# `groups-4096` _(no submodules)_ ## Purpose RFC 5054 Appendix A 4096-bit safe-prime group with generator `g = 5`. Reachable via `@suaveplan/srp/groups/4096`. Suitable for deployments that want headroom above the contemporary 2048-bit default at the cost of roughly 8x the `modPow` wall-clock time. Recommended when verifier-database lifetime is measured in decades or when the threat model includes well-resourced precomputed-discrete-log attacks against bundled groups. ## Features - `N_4096` byte-exact to RFC 5054 Appendix A "4096-bit Group". - `g_4096 = Uint8Array([5])`. - `BIT_LENGTH` literal `4096`. - Subpath-only. ## Usage: Basic Example ```ts import { N_4096, g_4096, BIT_LENGTH } from "@suaveplan/srp/groups/4096"; console.log(N_4096.byteLength); // 512 console.log(BIT_LENGTH); // 4096 ``` ## Usage: Advanced Example ```ts import { N_4096, g_4096 } from "@suaveplan/srp/groups/4096"; import { defaultHashBridge } from "@suaveplan/srp/hash"; import type { SrpParams } from "@suaveplan/srp/params"; const params: SrpParams = { N: N_4096, g: g_4096, bitLength: 4096, hash: defaultHashBridge("SHA256"), algorithm: "SHA256", }; ``` ## API Reference | Export | Type | Description | | ------------ | ------------ | -------------------------- | | `N_4096` | `Uint8Array` | 512-byte 4096-bit modulus. | | `g_4096` | `Uint8Array` | Generator `0x05`. | | `BIT_LENGTH` | `4096` | Literal bit length. | ## Implementation Notes A 4096-bit `modPow` takes roughly 8x the time of a 2048-bit `modPow`. On a contemporary laptop this is ~40–160 ms per handshake step. Interactive login flows that target sub-200 ms perceptual budgets SHOULD pre-warm `modPow` (run a no-op call during page load) or schedule the handshake outside the critical path. The byte-exact correctness gate lives in the spec-conformance suite. The constant is reviewed against RFC 5054 Appendix A's literal at every package release. The generator `g = 5` is unique to the larger RFC 5054 groups (3072, 4096, 6144); the smaller groups (1024, 1536, 2048) all use `g = 2`. The chosen generator depends on the modulus's quadratic-residue structure — RFC 5054 picked it once at design time so `g` generates a large prime-order subgroup of `Z_N*`. Consumers building `SrpParams` from raw constants MUST use `g_4096` rather than hard-coding `0x02`; using the wrong generator weakens the discrete-log hardness guarantee that backs SRP-6a's zero-knowledge property.