- `./error-codes` — `SECRETS_PROXY_*` codes (`SECRETS_PROXY_NOT_MANIFESTED`, `SECRETS_PROXY_NOT_FOUND`, `SECRETS_PROXY_PORT_CLOSED`).
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- `./testing` — paired `MessageChannel` + stub main-side server.
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## Out of scope
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- **Manifest allowlist enforcement** — main-side per §5.2b.
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- **Concrete secrets source** — `api-secrets-env` / `api-secrets-bun` / `api-secrets-vault` are Stages 4 / 8.
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- **Secret rotation hooks** — not in foundation scope.
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## Source mapping
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Genesis-original. Design doc sections: §5.2a, §5.2b.
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| Requirement | Design doc section |
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|---|---|
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| Proxy over abstract `SecretsLike` | §5.2 |
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| Non-manifested key rejected main-side | §5.2b |
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| No worker-side caching of values | §5.2a (cloneable boundary) |
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## Verification approach
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- `src/client/client.test.ts` — manifested key returns value; non-manifested throws `SECRETS_PROXY_NOT_MANIFESTED`.
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- `src/client/no-cache.test.ts` — calling `get(name)` twice issues two main-side calls (no worker-side caching).
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- `tests/conformance/run-secrets-conformance.test.ts` — `runSecretsConformance` from `@suaveplan/api-secrets/testing` passes. **Required before Stage 4 can complete.**
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## Migration impact
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None — additive only.
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<!-- markdownlint-disable MD024 -->
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# Capability Spec Delta: api-secrets-worker-proxy (api-secrets-worker-proxy)
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**Package**: `@suaveplan/api-secrets-worker-proxy`
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**Status**: PROPOSED
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> Every requirement below carries a `**Verified by:**` line at authoring time.
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## ADDED Requirements
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### Requirement: Proxy preserves SecretsLike surface and forwards every call to main
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The package SHALL expose `createSecretsProxyClient(port)` returning a `WorkerProxyOf<SecretsLike>`. Every method call SHALL be marshalled to the main process — there MUST be no worker-side cache of secret values, neither in module state nor in client-instance state. Two sequential `get("X")` calls MUST produce TWO main-side RPC invocations (so a rotated secret is picked up immediately AND a compromised worker cannot exfiltrate cached values).
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#### Scenario: two gets produce two RPC calls
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- **WHEN** worker code calls `ctx.secrets.get("X")` twice in succession
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- **THEN** the stub main-side server records two distinct receive events
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**Verified by:** `src/client/no-cache.test.ts::"two gets produce two main-side RPC calls"`
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---
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### Requirement: Non-manifested key throws reconstructed SECRETS_PROXY_NOT_MANIFESTED
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The package SHALL surface main-side rejection of non-manifested keys as `SECRETS_PROXY_NOT_MANIFESTED` reconstructed via `api-worker-rpc`'s error-reconstruction. Manifested keys whose value is absent in the configured source MUST surface as `SECRETS_PROXY_NOT_FOUND` — the two cases are distinct so the operator can tell "your plugin didn't declare this" from "your plugin declared it but the source is missing it."
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#### Scenario: non-manifested key is rejected
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- **WHEN** worker code calls `ctx.secrets.get("NOT_DECLARED")`
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- **THEN** the call rejects with `SuaveplanError` of code `SECRETS_PROXY_NOT_MANIFESTED`
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#### Scenario: manifested-but-absent key surfaces SECRETS_PROXY_NOT_FOUND
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- **WHEN** the manifest declares `STRIPE_KEY` but the source has no value AND worker calls `ctx.secrets.get("STRIPE_KEY")`
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- **THEN** the call rejects with `SECRETS_PROXY_NOT_FOUND`
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**Verified by:** `src/client/client.test.ts::"non-manifested key rejects"` AND `src/client/not-found.test.ts::"manifested-but-absent key surfaces NOT_FOUND"`
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---
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### Requirement: Conformance suite passes against this proxy
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The package SHALL be runnable as the surface argument to `runSecretsConformance` from `@suaveplan/api-secrets/testing`. Every scenario MUST pass identically to a direct in-process adapter. This is the Stage-4-precondition gate.
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#### Scenario: runSecretsConformance passes
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- **WHEN** `runSecretsConformance("worker-proxy", makeFactory)` runs
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- **THEN** every scenario passes
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**Verified by:** `tests/conformance/run-secrets-conformance.test.ts::"runSecretsConformance passes against proxy"`
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# Tasks — `@suaveplan/api-secrets-worker-proxy`
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> Every checkbox MUST reflect work actually done in this change.
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## 0. Pre-flight (non-negotiable)
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- [ ] 0.1 Confirm clean working tree (`git status` reports nothing) and no in-flight worktrees with uncommitted work (`git worktree list` then `git status` in each)
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- [ ] 0.2 If any worktrees exist under `.claude/worktrees/`, account for each one: still-active agent, work-pending-merge, or stale-and-prune. Stale worktrees MUST be removed (`git worktree remove`) before opening a new one — code that has been lost twice on main is the failure mode this guards against.
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- [ ] 0.3 Confirm the package set in `MANIFEST.md` matches `find packages -maxdepth 3 -name package.json` count. Drift here means a prior change archived without regenerating the manifest.
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## 1. Spec authoring
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- [x] 1.1 Read design doc §5.2, §5.2a, §5.2b
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- [x] 1.2 Read umbrella
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- [x] 1.3 Read `openspec/AGENTS.md` Sections 13 and 14
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- [x] 1.4 Draft `proposal.md`
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- [x] 1.5 Draft `specs/api-secrets-worker-proxy/spec.md`
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- [ ] 1.6 Every requirement carries `**Verified by:**`
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## 2. Implementation
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- [ ] 2.1 Scaffold `packages/api/api-secrets-worker-proxy/` (`0.1.0`, deps: `@suaveplan/api-worker-rpc`, `@suaveplan/api-types`, `@suaveplan/error`, `zod`; peer-dep on `@suaveplan/api-secrets`)
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- [ ] 2.2 `src/client/` — typed proxy client; explicit no-cache invariant
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- [ ] 2.3 `src/error-codes.ts` — `SECRETS_PROXY_*` codes
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- [ ] 2.4 `src/testing/` — paired `MessageChannel` + stub server
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- [ ] 2.5 `src/index.ts` — namespace re-exports
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## 3. Tests
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- [ ] 3.1 `src/client/client.test.ts` — manifested key returns value; non-manifested throws `SECRETS_PROXY_NOT_MANIFESTED`
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- [ ] 3.2 `src/client/no-cache.test.ts` — two `get(name)` calls produce two main-side RPC calls (no caching)
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- [ ] 3.3 `src/client/not-found.test.ts` — manifested but absent key throws `SECRETS_PROXY_NOT_FOUND`
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- [ ] 3.4 `tests/conformance/run-secrets-conformance.test.ts` — `runSecretsConformance` passes
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- [ ] 3.5 Every `it(...)` carries `{ timeout: 5000 }`
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## 4. Documentation
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- [ ] 4.1 Sibling `.md` per `.ts` (≥200 words)
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- [ ] 4.2 README links every co-located `.md`; explicit no-cache invariant called out
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- [ ] 4.3 Update CLAUDE.md
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## 5. Pre-archive verification (the 5-gate triple)
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- [ ] 5.1 `bun run check` — Biome 0/0/0
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- [ ] 5.2 `bunx turbo lint typecheck test --filter=@suaveplan/api-secrets-worker-proxy` — green
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- [ ] 5.3 `bunx turbo test:coverage --filter=@suaveplan/api-secrets-worker-proxy` — 100/100/100/100
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- [ ] 5.4 `bun scripts/openspec-conformance.ts @suaveplan/api-secrets-worker-proxy` — exit 0
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- [ ] 5.5 `bunx turbo build --filter=@suaveplan/api-secrets-worker-proxy` — green
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- [ ] 5.6 **Stage-4 conformance gate**: `runSecretsConformance` (from `@suaveplan/api-secrets/testing`) MUST pass under both direct AND worker-proxy surface before Stage 4 can complete
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## 6. Pre-archive 7-row checklist
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- [ ] 6.1 Generics — `SecretsLike` shape preserved
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- [ ] 6.2 Zod at wire boundary
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- [ ] 6.3 Every `SECRETS_PROXY_*` code thrown
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- [ ] 6.4 Strict-mode behaviors — no-cache invariant tested explicitly
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- [ ] 6.5 OTel — N/A here; main-side adapter emits secret-access counters
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- [ ] 6.6 Lifecycle dedup — N/A
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- [ ] 6.7 No retroactive tick
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## 7. Archive
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- [ ] 7.1 Fold spec delta into `openspec/specs/api-secrets-worker-proxy/spec.md`
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- [ ] 7.2 Move to `openspec/archive/<yyyy-mm-dd>-api-secrets-worker-proxy/`
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- [ ] 7.3 Tick Stage-3 row in umbrella
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- [ ] 7.4 Refresh `MANIFEST.md`
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